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Reading and Repair: Fictions of “Mau Mau”
Elliot Ross
This dissertation argues that works of literature offer a valuable critical supplement to historical 
and legal accounts of colonial violence, due to the common investment of literary texts in 
thematizing moral complexity and complicity, and by drawing attention to intimate and social 
forms of harm that might otherwise go unaccounted for. Following the recent successful lawsuit 
against the British government by elderly Kenyans who survived torture in the 1950s, as well as 
recent historical scholarship on the colonial government's brutal counterinsurgency, I argue that 
the paradigmatic anticolonial event commonly referred to as the “Mau Mau” uprising has been 
reframed in terms of a series of grave human rights abuses. I examine the diverse ways in which 
the Mau Mau struggle has been figured in narrative fiction, focusing on works by Ng!g" wa 
Thiong'o, Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor, Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye, and the white supremacist 
Robert Ruark. The dissertation shows literary texts to be sites of distinct forms of knowledge 
concerning the harms of political violence. My readings demonstrate that fictions of Mau Mau 
have figured that crisis as both a crime that demands urgent redress and an event whose damage 
is permanent and irreparable, each text staging in distinct ways the structuring paradox of 
historical reparation as an impossible ethical demand that must nonetheless be insisted upon. I 
think of reparations claims as radical decolonizing demands, countering recent critiques of the 
“politics of reparations” as a liberal departure from properly emancipationist thinking.
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Introduction: Reading and Repair
I. Ndiki Mutua and Others vs. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2009)
On 24 June 2009, five elderly Kenyans stood at the door of 10 Downing Street, the official 
residence of the British Prime Minister, and submitted a letter to Gordon Brown. It begins with 
an epigraphic Gikuyu proverb: “Muingatwo na kihoto dacokaga; muingatwo na njuguma 
niacokaga.” An English translation is provided: “He who is defeated with unjust force will 
always come back, he who is dealt with justly will never come back.” Born as colonial subjects, 
after more than half a century they had come “back” to the seat of imperial power as Kenyan 
citizens to demand the old colonizer take responsibility for some of the worst crimes carried out 
during the last years of British rule in Kenya. The main body of the letter begins as follows:
We are Kenyans in our 70s and 80s who have travelled to London from our rural villages 
to tell the world of the torture and trauma we lived through at the hands of the British 
regime. With the support of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, we have come to 
London to issue our legal claims. This is the first time that we have left Kenya and so, for 
us, this is a defining moment in our lives. (Letter to Gordon Brown)
The press photographs from the day are resonant images. One shows a middle-aged white 
policeman opening the door of 10 Downing Street and peering at the unlikely group with a 
mixture of suspicion and surprise. In another, the five stand side by side, facing the cameras. 
Gitu Wa Kahengeri, secretary general of the Mau Mau War Veterans Association, holds up a 
large brown envelope, upon which is written in black marker pen: “To the Prime Minister.”  Each 
of the three male claimants leans upon a walking stick. Paulo Nzili and Ndiki Mutua, who both 
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suffered castration by a British colonial official while in detention, have removed their caps. 
Wambugu Wa Nyingi, who survived the infamous Hola massacre of 1959, wears a suit. His 
shoulders are back and his head is high. Jane Muthoni Mara wears a colourful headscarf, a grey 
cardigan, and comfortable looking sneakers. In the 1950s she was detained for three years as a 
child of 15 and suffered extreme sexual torture. A fifth signatory, Susan Ciongombe Ngondi, 
endured a similar ordeal to Muthoni, but died before she could deliver the letter to Downing 
Street with her fellow claimants. Gitu would later describe the Downing Street visit to a British 
newspaper, and recalled: “As we left we started singing freedom songs because we had come so 
far” (Independent).
 The British Government resisted all attempts to come to an early settlement without 
going to court, and eventually agreed to settle the case, Ndiki Mutua and others vs. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (2009), only after its objections regarding limitation and liability had 
been dismissed at two separate court hearings and the case was set to go to a full trial. On June 6 
2013, the British foreign secretary William Hague admitted in parliament that the claimants (by 
now numbering 5,228) had been victims of torture and other forms of brutal treatment for which 
the British colonial authorities were responsible. He described the settlement as “full and final”: 
We understand the pain and the grief felt by those who were involved in the events of 
emergency in Kenya. The British government recognises that Kenyans were subjected to 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration. The 
British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place and that they marred 
Kenya's progress to independence. Torture and ill-treatment are abhorrent violations of 
human dignity which we unreservedly condemn. (Hague)
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Compensation of £19.9 million was paid to Leigh Day’s clients -- with each receiving 
approximately £3,800 -- as well as their legal costs, and the British Government undertook to 
finance a memorial in Nairobi to the victims of torture under colonial rule during the 1950s. 
Sculptor Kevin Oduor, whose statue of Land and Freedom Army field marshal Dedan Kimathi 
had been unveiled by Mwai Kibaki in central Nairobi in 2007, was awarded the commission. In 
September 2015 a bronze statue was unveiled in Uhuru Park, Nairobi. It depicts a male guerrilla 
fighter with a rifle receiving a basket of food from a young woman. The faces of the two figures 
are averted from one another, as was customary during the ‘forest war,’ so that in the event one 
of them is captured and interrogated by British forces they would be unable to identify the other. 
A large sign reads: “Memorial to the victims of torture and ill-treatment during the colonial era 
(1952-1960).”
This settlement marked the first time that any victim of British colonial atrocities had 
been paid historical reparations. The British Government’s acknowledgment during the second 
court hearing that the colonial regime in Kenya was responsible for torture was the first such 
official admission vis-a-vis British colonial crimes of which I am aware, and the Uhuru Park 
memorial is the only one of its kind anywhere in Britain’s former dominions. However, the legal 
proceedings also secured another, unexpected, form of redress, with major repercussions for the 
historiography of Empire and decolonization. In addition to the particular terms of the 
settlement, the case prompted a major disclosure of hitherto secret colonial government records 
pertaining to Kenya -- 300 boxes containing 1,500 files -- as well as tens of thousands of files 
from 36 different British colonies such as Malaya, Cyprus and Aden (Elkins, 2015, 857; 
Anderson, 2015, 157). Leigh Day had been advised initially by the historian Caroline Elkins, 
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who later served as an expert witness alongside David Anderson and Huw Bennett (each has 
distinct areas of expertise on the “Emergency” period in Kenya). Revisionist scholarship by both 
Elkins and Anderson had clearly identified vast gaps in the colonial archive available in Nairobi 
and London, including records pertaining to the well-known destruction of documents 
undertaken by colonial officials in the early 1960s. When Anderson made direct reference to 
missing evidence in a witness statement submitted in 2010, the Government was legally 
obligated to produce the files or else account for their destruction -- the official position 
sustained up until then that the enormous cache of files had simply been misplaced was no longer 
sufficient. It is worth noting that serious efforts had been made following independence to have 
these documents returned to Kenya. Anderson has himself described how archivists in London 
lied in response to a formal letter from Jomo Kenyatta’s government in 1967 requesting the 
return of “stolen papers,” insisting no such papers existed, and how a 1974 delegation to London 
from the Kenya National Archive was “systematically and deliberately misled” (Anderson, 149). 
In 2011, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced they had discovered the missing files 
at Hanslope Park, a large facility the ministry shares with the U.K.’s secret intelligence agencies, 
MI5 and MI6. This announcement made front page news in the U.K. at the time. These files have 
been gradually catalogued, reviewed, redacted, and made public at the U.K. National Archive in 
series “FCO 141,” the so-called “migrated archives,” though it is expected at some point the 
Kenyan Government will request their repatriation. 170 other boxes that ought to be in the same 
series, 13 of which pertain to Kenya, are still missing and it is not thought likely that these will 
ever surface (Elkins, 2015, 857).
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This dissertation emerged from, and speaks to, this unprecedented moment of public 
reckoning with the violence of British colonial rule in Kenya. The impetus for my research began 
with a sense of puzzlement about how to think about the meaning of the reparations secured by 
the 5,228 claimants, with a question about what kinds of critical reflection on the settlement 
might prove most generative. The dissertation investigates the ways in which works of literature 
can offer a critical supplement to historical and testimonial accounts of colonial violence, due to 
the common investment of literary texts in thematizing moral complexity and complicity, and by 
drawing attention to intimate and social forms of harm that might otherwise go unaccounted for. 
I argue that the paradigmatic anticolonial event commonly referred to as the “Mau Mau” uprising 
has been reframed in terms of a series of grave human rights abuses, and I think through this 
shift by attending to different narratives -- both testimonial and literary -- of that event. My 
readings show that fictions of “Mau Mau” have figured that crisis as both a crime that demands 
urgent redress and an event whose damage is permanent and irreparable, each text staging in 
distinct ways the structuring paradox of historical reparation as an impossible moral demand that 
must nonetheless be insisted upon. In this Introduction I begin with an account of the 
contemporary theoretical critique of historical reparations claims. I then explain why “Mau Mau” 
makes such a compelling case study for thinking through fundamental questions in relation to the 
concept of “repair.” I outline the dissertation’s archives, sources and methodological approach, 
and frame the project’s distinctive contribution. 
II. What are the politics of reparations?
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The sound of the elderly claimants singing their freedom songs on Downing Street would have 
struck many of those who have lately theorized the politics of historical reparations claims as a 
profoundly incongruous moment: the celebration of revolutionary hopes at what might appear to 
such theorists as an occasion that exemplified the pursuit of a greatly diminished set of political 
aspirations. A notable feature of late twentieth and early twenty-first century public life has been 
the turn towards reparations claims as a response to historical injustices, what Wole Soyinka 
describes in terms of a “fin de millenaire fever of atonement” (Soyinka, 90). The question of the 
social and historical underpinnings of this development has been the subject of scholarly debate. 
The most concrete institutional indication of the proliferation of reparations claims as a way of 
engaging the past is the United Nations’ “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law” (2005), drafted in the 1980s and 1990s by legal scholars, and considered in 
terms of an extrapolation of tort law into international affairs (Torpey, 45; Olick and Coughlin, 
47). However, accounts of the broader context vary. In his book, Making Whole What Has Been 
Smashed (2006), John Torpey argues that “a remarkable efflorescence in the use of law to 
address injustices perpetrated by states, churches and private firms” has come about due to the 
rise of what he terms “reparations politics,” conceived of as “a field of interrelated activities” 
that “may involve trials of perpetrators, purges, truth commissions, rehabilitations of those 
wrongly convicted of crimes, monetary compensation, social policies designed to rectify 
inequalities rooted in unjust past social arrangements, memorials, changes in school history, and 
more” (Torpey, 49). Torpey argues that the character of the law -- most especially international 
law -- has been altered in recent years, such that individuals are now “legitimate actors” as much 
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as states. He claims that this is in part a response to the Nazi regime, which waged war not only 
against other states but also against non-state groups such as Jews, homosexuals and the Roma, 
and “the diffusion of Holocaust consciousness” which ensued (Torpey, 42, 46). Making Whole 
What Has Been Smashed examines in some detail the discourse surrounding reparations claims 
by Japanese-Americans and Japanese Canadians, African-Americans, Namibia and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, and concludes that: “The spread of reparations [...] 
parallels the rise of human rights thinking, the emergence of substate groups and individuals as 
subjects of international law, and the juridification of politics in general” (Torpey, 159). 
However, Torpey resists a more precise description of the relation between “reparations politics” 
and these broader, contemporaneous developments they are said to “parallel” (elsewhere he 
writes that they “complement” each other) (Torpey, 48). He places these formations within an 
underlying context in which the fundamental conditions for politics have been transformed, and 
offers the relation between the discourse of human rights and the rise of reparations as a central 
question. In a similar vein, Jeffrey Olick and Brenda Coughlin read reparations as an important 
symptom of what they term a broader “politics of regret,” tied to the discourse of universal 
human rights through the shared belief that “only gestures of reparation, apology and 
acknowledgment can restore the dignity of history’s victims and deter new outbreaks of 
inhumanity” (Olick and Coughlin, 37).
 An important mode of response to the turn towards historical reparations has been a 
melancholic one, marking the loss or weakening of older “structures of memory and 
critique” (Soyinka, 39)1 which are said to have operated in a more oppositional way and are thus 
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1  I borrow this phrase from Soyinka as it conveys his sense of reparations as a mode of engaging the 
past whose significance extends well beyond the details of any particular claim.
regarded nostalgically as politics proper. Thus, for Wendy Brown, the pursuit of legal redress for 
suffering and loss caused by oppression is a characteristic of the desire for bringing “closure” to 
social injury by reparation or apology, which have in her view emerged as “our most ubiquitous 
form of historical political thinking today” (Brown 2001, 171). The trouble with this, in Brown’s 
general account, is that the very practice of demanding such reparations “casts the law in 
particular and the state more generally as neutral arbiters of injury rather than as themselves 
invested with the power to injure,” and as such these kinds of demands require to be considered 
in terms of a Nietzschean “politics of ressentiment” and not as a “politics of freedom.” “When 
social “hurt” is conveyed to the law for resolution,” she writes, “political ground is ceded to 
moral and juridical ground” (Brown 1995, 27). Along similar lines, John Torpey begins his book 
by describing a space vacated by “big ideas politics,” as grand political visions for the future 
dwindled with the end of the Cold War, leaving only market ideologies (Torpey, 23). By the end 
of his study, Torpey argues that recent shifts in political thinking, most especially the turn 
towards the courtroom as the venue for compensating historical injuries, should be analyzed in 
terms of the characteristic processes of neoliberalism  coming to bear on legal, moral and 
historical discourses. “The fragmentation of the body-politic,” he claims, “is the other side of the 
privatization of justice and history” (Torpey, 161). This critique forms the basis for Jean 
Comaroff and John Comaroff’s 2012 essay “History on Trial: Memory, Evidence, and the 
Forensic Production of the Past,” in which they lament: “there is a significant move afoot to 
redefine colonialism itself as a culpable crime -- thereby to reduce history to the language of 
torts, of plaintiffs and perpetrators, injuries and liabilities” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 138). Both 
Torpey and the Comaroffs rely on nostalgic descriptions of past dispensations -- the body-politic 
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once whole, a sense of history formerly expansive -- as ways of framing the present 
unfavourably. However, one would certainly struggle to make sense of the Kenyan reparations 
claim through either critique, inasmuch as there is no moment in Kenyan history in which a 
sufficiently united political community comes into view, or in which historiography and the law 
have been active mainly in service of the common good. 
 These melancholic responses are in line with recent critiques of the political significance 
of human rights as an emergent discourse, and express many of the same concerns. In his book 
The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2012), Samuel Moyn makes the case that the 
morality of human rights has come to function as a putative substitute for politics, indeed that its 
capacity to function as what he terms an “antipolitics” is precisely what accounts for its 
ascendance in the 1970s and 1980s, a period characterized by what he terms “a crisis of 
utopianism” (Moyn 2012, 9). In a more recent book, Human Rights and the Uses of History 
(2014) Moyn asks: “How has international criminal justice ascended so quickly, and so high, 
even as social justice is increasingly marginalized, undermined from within at home and eroded 
through the victory of the free market on the world stage?” (Moyn 2014, 54). Here, in common 
with Torpey and the Comaroffs, is a description of the correlation between the increased 
prominence of legal cases in the international sphere and the decline of a favoured form of 
domestic politics (in this case social democratic rather than necessarily revolutionary), with both 
developments tied to neoliberalism’s emergence as the political and ideological centre.2 
 A related part of the context for analyzing the political significance of reparations has 
been the emergence of reconciliation as the normative organizing principle for facilitating major 
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2 In his “Theses on the Philosophy of Human Rights,” Moyn claims simply: “human rights and market 
fundamentalism displaced national welfarism.”
political transitions away from overtly oppressive forms of rule and towards liberal democracy. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) of the kind instituted in South Africa and 
elsewhere offer a legal venue distinct from an ordinary criminal court. Mahmood Mamdani 
narrates the emergence of the TRC’s conditions of possibility in terms of the collapse of the post-
war “justice” paradigm (which structured demands for independence from colonial rule), and the 
ascendancy of a “rights” paradigm which in South Africa is given the name 
“reconciliation” (Mamdani, 17). Because Mamdani’s particular preoccupation in his essay, 
“From Justice to Reconciliation: Making Sense of the African Experience,” is with accounting 
for the different demands made by anticolonial movements in the 1950s and 1960s as opposed to 
those articulated in responses to the end of apartheid and to the Rwandan genocide, he attempts 
to excavate the particulars of a shift which bears a more immediate resemblance to that 
pertaining to the Kenyan case (armed struggle then, legal claim now). In the new rights/
reconciliation paradigm, Mamdani claims, the central relationship is understood as that existing 
between perpetrators and victims and not, as before, between beneficiaries and victims: 
the focus is on agency at the expense of structure and system. It is on gross abuses of 
human rights -- murder, torture, rape -- but not on gross systemic outcomes such as pass 
laws and forced removals. It is on individual violations, not on systemic group advantage 
[...] Responsibility for the old order is pinned on individual perpetrators, agents, not even 
on the old political elite. Guilt, evil, is defined in strictly individual terms (Mamdani, 23).
 
Here the language of human rights is called upon as a name for that genre of atrocity which can 
plausibly be abstracted from “structure and system” and expressed as a discrete case or cases. In 
this context, Mamdani favours the notion of what he calls “a community of survivors” as a way 
10
of foreclosing the possibility of  a permanent program for redress becoming entrenched as a 
vendetta and allowing for the reorganization of power relations and of the political community as 
a whole (Mamdani, 20). Like Brown, Torpey, Moyn and the Comaroffs, Mamdani marks the new 
dispensation in terms of what it has displaced, however he is able to specify positive possibilities 
pertaining to the new framework rather than only expressing admiration for what came before. 
The reconciliation paradigm is considered in terms of a fruitful new dispensation and not as a 
simple dead end.
 While I find many of the conceptual concerns expressed by critics of the new 
“reparations politics” to be important questions to consider, I have become skeptical, through the 
work of this dissertation, about the major contention I see shared by many of the scholars cited 
above. This is the idea that the politics of repair should be thought of in opposition to properly 
emancipatory forms of politics. In my view, such a critique relies on the construction of an 
overly narrow concept of “reparations” that is produced by a focus on legal or quasi-judicial 
examples that excludes, or fails to give sufficient attention to, other forms of reparation, other 
modes of political orientation that one might think of as reparatory, that are not circumscribed by 
judicial proceedings. Such legal cases may indeed be said to “juridify the past,” but should not be 
taken as definitive of such a capacious term as “reparations politics,” which to my mind is more 
productively thought of as a name that encompasses a range of responses to harmful historical 
events, responses that articulate different conceptions of the political just as they exemplify 
different versions of repair. The notions of reparative politics that emerge from my readings in 
the literary archive that I’ve assembled in relation to the “Mau Mau” event are not of some 
liberal or neo-liberal dead end, nor of “closure.” Through these readings, I want to think in 
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particular about the radical, decolonizing possibilities attached to different concepts and practices 
of repair. Just as Ndiki Mutua and Others led me to other kinds of narratives concerned with the 
“Mau Mau” event, so my understanding and application of the term “repair” extends well 
beyond the court-room that forms the central focus of critiques such as those by Torpey and the 
Comaroffs. Instead, I think of the legal case and the narratives on which it depended as one 
important instance of reparatory aspirations and demands being put to work in connection to the 
many different forms of harm inflicted on Kenya and Kenyans by colonial power, and as a 
starting point for reflecting on colonial atrocites rather than any sort of political or intellectual 
resolution.
 This concept of reparation as a decolonizing demand is not an original one in relation to 
mid-20th century independence movements. Indeed, it occupies a prominent position in what 
may be considered the central text of 20th century anti-colonial thought. Frantz Fanon was an 
unambiguous advocate of reparations for colonialism. His, too, were a “politics of repair.” In 
concluding his first chapter, “Concerning Violence,” in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon 
theorizes the Third World’s demand for reparations from “the capitalists” as a fundamental part 
of the itinerary he commends for decolonization. “What counts today,” he writes, “the question 
which is looming on the horizon, is the need for a redistribution of wealth. Humanity must reply 
to this question, or be shaken to pieces by it” (Fanon, 98). In order to accomplish the kind of 
massive social and economic overhaul which he envisions following the end of colonial rule, 
“capital of all kinds” needs to be set to work at a scale far beyond what “the underdeveloped 
peoples” can achieve alone, despite their “colossal effort”:
The truth is that we ought not to accept these conditions. We should flatly refuse the 
situation to which the Western countries wish to condemn us. Colonialism and 
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imperialism have not paid their score [ne sont pas quitte avec nous] when they withdraw 
their flags and their police forces from our territories. For centuries the capitalists have 
behaved in the developed world like nothing more than war criminals. Deportations, 
massacres, forced labor, and slavery have been the main methods used by capitalism to 
increase its wealth, its gold or diamond reserves, and to establish its power [Fanon then 
draws an analogy with European nations’ demand for reparations from Germany in 1945, 
and then to reparations paid to Israel.] In the same way we may say that the imperialist 
states would make a great mistake and commit an unspeakable injustice if they contented 
themselves with withdrawing from our soil the military cohorts, and the administrative 
and managerial services whose function it was to discover the wealth of the country, to 
extract it and to send it off to the mother countries. We are not blinded by the moral 
reparation of national independence; nor are we fed by it [La réparation morale de 
l'indépendance nationale ne nous aveugle pas, ne nous nourrit pas]. The wealth of the 
imperial countries is our wealth too […] For in a very concrete way Europe has stuffed 
herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the colonial countries: Latin 
America, China, and Africa. From all these continents, under whose eyes Europe today 
raises up her tower of opulence, there has flowed diamonds and oil, silk and cotton, wood 
and exotic products. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. The wealth which 
smothers her is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped peoples. The ports of 
Holland, the docks of Bordeaux and Liverpool were specialized in the Negro slave trade, 
and owe their renown to millions of deported slaves. So when we hear the head of a 
European state declare with his hand on his heart that he must come to the aid of the poor 
underdeveloped peoples, we do not tremble with gratitude. Quite the contrary; we say to 
ourselves: “It’s a just reparation which will be paid to us [c'est une juste réparation qui va 
nous être faite].” Nor will we acquiesce in the help for underdeveloped countries being a 
program of “sisters of charity.” This help [aide] should be the ratification of a double 
realization: the realization by the colonized peoples that it is their due [leur est dûe], and 
the realization by the capitalist powers that in fact they must pay. (Fanon, 100-103)
Fanon here theorizes reparations as a singular concept through which the enduring harms of 
economic exploitation under colonialism are recognized and property relations reorganized 
accordingly as the colonized countries’ role in the creation of “European” capital is reconceived 
in terms of an ongoing obligation upon the colonizers. He stresses that a primary characteristic of 
colonial atrocities and abuses -- “deportations, massacres, forced labor, and slavery” -- is their 
function as economic activities, practices through which profit was extracted. This is why, in 
Fanon’s terms, “la réparation morale” of state sovereignty fails, on its own, as a means of 
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addressing the record of colonial brutality. Material reparations are, for Fanon, a significant 
factor in differentiating between mere independence and genuine decolonization, and the “double 
realization” that reparations are owing is itself a radical goal. It is certainly the case that Fanon’s 
concept of colonial atrocities as capitalist method runs against the grain of the way in which such 
violations are usually framed within a liberal, progressivist discourse of human rights, however 
this merely underscores that while certain kinds of reparations claims might come under the 
rubric of human rights culture, the politics of reparations should be understood as a term that 
describes a cluster of ideas and practices that cannot be circumscribed by, or conflated with, 
recent iterations of human rights discourse.
III. Literary and testimonial narrative
By its very nature, a reparations claim hopes to reshape our way of imagining a particular 
moment or moments from the past. This requires the crafting of new narratives. As David Scott 
argues in relation to a particular mode of historiography he characterizes as “reparatory”: “A 
reparatory history aims to reconstruct [...] evil pasts in ways that potentially enable us to rethink 
the moral responsibility that the present owes in respect of them. In this sense, moral and 
reparatory histories confront us with pasts that are not past but that remain unresolved or 
unreconciled such that they weigh upon the psyche” (Scott, 2018, viii). In a similar way, a 
reparations claim such as Mutua and Others vs F.C.O. alters our orientation toward the historical 
period or conjuncture that it brings into question, and insists on legal responsibility being taken 
in the present, by putting forward new narratives. The narrative form the legal case relied on as 
evidence was the witness testimony of the claimants. I am interested in the relationship between 
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these testimonies (and the case as a whole) and extant literary and cultural narratives that shaped 
understandings of “Mau Mau.” By reading fictional narratives alongside the witness testimony, 
and reading them with a particular attunement to questions of harm and repair, my work 
contextualizes those narratives produced for the High Court as one among many different ways 
in which the harms of British counterinsurgency in Kenya and the imperative of repair has been 
staged through narrative.
I examine some of the diverse ways in which the anticolonial struggle and 
counterinsurgency has been figured in literature since the 1950s. Mine is a project of attentive re-
reading, consciously positioned at a moment in which the crisis that precipitated the end of 
colonial rule in Kenya has come to be figured more overtly as a series of atrocities that raise 
question about the possibilities of reparation than as a trope for a certain mode of anticolonial 
struggle, or for expounding the shortcomings of decolonization. The literary archive regarding 
the anticolonial struggle in Kenya during the 1950s is a very rich one, and includes several 
classic texts in the field of postcolonial studies. In particular, it comprises a major theme in the 
work of Ng!g" wa Thiong'o over many decades, from his early novels in the 1960s, to his play 
(with Micere Mugo) The Trial of Dedan Kimathi (1976), Petals of Blood (1977), Matigari 
(1987), his recent memoirs, and his literary-theoretical work. The Land and Freedom struggle 
has functioned as a kind of marker for Ng!g", a crisis he has been engaged in narrating and 
retelling throughout his writing life. There are also many memoirs, such as J.M. Kariuki’s ‘Mau 
Mau’ Detainee (1963), and widely various treatments from outside Kenya, such as the Jamaican 
novelist Victor Stafford Reid’s The Leopard (1958) and Robert Ruark’s Something of Value 
(1955). 
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Testimonial and literary narrative forms work differently. These differences present me 
with useful methodological difficulties, and in my view they also help make this project’s 
contribution to contemporary debates around historical reparations a distinctive one. The work of 
Julie Stone Peters is instructive as a critique of what she calls the “culture of testimony” that in 
her view characterizes the institutions of transitional justice that have proliferated since the latter 
part of the twentieth century (Peters, 253). For Peters, the function of testimony within this 
normative framework for reconciliation has surpassed its primary role as a form of evidence to 
take on “an independent legal-political function”: “Narrative has come to be used instead of (or 
alongside) punishment or victim compensation -- not as evidence but as a form of redress in and 
of itself” (Peters, 254). Specifically, in Peters’ view, the aspiration of truth commissions and 
tribunals towards “a kind of redemption through storytelling” that functions in three related 
ways: awakening “the sympathetic moral sense of the broader public,” the “healing” of both 
victims and perpetrators, and the achievement of “closure” at the community level. “To deal with 
large-scale suffering,” she concludes, reading Arendt, “one needs politics rather than narratively-
induced and individually directed compassion” (Peters, 280). My thinking in this dissertation 
emerges in relation to a case of tort law rather than the kind of “quasi-judicial, quasi-political, 
quasi-theatrical” forms of transitional justice Peters critiques (Peters, 253). However, Peters 
demonstrates that the work testimony performs, or the work that may be expected of it, is 
culturally and politically contingent, that this may extend well beyond its ‘ordinary’ function as 
an evidentiary narrative whose truthfulness is established in an especially pronounced way by the 
strength of its claim to authenticity. Peters’ skepticism that “narratives of suffering” can ever be 
perceived as “sufficient to the righting of wrongs,” and that narrative closure can produce 
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satisfactory forms of moral or political closure, leads me to wonder about other kinds of 
“narratives of suffering” that are produced independently of any judicial process, and which 
stage a longing for redress and its impossibility, that explore the radical possibilities of narrative 
in re-orienting a reader’s relation to a certain past while at the same time underscoring the 
tenuous relationship between storytelling and political justice (Peters, 275). Most of the literary 
texts I read in this dissertation are works of this kind.
Specifying the particular qualities that distinguish literary and testimonial narratives at 
the generic level is as difficult as trying to offer a general theory of the literary. Certain 
distinctions do emerge through my readings in this dissertation, however I am cautious about the 
extent to which these may be extrapolated much beyond the particular examples I analyze. 
Joseph Slaughter, in thinking through certain forms of “collusion” between literature and law, 
points to literature’s “capacity to sustain ambiguity and complexity,” by contrast with the law, 
which finds “ambiguity and ambivalence” to be “intolerable” (Slaughter, 43-44). At least as it 
fulfills its primary function in relation to the court of law, legal testimony (and particularly the 
testimony of victims) ought not to be a narrative form in which ambiguity is intentionally set to 
work. By contrast, the literary can be thought of in Slaughter’s terms as a discursive mode that 
relies on ambiguity for its effects. Jennifer Wenzel has described “literature’s facility with 
imagining temporal structures that historians find counterintuitive,” and (drawing on the work of 
Ashis Nandy) the creative arts’ maintenance of “a space outside the hegemony of historical 
constructions of the past [...] fiction and film can grasp heterotemporality and nonrationalist, 
subaltern pasts in ways that scholarly histories cannot” (Wenzel, 236). These claims may also be 
true, or partially true, of testimony, especially where, as in Mutua and Others vs FCO, those 
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giving testimony belong to Kenya’s rural poor. However, the especially complex ways in which 
literary texts can stage time is an important aspect of all my readings. Perhaps most suggestive of 
all for my purposes is Wenzel’s theorization of a fundamental antinomy of the literary, a mode of 
discourse that at once offers “visionary possibilities” and admits that such possibilities are “just 
stories” (Wenzel, 236). I think this double quality of literature corresponds in a meaningful way 
with the moral politics of reparations, which, in their most radical form, are structured both 
around the argument that redress for past wrongs is imperative and the insistence that no such 
redress can be fully realised.
IV. “Mau Mau” reparations as case study
As a case study for thinking through different concepts of repair, and especially that of repair as a 
decolonizing demand, the Land and Freedom Army’s uprising stands out for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is an exemplary event of anticolonial struggle. For anticolonial thinkers and colonial power 
alike, “Mau Mau” came to function as a metaphor for something like the very essence of 
anticolonialism. In The Wretched of the Earth, towards the end of the opening chapter already 
cited, “Mau Mau” appears as the term Fanon gives to  peasant struggles against colonialism in 
general, as he thinks through the place of such struggles within a Cold War context. Its class 
character (as the form of anticolonial struggle carried out independent of bourgeois control) is 
tied to its other salient feature, namely that “Mau Mau” is the refusal to negotiate with colonial 
power: 
Blown-up bridges, ravaged farms, repressions, and fighting harshly disrupt the economy 
[...] One step more, and the leader of the nationalist party keeps his distance with regard 
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to that violence. He loudly proclaims that he has nothing to do with these Mau-Mau, 
these terrorists, these throat-slitters [...] as the settlers cannot discuss terms with these 
Mau-Mau, he himself will be quite willing to begin negotiations (Fanon, 62).3
Earlier, George Padmore, in Pan-Africanism or Communism? (1956) had offered Pan-Africanism 
as a Gandhian alternative to struggles carried out in the style of “Mau Mau.” Padmore 
understood the uprising as a consequence of the failure on the part of the colonial government in 
Kenya to address legitimate political grievances raised by moderate African nationalist parties, 
such as the Kenyan African Union. The aspiration of the Pan-African movement, he argued, was 
to “inspire and encourage Africans in other parts of the continent to follow in the footsteps of the 
Gold Coast along the road of non-violent revolution instead of Mau Mauism” (Padmore, Chapter 
10).
 The second main reason for turning to Kenya’s war of decolonization as my case study 
concerns the question of time, and in particular the timing of these reparations claims. 
Temporality is always the question for reparations claims. They insist on the continued effects of 
past injustice in the present and moreover on the imperative that a measure of responsibility be 
taken now for the wrongs of a different time. Michel-Rolph Trouillot describes the need for a 
“temporal bridge” to be constructed between past and present in instances of historical reparation 
or apology, and here narrative plays a crucial role (Trouillot, 172). In the “Mau Mau” reparations 
case, this question is brought into sharp focus in a singular way, because the victims only 
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3 Later on, analyzing new forms of domination emerging with the Cold War, Fanon writes: “if we situate 
[the violence of the native] in the dynamics of the international situation, we see at once that it 
constitutes a terrible menace for the oppressor. Persistent jacqueries and Mau-Mau disturbance 
unbalance the colony’s economic life but do not endanger the mother country. What is more important in 
the eyes of imperialism is the opportunity for socialist propaganda to infiltrate among the masses and to 
contaminate them. This is already a serious danger in the cold war; but what would happen to that 
colony in case of real war, riddled as it is by murderous guerillas?” (Fanon, 79).
demanded reparations at a late stage in their lives, having witnessed and suffered atrocities of the 
very worst kind as youths and young adults. Mutua, Muthoni, Wambugu, Ciongombe and Nzili 
brought their claims late on in lifetimes during which reparations appeared an impossible, even 
unthinkable, aspiration. At least on the side of the victims in Mutua & others vs The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (2009), the temporal gap to be negotiated between the original offences 
and the reparations claims is not quite of the kind where the fundamental problem to be reckoned 
with is a generational one, a problem which invariably requires that those in search of reparations 
make an argument about the ways in which injury and responsibility should be passed down and 
inherited in some form among members of a particular community or group. This argument has 
been especially important within the scholarly debate around the question of reparations for 
descendants of people enslaved in the New World.4 So far as thinking about the “Mau Mau” case 
is concerned, we are situated on the cusp of this question but not yet required to think concretely 
in terms of the passage of obligations and entitlements through what Janna Thompson calls 
“intergenerational communities” (Thompson, xviii). Rather, the question of what seems, from 
today’s perspective, like a curious delay in making the demand for reparations, a lag of close to 
five decades between the atrocities and the law-suit, invites reflection on the ways in which our 
present may be considered especially well-suited to those ethical and political approaches to 
history we might think of as reparatory. As David Scott writes: “Reparations as moral‐politics is 
interesting not merely because it is right as a matter of principle (whatever that might mean) but 
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4 See for example Bernard Boxill, “The Morality of Reparation,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 2, No. 1 
(1972), 113-122; Bernard Boxill, “A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 
7, No. 1 (2003), 63-91; Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (1973); Janna Thompson, Taking 
Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice (2002); Hilary Beckles, Britain’s Black Debt: 
Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide (2013); David Scott, “The Moral Justification of 
Reparations for New World Slavery,” in Robert Nichols and Jakeet Singh, eds., Freedom and Democracy 
in an Imperial Context: Dialogues with James Tully (2014), 100–120.
because it is timely as a mode of responsiveness to a particular conjuncture” (Scott, 2014, ix). By  
placing the reparatory story told by Mutua and Others vs FCO alongside other reparatory stories 
that pertain to the same historical event, rather than exceptionalizing it as a form of narrative 
“closure,” I seek to show that demands for redress for what the British did in Kenya is not time-
limited by the bodies of the victims and their capacity to speak, and that the work of imagining 
and insisting on reparation need not be theirs alone. 
V. A note on two key terms
(a) Repair
In this dissertation I look to work within and think through a range of possible senses of “repair,” 
rather than seeking to develop a narrower understanding of the term. In my view those practices, 
orientations or aspirations can be considered reparatory which are conceived as a response to 
past harms and which offer the prospect of some form of remedy for those violations. In her 
recent study, Reparations for Slavery and the Slave Trade: A Transnational and Comparative 
History (2017), the historian Ana Lucia Araujo ventures an account of demands for reparations 
for slavery, focused on the United States, Brasil, Cuba and Haiti, since the 1700s.5 What interests 
me most about Araujo’s approach is the breadth of the range of historical examples she takes to 
be instances of reparations claims (Araujo). She uses the terms repair and redress 
interchangeably, as concepts which, in her view, encompass practices as various as the 
revolutions of Haiti and Cuba, lawsuits by freed people demanding back-pay or pensions during 
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5 I made this point in my review of Araujoʼs book, see Elliot Ross, Review Essay: Ana Lucia Araujo, 
Reparations for Slavery and the Slave Trade: A Transnational and Comparative History. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic (2017), In Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 56. No. 3 (2018): 538-540.
their lifetime, petitions submitted to government institutions and public appeals by historical 
figures such as Sojourner Truth, Marcus Garvey and Paul Robeson (Ross, 538).
 Within literary studies, David Eng’s thinking on the question of repair is especially 
clarifying of the complexities of the term’s utility. Eng distinguishes between the work of repair 
as a noun and a verb. Repair as a noun works by designating “a political accounting of injury and 
harm, as a definitive moment of recognition and redress, and as a distinct event that writes a 
history of violence into the past. This perspective supports a history of reparations in political 
theory [...] as a discrete historical event and definitive legal accounting of the past in the name of 
victims and perpetrators” (Eng). However, the term “functions more as a verb” within “the 
conceptual grammar of psychoanalysis”: “as a continuous process of violence and repair 
subtending the subjective vicissitudes of love and hate that demand the constant retelling of their 
affective vagaries [...] reparation as a verb thus facilitates new constellations of the injured to 
emerge and new atrocities to be apprehended. Such continuous openings of the future for the past 
might be described as vulnerability in process, another way to think about the political and social 
emergencies of vulnerable times.” Yet Eng’s distinction is so compelling to think with not 
because there really are in fact two entirely distinct modes of repair that can be clearly marked 
off from one another -- one for the social and political sphere, and another for the realm of 
subjective experience -- but because these two senses of repair he delineates are mutually 
entangled. When one reads the term “repair,” the tensions between the political and the 
subjective, and between the contrasting temporalities of the “discrete historical event,” as 




A recurring difficulty encountered in writing this dissertation has been with the term “Mau Mau.” 
Despite its pejorative connotations, and the availability of the alternative name Land and 
Freedom Army,  “Mau Mau” has proven a difficult term to dispense with. Due to its uncertain 
origins and enduring ambiguity, it functions effectively as a placeholder through which all the 
different versions of the historical event it describes can be routed, all its different dimensions 
marked, without being resolved. “Mau Mau” names an anti-colonial peasant revolt, a nationalist 
or pseudo-nationalist liberation struggle, a civil war, a revolution, a colonial counterinsurgency 
and a transnational white supremacist panic. It is both a figure of radical Black diasporic 
aspiration -- one thinks of Boots Riley and the Mau Mau Rhythm Collective or of Malcolm X’s 
1964 call for “a Mau Mau” in Harlem and in the South -- and an adaptation of the old trope of 
the savage African with a veneer of historical specificity attached to Kenya’s decolonization. The 
term’s continued use by veterans associations and victims of colonial abuses in describing their 
movement shows that if the term is to drop from common usage among those for whom the 
term’s political meanings exceeds (even counters) the colonial slur, there is a conversation that 
would need to take place and an adequate replacement term would have to be thought through. 
Simon Gikandi argues that “what made “Mau Mau” such a difficult phenomenon to represent 
was [...] the way  it refused to be contained by the discursive mechanisms of colonial rule [...] 
because “Mau Mau” was the unnamed and unnameable event (even to this day no one knows 
what the name meant or represented), it signified a certain gap in both European and Gikuyu 
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consciousness” (Gikandi, 27). Like Gikandi, I surround the term with quotation marks in order to 
mark the provisionality of my usage in this dissertation. 
VI. Chapter Outline
My first chapter examines the lawsuit against the British government in detail. I read the five 
claimants’ witness statements prepared as evidence in Ndiki Mutua and others vs. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (2009). These testimonies are the narrative basis on which the 
reparations claim was made, and they narrate the lives of anti-colonial revolutionaries as victims 
of severe human rights violations. In so doing, they also narrate the Land and Freedom struggle 
in a new mode, one centred above all on the experience of physical suffering and injury. Drawing 
on interviews with a lawyer from Leigh Day, I describe and analyze the particularities of these 
texts and how they were assembled, and offer critical comparisons at the level of genre with 
other narrative forms: testimonio, oral history and slave narratives. My reading of the five 
witness statements attends to the ways in which the claimants’ experiences are narrated and 
contextualized politically and historically, how they reflect on the atrocities committed against 
them, and the way in which temporality in these narratives is structured by violence and its 
aftermath -- beatings, torture, mutilation, and the scars, pains and aches in the decades since. The 
narrative form of the witness statements is shaped by their evidentiary function in ‘quantifying 
the harms’ each victim has suffered. Examining the documents through which the case was 
framed and the appeal for recognition and redress from the British Government was articulated, I 
show that the claim as a whole functions through a number of constitutive contradictions. The 
individual claimants demonstrate in their witness statements that they understand the violence 
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against them in relation to the structures of British counterinsurgency and colonialism as a 
system of white domination, however the auxiliary texts submitted to the British Government 
offer a concessionary uncoupling of the specific atrocities in question from British colonialism 
itself, by framing these atrocities, strategically, as exceptional and devoid of political meaning.
 Chapter 2 is a reading of Ng!g" wa Thiong’o’s A Grain of Wheat (1967), his third novel, 
which tells the story of a poor rural community’s attempts to recover from having been subjected  
to the colonial counterinsurgency. I argue that the text works by staging the difficulty of 
remembering and narrating traumatic events such as detention, villagization, murder, torture, 
beatings and sexual assault. In my view this novel teaches its reader to attend to forms of harm 
that extend beyond bodily injury into the realm of quotidian social relations, and the ways in 
which the damage inflicted by colonial torture of men is reproduced and redirected as gender 
violence against women. Unlike the witness statements, Ng!g"’s novel directs its reader to reflect  
on forms of harm which cannot be adequately remembered or recounted, still less ameliorated or 
redressed. A Grain of Wheat thematizes the highly tenuous and contingent character of practices 
of repair, describing these at the level of intimate social relations and the work of care. In the 
second part of Chapter 2, I examine the early critical scholarship on A Grain of Wheat and the 
kinds of questions that preoccupied critical readers of the novel in the three decades or so 
following its publication. Such questions included: does the novel stage Ng!g"’s socialist/
Fanonian/revolutionary commitments, and if so, how? And: in what ways is the text itself a 
revisionary history of the Land and Freedom Army, and a vindication of their struggle? While 
my own response to the novel, shaped by the court case and revisionary histories, centres on 
questions of harm and repair, I argue that the evidence of early readings demonstrates that a 
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concern with these particular themes has less to do with whether or not a critic may conceive of 
their own politics in radical terms, so much as the specific sensibility that shapes their politics. 
Whereas a “committed” critic such as Peter Nazareth reads A Grain of Wheat through Fanon and 
frames repair as a major question in the novel’s staging of the crisis of decolonization, Ali 
Mazrui’s reading of Ng!g"’s fiction speaks to a different conception of Third World nationalist 
struggle in which suffering and loss are meaningful as sacrifice and a vision as tragic as Ng!g"’s 
in A Grain of Wheat is difficult to assimilate.
While the first two chapters deal with different modes of narrating enduring forms of 
harm, in Chapter 3 I examine the other side of the question of historical reparations. What 
archival processes and structures have shaped the amnesia and erasure regarding the “Mau Mau” 
event in Britain? And what role might literary texts play in making the case for reparations 
compelling to those who are called upon to own the responsibility they bear for past violations? 
The first part of the chapter analyzes the records of large-scale document destruction in the 
Hanslope Park Disclosure, the tranche of files from the Kenyan colonial archive belatedly 
disclosed as one consequence of Mutua and others vs. FCO. I show that these papers are 
evidence that anxieties about the prospect of "embarrassment" were fundamental to rationalizing 
the archival purge. The erasure skews permanently the terms on which historical debate may take 
place, including debates concerning historical reparation, because the colonial bureaucracy’s own 
records of its worst abuses can never again be consulted. Without the papers deemed shameful to 
colonial power, which would have held the possibility of supporting a measure of accountability 
(via the work of historians) in Britain at an earlier time,  I argue that texts of a different order can 
be called on as technologies for “implicating subjects.” The latter part of the chapter focuses on 
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the bestselling white-supremacist novel Something of Value (1954) by Robert Ruark. A key text 
in the construction and wide dissemination of “Mau Mau” as a specific trope for demonizing and 
delegitimizing the struggle for Land and Freedom, the obscurity into which Something of Value 
has fallen in the decades since works to support the same kind of ignorance and amnesia 
promoted by the official program of document destruction. My reading of Something of Value 
locates a popular fiction that narrates the torture of those designated "Mau Mau" within a 
romance of white masculinity under threat. The extreme brutality of the counterinsurgency is 
figured as not only an expression of virulent racism, but also as a project of gender and class 
ordering, in defense of a banal bourgeois culture centered on property and family life that must 
sustain the colonial system of racial capitalism in order to reproduce itself. By offering an 
‘archive of feeling’ of the kinds of attitudes and anxieties that spoke compellingly to a 
transnational white supremacist  imaginary in the 1950s, I argue that the novel today can 
partially counter the exhaustive and ongoing efforts of colonial power to evade embarrassment as 
the text “tells the most common secrets” of settler culture (Foucault, 173). 
The final chapter focuses on fictions centred on the experience of women in Kenya since 
independence. I read three texts by women, each of which provides narratives through which to 
interrogate the new nation-state and its relation to long histories of political violence that begin 
with the colonial war of the 1950s. Each thematizes repair as a distinctively feminist practice, 
and stages different forms of harm as the ethical basis for imagining a more just political and 
social order, in which the question of the nation-state as both a suitable vehicle for radical 
aspirations and the object of political reform may be called into question. I read Marjorie Oludhe 
Macgoye’s novel Coming to Birth (1986) as a text that stages the question of the connection 
27
between oppression and exploitation in independent Kenya and the colonial counterinsurgency of 
the 1950s by centering the experience of Paulina, a vulnerable young working class woman.The 
novel narrates forms of feminist dissent against a new nation-state within which Paulina 
struggles to flourish as a citizen. Amirah Tajdin’s short film, His to Keep (2013), is an account of 
the tension between the articulation of the Kenyan national project over fifty years on the one 
hand, and on the other both the radical hopes that motivated the struggle for freedom and the 
tremendous suffering and loss endured by those who fought British rule. Finally, I read Yvonne 
Owuor’s novel Dust (2014) as a fiction that imagines a radical break from a nation-state structure 
inherited from colonial power that, in the novel, simply reproduces the kinds of violence against 
its citizens that the British inflicted upon colonial subjects.
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Chapter I | Writing the struggle for land and freedom as a reparations case
JUDGE: Have you anything to say before the sentence?
KIMATHI: In the court of Imperialism! 
There has never and will never be
Justice for the people 
Under imperialism. 
Justice is created 
through a revolutionary struggle 
Against all the forces of imperialism. 
Our struggle must therefore continue.
-- Ng!g" wa Thiong'o and Micere Githae Mugo, The Trial of Dedan Kimathi (1976)
As more and more evidence mounted up of atrocities committed by the British colonial 
government in Kenya in the 1950s and early 1960s, the United Kingdom in 2013 agreed to settle 
a class-action suit brought by London law firm Leigh Day on behalf of 5,228 elderly Kenyans 
with the support of the Kenyan government, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (K.H.R.C.) 
and the Mau Mau War Veterans Association.6 The testimony of the five elderly Kenyans who 
were the original claimants in the case -- Ndiki Mutwiwa Mutua, Jane Muthoni Mara, Wambugu 
Wa Nyingi, Susan Ciongombe Ngondi and Paulo Muoka Nzili -- proved crucial in winning the 
meagre reparations that were eventually paid out. 
 In this chapter I offer a reading of the small cluster of texts which together formed the 
written submissions against the United Kingdom government in the case of Ndiki Mutua & 
others vs The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2009), thinking of them as exemplary texts of 
reparations demands as a narrative practice. I am especially interested in the witness statements 
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6 Leigh Day had previously won compensation for 220 Masai people killed or injured by unexploded 
bombs left on the British Army’s practice ranges (2002) as well as representing hundreds of Kenyan 
women who were raped by British Army soldiers between 1972 and 2002. See the article entitled 
“Kenya” on the firm’s web site: <http://www.leighday.co.uk/International-and-group-claims/Kenya>. The 
firm also represents the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in their ongoing claim for historical 
reparations for slavery.
made by these five original claimants. Each statement took the form of a life-narrative, beginning 
from birth as a colonial subject, and concluding with a reflection on their decision to sue the 
British government for torture and brutality suffered in the 1950s. They are stories about life 
under colonialism, and the enduring effects of ordeals suffered as victims of Britain’s 
counterinsurgency, told in the early 21st century in the hope of securing both material and 
symbolic compensation. Intensely mediated as they are, the witness statements cannot simply be 
read in the same way one might read a memoir, autobiography or biography. At the very centre 
of any claim for reparations must be a story about the past, and the form of that story structures 
the way in which that past is brought to bear on the present. 
In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which it is possible to identify distinctive 
characteristics of these testimonies, as well as the framing texts produced in support of the legal 
claim for compensation in Ndiki Mutua & others vs The Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I 
think of these texts as major documents within a broader, ongoing reparatory project in relation 
to British colonial rule in Kenya. I argue that in constructing the narratives required to “quantify 
the harms” due for compensation and make the case in as legible and compelling a way as 
possible to the High Court, the victims’ experience of torture was abstracted as far as possible 
from its political and historical context of anticolonial struggle. Counter-intuitively, the 
relationship between colonial power and the violence carried out by colonial officials is called 
into question by the legal case, rather than underlined. These life narratives, constructed by both 
the claimants and their lawyers, focus overwhelmingly on the experience of extreme bodily 
injury -- especially castration, sexual torture and genital mutilation -- under colonial captivity, 
and the suffering ensuing from these injuries in the decades since. The notion of the harm for 
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which the United Kingdom bears responsibility is delineated in a narrow way that is effective in 
evidencing criminality, but includes little in regards other forms of injury suffered by colonial 
subjects, whether social, economic or political, during the counter-insurgency or otherwise. 
While the legal case established this responsibility, taken in isolation it risked framing the 
atrocities that constitute its major object as aberrations, extraordinary acts of cruelty unmoored 
from any concrete social or political project, exceptional forms of brutality that defy 
interpretation. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by outlining the circumstances that 
contributed to the lawsuit and the details of the suit itself. I briefly analyze the distinctive 
features of recent (one might say reparatory) historical scholarship that helped precipitate the 
formation of a viable legal case, as well as the practical work of the lawyers in conjunction with 
civil society organizations in Kenya that followed the unbanning of Land and Freedom Army 
groups in the early 2000s. Next, I analyze the specific formal features of the victims’ witness 
statements in relation to the related genres of oral history, testimonio and slave narrative. I detail 
the crucial role played by the lawyers in crafting these statements, and the complexities of their 
authorship as collaboratively produced texts whose author-function must primarily be legible as 
the victim of severe human rights violations in need of urgent redress. The chapter’s third section 
gives a reading of the statements themselves. I show that these narratives aim to help “quantify 
the harms,” endured by the victims, and that the working understanding of harm pertains 
overwhelmingly to torture, physical suffering and bodily injury. Acts of physical violence and 
their aftermath structure the staging of time in these texts. However, the witness statements 
sustain a sense of the individuality and authenticity of the victims by including detailed personal 
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memories and reflections, including on the political character of their experiences. The way in 
which the victims analyze their lives and describe their understandings of the legal proceedings 
is frequently in tension with the collectively authored texts that framed the legal case, a 
document from 2009 seeking an early settlement titled “Victims of British Torture in Kenya -- 
Options for Justice” as well as the letter to then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. In these texts, the 
lawyers strategically present the claim as only about human rights violations, and disavow 
explicitly any political aspect, repeatedly insisting that the settlement they seek is not “about 
colonialism.” I argue that this reparations claim, directed at the British state via British judicial 
processes, works by sustaining this tension between subjective narrative licensed to make 
‘political’ claims and an authoritative collective discourse in which such claims are disavowed.
I. Historiographical and political contexts for the legal case against the British Government for 
colonial atrocities
Kenya’s late colonial period has been the subject of intensive debate and re-appraisal in recent 
years, and fresh historical work proved a catalyst for the legal case. In 2005, two prominent 
revisionist histories of 1950s Kenya were published: Caroline Elkins’ Imperial Reckoning: The 
Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (2005) and David Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged: 
The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (2005). Both books were widely reviewed in 
Kenya and in the international press.7 Elkins’ book received the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-
Fiction. Her account drew criticism from other historians, who argued that her methodology 
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7 See for example Bernard Porter, “How Did They Get Away With It?” London Review of Books, 3 March 
2005; Neal Ascherson, “The Breaking of the Mau Mau,” New York Review of Books, 7 April, 2005; 
Mahmood Mamdani, “Colonial Legacies,” Washington Post, 3 July, 2005.
placed excessive weight on oral testimonies of Kenyans rather than official archival documents, 
rendering her main conclusions unreliable and leading her to neglect the nuances of a notoriously 
complex civil war.8 Elkins offered a picture of orchestrated violence and brutality committed by 
colonial authorities on an enormous scale. Having initially proposed to “write a history of the 
success of Britain’s civilizing mission in the detention camps of Kenya” (Elkins, xii), based on 
her reading of the files on the last years of colonial rule in Kenya that were available at the U.K. 
National Archive in the mid-1990s, Elkins re-thought her project after establishing that the 
British had undertaken a comprehensive purge of files: “Any ministry or department that dealt 
with the unsavory side of detention was pretty well emptied of its files, whereas those that 
ostensibly addressed detainee reform, or Britain’s civilizing mission, were left fairly 
intact” (Elkins, xiii). Imperial Reckoning, titled Britain’s Gulag in the U.K. edition, narrates the 
colonial counterinsurgency, with a special focus on the extensive “Pipeline” of detention camps 
through which suspected insurgents were “rehabilitated,” as well as the program of 
“villagization” by which a vast section of the population, mainly women and children, was 
detained in fortified villages under extremely harsh conditions. Elkins’ study includes a good 
deal of political context, especially regarding the role of key officials and politicians in London 
and Nairobi. Her sixth chapter, “The World Behind the Wire,” offers a textured account of 
detainees’ lived experience -- the social mores, forms of collective organization, and resistance 
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(2005), 489–496; Bethwell Ogot, ‘Britain’s Gulag’, Journal of African History, Vol. 46, Issue 3 (2005), 493–
505; Pascal James Imperato, ‘Differing perspectives on Mau Mau’, African Studies Review, Vol. 48, Issue 
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Mau,” The Round Table, Vol. 96, Issue 389 (2007), 201-23. Elkins responds to these criticisms in two 
essays: “Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice,” The Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2011), 731-748, and “Looking beyond Mau Mau: 
Archiving Violence in the Era of Decolonization,” American Historical Review, Vol. 120, Issue 1, (2015) 
852-868.
that characterized life in the Pipeline. As in the book as a whole, though, the central subject of 
Elkins’ account concerns the physical violence, especially torture, inflicted on detainees: “The 
Pipeline was based upon the principles of organized terror, violence, and degradation [...] 
Freedom was eliminated, and violence, or the threat of it, was part of every waking and sleeping 
moment” (Elkins, 190).
Elkins work rendered unviable certain notions of the period, still prevalent in the U.K., 
the United States and elsewhere, that were inherited from popular “black peril” narratives 
circulated among colonial settlers and thence to a broader Anglophone audience via international 
media, popular fiction and Hollywood films during the 1950s and 1960s.9 These racist and 
gendered characterizations of a nihilistic, savage death cult, typically framed the Emergency 
period in terms of a suitable, if reluctant, response to the putative threat posed by rebellious black 
men to white women and children in the colony.10 Contemporary analyses of the political and 
economic causes of the uprising were few and far between.11 There was until recently, at least at 
the international level, only a very limited awareness of the magnitude and systematized nature 
of colonial atrocities. While the figure of “Mau Mau” has often been mobilized to denote the 
revolutionary or the savage, Elkins’ narration of the uprising and the colonial response introduces 
a compelling new paradigm: “Mau Mau” as victim.
34
9 See Robert Ruark, Something of Value (1955), Robert Ruark, Uhuru (1962), Richard Brooks dir., 
Something of Value (Africa Ablaze) (1957), John Guillermin dir., Guns at Batasi (1964), Brian Desmond 
Hurst dir., Simba -- Mark of the Mau Mau (1955), Terence Young dir., Safari (1956).
10 On the death of the six-year-old Michael Ruck and ensuing reportage, see for example Anderson, 
93-95 and Elkins, 42-43.
11 See George Padmore, “Behind the Mau Mau,” Phylon, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1953), 355-372, and George 
Padmore, “What and Who is the Mau Mau?” Chapter 14 in Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming 
Struggle for Africa (1956).
Imperial Reckoning narrates the counterinsurgency in terms of a genocide carried out 
against the predominantly Gikuyu “Mau Mau,” and places it in a global historical framework as 
such. “Mau Mau,” she writes, “became for many whites in Kenya, and for many Gikuyu loyalists 
as well, what the Armenians had been to the Turks, the Hutu to the Tutsi [sic], the Bengalis to the 
Pakistanis, and the Jews to the Nazis” (Elkins, 49). The figure of the “gulag” is used in framing 
the text -- both in the U.K. title and the subtitle of the U.S. edition,“The Untold Story of Britain’s 
Gulag in Kenya” -- though this historical comparison is not explicitly accounted for in the text. 
The book concludes by marking the lack of official initiatives towards reconciliation, 
memorialization or reparations for the “Mau Mau” (Elkins, 367). 
I think Imperial Reckoning can be usefully thought of  in relation to what Catherine Hall 
calls “reparatory history” (Hall, 1).  In her theorization of the notion of reparatory history, Hall 
places special emphasis (drawing on Mamdani) on work that takes as its subject the beneficiaries 
of past wrong, not only the perpetrators (Hall, 6). “Reparatory history must be about more than 
identifying wrongdoers and seeking redress,” Hall claims, adding: “it begins with the 
descendants, with trauma and loss, but the hope is that the work of mourning can be linked to 
hopes for reconciliation, the repair of relations damaged by historical injustice” (Hall, 10). A 
project headed by Hall in recent years, “The Legacies of British Slave-ownership,” has attempted 
to “shift the narrative of Britain’s relation to slavery from a focus on abolition to one on the 
benefits associated with the business of slavery and its importance to the making of modern 
Britain and in the process to contribute to undoing whitewashed histories” (Hall, 14). Reparatory 
history for Hall is focused less on detailing, say, the lived experience of enslaved people on a 
plantation. Rather, such work attempts to address “the need to develop a different understanding 
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here of Britain’s involvement in the slavery business and our responsibilities, as beneficiaries of 
the gross inequalities associated with slavery and colonialism” (Hall, 16, emphasis original). In 
Hall’s terms, I think of Elkins’ invaluable contribution to the historiography of the late colonial 
period in Kenya as one starting point for a broader project of reparatory work. Imperial 
Reckoning insists on the much-belated recognition and acknowledgment of the scale and gravity 
of the brutality of Britain’s counterinsurgency campaign, opening up a new context of debate for 
work concerned with “waken[ing] a sense of the responsibilities of ‘implicated subjects’ who 
have benefitted culturally, economically and politically from the hurts inflicted on others, in the 
hope that change can happen, racisms could be eradicated” (Hall, 13).
A salient feature of critical reviews of Imperial Reckoning was the connection drawn by 
reviewers between Elkins’ reliance on oral sources and what they characterized as her 
specifically liberal response to the “Mau Mau” war as an event (i.e., the demand for reparations). 
For example, Bethwell Ogot writes: 
Besides archival sources, the bulk of [Elkins’] information came from some 300 
survivors who were keen to talk about their experiences in the camps and in the barbed-
wire villages. This is history based on the testimony of the small person. Dr. Elkins 
wanted to recreate the world behind the wire from survivor testimonies which she began 
collecting from 1998. But oral histories often pose serious methodological  problems. 
How accurate are they? To what extent can one rely on the memories of people who have 
experienced traumatic events, about fifty years later? [...] She portrays the Mau Mau war 
as an unequal conflict between the British colonial forces and their lackeys in Kenya on 
one side, and Mau Mau fighters on the other side. This is too simple. No wonder the 
British Human Rights lawyer Martyn Day, who is helping to put together a case for Mau 
Mau veterans to seek reparations from Britain, plans to use oral evidence from Elkins’s 
book (Ogot, 493-495). 
Likewise, Joanna Lewis writes: 
The oral testimonies used are heartbreaking and disturbing, the main staple of much of 
the dramatic claims in the book. There are multiple accounts of arbitrary beatings, rapes 
(men sodomized with bottles and rifle barrels and castrated), improvised torture 
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techniques and callous killings. Esther Muchiri at Ruthigiti, Mau Mau supporter, 
recounted her experience of the Home Guard: ‘‘We were beaten the whole day until 
evening.” But the accounts are also flat and the lives and motives of individuals are 
absent. There is little time for context, just repetition of statements. But in order to 
privilege Mau Mau supporters over others in terms of reparations, skipping over their 
violence and a whole generation of scholarship is useful [...] In contrast to other 
historians working on histories of violence and memory, and basing major arguments on 
testimony, much less time was spent interviewing. In the interviews conducted the 
numbers who actually mentioned violence amount to just over a third, making such 
uniform accounts start to lose their veracity as well as the extrapolations, some reviewers 
pointing out that Elkins is a known activist in the campaigns for reparations (Lewis, 
214-215).
 
Elkins’ use of oral sources is read as un-thorough, ill-disciplined, and tied to a sentimental liberal 
politics that is about writing a history of the period that produces one set of clearly defined 
‘victims’ and another set of perpetrators, regardless of the complexities of the situations at hand. 
Lewis associates this with over-reliance on a particularly “flat” mode of storytelling for 
evidence, overly repetitive and lacking a sense of the interior life of the one offering testimony -- 
in other words, the lack of literary qualities exhibited by oral testimonies of this kind. In a recent 
essay that partly extended her response to criticisms of this nature, Elkins made the intriguing 
move of concurring with precisely the idea that oral accounts are an inalienably political form, 
specifically those centred on atrocity. In her view, “graphic accounts of torture, rape, and murder 
[...] broke the [disciplinary] field’s code of silence. It was not only the empirical evidence that 
discomforted, but also the questioned authenticity of the colonial archive” (Elkins 2015, 854). 
For Elkins, the introduction of oral testimonies as evidence for historical writing re-orients and 
re-organizes our relation to the official colonial archive, and the written historical record more 
broadly, inasmuch as the contents of the oral testimony, or more specifically, its suppression, has 
been a fundamental structuring principle for that archive and the body of historiography 
connected with it.
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 The new revisionary histories, most prominently Elkins’ study, virtually coincided with a 
major shift in Kenya as “Mau Mau” organizations were unbanned.  Following independence in 
1963, Jomo Kenyatta’s government retained the 1952 colonial ban on “Mau Mau” organizations 
of any kind, with Kenyatta famously writing in his memoir, Suffering Without Bitterness: The 
Founding of the Kenya Nation (1968): “Mau Mau was a disease which has been eradicated and 
must never be remembered again” (Kenyatta, 189). The official prescription that Mau Mau be 
forgotten was central to efforts by Kenyatta’s government, buttressed by the work of sympathetic 
historians, to embed a national narrative concerning the struggle against colonial rule in which 
all Kenyans were said to have played a more or less equal part, with Kenyatta himself figured as 
the predominant motive force. The anti-“Mau Mau” law remained in place until it was revoked 
by the administration of Mwai Kibaki in 2003, since when efforts have been made to co-opt 
unevenly the history of the “Mau Mau” struggle into contemporary Kenyan nationalism. This 
allowed for the open assembly of “Mau Mau” veterans groups for the first time, most 
significantly the Mau Mau War Veterans Association. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (a 
non-governmental organization), began working with “Mau Mau” veterans groups in 2003, soon 
after their unbanning, and undertook a process of interviewing veterans in 2006 with a view to 
compiling testimonies for a possible legal case (“Long March for Justice,” 2). K.H.R.C. then 
contacted the London law firm Leigh Day, who took up the case in 2006, serving a letter of claim 
upon the British government, which was rejected along with requests for the release of evidence. 
By mid-2009, the K.H.R.C. had identified a pool of potential claimants which was narrowed 
down to five in consultation with Leigh Day. These five flew to London to issue their claims at 
the Royal Courts of Justice (“Long March for Justice,” 3). Elkins, Anderson, and Huw Bennett, a 
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military historian, were tasked as expert witnesses. The British Government contested the claim 
on two grounds: limitation (too much time had passed for there to be a fair trial), and liability 
(responsibility for the acts of the colonial administration had passed to the Kenyan Government 
upon independence, and not to London). At the first court hearing in 2011 the question of 
liability was addressed, with the judge ruling against the British Government, which then 
continued to resist settlement at a second hearing in 2012 on the grounds that the torture (which 
it conceded had indeed occurred) had taken place too long ago. When this defence was rejected, 
the case was set for a full trial. Major new evidence had come to light through the court 
proceedings, as the judge ordered the British Government to unseal thousands of secret Kenyan 
colonial files which it claimed to have lost, but were located at Hanslope Park (the so-called 
Hanslope Park Disclosure). Following the second hearing in 2012, Leigh Day, the K.H.R.C. and 
the M.M.W.V.A. identified several thousand others “with strong evidence to show that they had 
suffered from acts of torture and severe abuse whilst detained by the British authorities,” and 
who could bring cases similar to that of the test claimants (“Long March for Justice,” 8). In June 
2013, the British Government dropped its appeal and agreed to a settlement with all 5,228 
claimants totaling £19.9 million, expressed “sincere regret” in the British parliament and 
committed to pay for a memorial in Kenya to the victims of colonial era torture. 
 The court settlement was bittersweet. On the one hand, the legal team representing the 
claimants had argued their case extremely effectively, and defeated each of the British 
government’s objections, securing monetary compensation and a grudging expression of regret, 
as well as the discovery and release of secret government files. On the other hand, the payout 
was paltry relative to the scale and severity of the atrocities at issue. And the success in court, 
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doubtless better late than never, put in sharp relief the many decades during which victims of 
colonial torture in Kenya had enjoyed no recourse whatsoever. There is, of course, no one way of 
framing the event of the attainment of such historical reparations, but rather a range of competing 
perspectives inflected by differing political values and aspirations, and by distinct notions of 
history and memory.
II. “The patterns of the remembering and the forms of the telling”: a formal analysis of the 
witness statements
The witness statements in Mutua & others vs The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are above 
all texts that express profound sorrow. They revisit and remember long years of misery, young 
lives shattered by colonial violence, and lifetimes spent trying and failing to recover from the 
experience of extreme cruelty and loss. Jane Muthoni Mara worked providing cooking and 
laundry services to “Mau Mau” guerilla fighters in the early 1950s. She was detained without 
trial for three years from the age of 15, and was subjected to the method of sexual torture used by 
the British on so-called “hardcore” women suspects, the insertion of a glass bottle filled with 
boiling water into her vagina during interrogation (Muthoni). Susan Ciongombe Ngondi suffered 
the same fate in captivity (at the hands of the same colonial official), having previously been 
raped by a loyalist soldier and seen her mother whipped to death (not while  formally detained, 
but having been caught up in the colonial government’s “villagization” containment strategy). 
Paulo Nzili was detained without trial for almost one year, suffered numerous beatings, and was 
castrated with pliers (Nzili). Ndiki Mutua was likewise picked out as “hardcore,” was castrated 
by the same officer as Nzili, and had both wrists broken, before making a dramatic escape from 
the detention camp he was held in and spending several years convalescing among “Mau Mau” 
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guerillas in their forest strongholds. Wambugu Wa Nyingi was detained for nine years without 
trial from 1952, during which time he was waterboarded, chained upside down, and beaten 
unconscious on several occasions. Wambugu survived the notorious Hola massacre of March 
1959, when eleven men were beaten to death for refusing to dig their own graves -- he lay in a 
room with the eleven dead, unconscious, for two days (Wambugu). As ‘test’ or ‘lead’ claimants, 
their stories are metonymic, standing in for a social history of collective experience, and their 
suffering bodies are available for scrutiny by the court as sites where the truth about the broader 
experience of thousands of fellow colonial subjects can be located. The process by which the 
original claimants became the test claimants for the class action lawsuit was described to me by 
Rebekah Read of Leigh Day as class action “in reverse” (Read). The usual procedure is for test 
claimants to be identified and agreed upon as “representative” of the wider case through a 
process of negotiation between plaintiff and defendant. In this case, however, the case began 
with the claims of the five individuals and the several thousand others eventually compensated 
had their claims “tacked on” only once the hearings on limitation and liability had been won and 
the case was set for a full trial.
! The witness statements are difficult to read using the tools of literary scholarship. They 
are not the unfiltered records of particular voices or consciousnesses drawing on reserves of 
memory in order to narrate a version of their past. They are rather narratives whose conditions of 
production were determined by the work of assembling the legal claim for reparations. These 
conditions are manifest at the formal level; they are the life narratives which must be produced in 
order for a reparations claim to be made. They are multiply mediated texts, pieced together by 
lawyers from a series of interviews carried out via translators (Kikamba in the case of Mutua and 
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Nzili, Gikuyu for Ciongombe, Muthoni and Wambugu). This reflects the claimants’ position as 
both sometime freedom fighters from Kenya’s illiterate, rural poor and as plaintiffs whose 
encounter with the British government via the courts was occasioned by their belated 
incorporation within the human rights apparatus in Kenya and its broader metropolitan ambit. 
This is not to say that the veterans are not the authors, but rather that the mode of authorship at 
play is a distinctive one, in which discerning their own particular rhetorical and conceptual 
strategies is especially difficult. It is not my intention here to criticize the entirely legitimate, 
canny strategies employed by the lawyers who handled this suit and prepared the witness 
statements, working to make them compelling forms of evidence so that the interests of their 
clients could be best represented. In the teeth of the Crown’s objections concerning the length of 
time since the alleged crimes as well as the argument that jurisdiction for colonial Kenya had 
passed to independent Kenya rather than the United Kingdom, it was especially important for the 
lawyers to present witness statements that made the experience of the claimants legible to the 
High Court in London.
 According to Rebekah Read, a lawyer with Leigh Day who helped put the witness 
statements together, these texts were compiled through a series of interviews conducted over a 
number of years (Read). The most significant of these were from 2009-2010, when the K.H.R.C. 
arranged for the five claimants to travel to Nairobi where they were interviewed through a 
translator, whilst on speakerphone to Read and her colleagues in London. The claimants, Read 
said, would begin by offering an account of the most serious and traumatic abuse they had been 
subjected to. She and her colleagues would then ask “a large number of open questions” with the 
objective of providing a fuller picture of the context for the abuses suffered and how these had 
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affected the victim’s subsequent life. Here and there, and in subsequent interviews, the lawyers 
would ask more detailed questions, pertaining to some aspect of the victim’s account which the 
lawyer considered salient. 
 All responses were translated into English over the phone and these translations typed 
verbatim into individual word processing files. From these, working within the same files, the 
full witness statements were later assembled, each offering a life narrative told in the first person 
in chronological form, from birth and early life up to a concluding reflection on the individual 
claimant’s motivations for bringing the case. In the final versions put to the court, none of the 
lawyers’ questions were included, and these appear only seldom in the earlier drafts I have been 
able to obtain. These texts, then, were constructed from a series of interviews but without ever 
keeping transcripts of these occasions from which a more immediate sense of the nature of the 
victims’ responses to questioning (and indeed the framework of questioning itself) might be 
accessible. It is, however, possible to engage in a limited way with the lawyers’ editorial practice, 
by reading the witness statements alongside their earlier drafts. The testimony is also made, in its 
finished form, by ignoring the specificity of Gikuyu and Kikamba, the languages spoken by the 
claimants, none of whom are fluent in English. No record of the words spoken by the claimants 
in their vernacular was kept. The claimants were present in court for both of the hearings. 
However, questioning was minimal and did not extend beyond necessary formalities. All of the 
evidence presented to the court by the claimants is contained in the witness statements, though 
both Susan Ciongombe Ngondi and Ndiki Mutua passed away while the legal proceedings were 
ongoing and Ciongombe statement is an incomplete draft. Insofar as the witness statements were 
put to work as evidence throughout the court hearings, neither the question of translation nor that  
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of the necessary adaptation and distortion of the words spoken by the victims in interviews, in 
order to form a seamless narrative text, were ever at issue. This can be partially explained by the 
distinction between civil and criminal law in England, according to Read, who said that were it 
to have been a criminal case then transcripts of the interviews would have been produced and 
analyzed as evidence (Read).  Instead, the case proceeded to a significant extent by avoiding the 
question of the difference between the victims and their legal representatives, and how this was 
negotiated in producing the witness statements.  
 The witness statements are, of course, marked by the methodology through which they 
were produced, and the occasion of the court case for which they were submitted as evidence. A 
number of features are generic across all five of the test claimants’ statements, reflecting the 
common techniques used by the lawyers in interviewing and converting those transcripts into the 
finished statements. Each text, for example, begins by framing the narrative body of the 
testimony as a future statement spoken in the High Court in London, for example: “I, Jane 
Muthoni Mara of Kahuhoni Village, Central Province, Kenya WILL SAY as follows.” They end 
with a “statement of truth” signed by the claimant (“This statement is true to the best of my 
knowledge and belief and I am aware that it will be placed before the court,”) and  another by a 
K.H.R.C. official guaranteeing that the victim “appeared to understand [...] the document and 
approved its contents as accurate” (Muthoni, 1). The human rights organization’s signature is 
required in order to vouch for the authenticity and truthfulness of the text; however it is also 
through this signature that the notion of the claimant as the text’s author is called into question.
! It is necessary to confront, rather than defer, fundamental questions about these 
narratives. Who is it that speaks in these texts? Whose voice is heard? To whom does the 
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language of these texts belong? I argue that we encounter in each of the witness statements an “I” 
-- a perspective, a voice -- that is conjured out of the combination of victim, translator, and 
lawyer, who also functions as amanuensis and editor. The principal feature of the genre is that the 
figured self must be legible (for a readership co-constructed by the claimant alongside the legal 
and human rights institutions through which she speaks), as a victim of historical injustice whose 
experience -- and recounting of that experience -- makes reparation both plausible and desirable. 
There are important similarities as well as differences with the genre theorized in 
influential fashion by John Beverley as “testimonio”: “a novel or novella-length narrative in 
book or pamphlet (that is, printed as opposed to acoustic) form, told in the first person by a 
narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts, and whose 
unit of narration is usually a “life” or a significant life experience” (Beverley, 30-31). Beverley’s 
archive is drawn from Latin America, and he describes testimonio as “a narrative form linked 
closely to national liberation struggles inspired by Marxism” (Beverley, x), “a weapon, a way of 
fighting back” (Beverley, xv), and “both an art and a strategy of subaltern memory” (Beverley, 
73). Whereas the witness statements are formed in response to the need for evidence in a legal 
claim, testimonio works at the political level by making a “demand for solidarity with the 
‘wretched of the earth’ ” (Beverley, xvii) in relation to a “situation of narration” marked by 
“urgency” (Beverley, 32). “Something is asked of us by testimonio,” writes Beverley. The text 
places its reader “under an obligation to respond” (Beverley, 1). The analogy Beverley draws for 
how testimonio constructs its reader is an intriguing one for my purposes: “The position of the 
reader of testimonio is akin to that of a jury member in a court-room” (Beverley, 32). This 
kinship is a way of drawing an analogy, but also a distinction. Though he uses the court-room 
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analogy, Beverley does not theorise testimonio as itself a legal genre. The legal function of the 
witness statements means they are not, at least in the first instance, directed towards soliciting 
the solidarity of a general reader or as a “weapon” with which to fight back, signifying “the need 
for a general social change in which the stability of the reader’s world must be brought into 
question” (Beverley, 41). Rather, they call on a court of law to make a judgment that recognizes 
violations of human rights and ameliorates their suffering through a legal verdict and 
compensation. Beverley differentiates testimonio from oral history -- another form of “mediated 
narrative” (Beverley, 47) -- by claiming that whereas in oral history “the intentionality of the 
recorder -- usually a social scientist [...] is dominant,” in testimonio “it is the intentionality of the 
narrator that is paramount” (Beverley, 32). I find it difficult to judge whether, in Beverley’s 
terms, the intention of the lawyer or the claimant predominates in the witness statements in Ndiki 
and Others. The key distinction between these texts and those analyzed by Beverley is their 
function as evidence within a legal process, and the role of lawyers in assembling and shaping 
them so as to perform this function most effectively. I choose to think of them as a specific kind 
of testimonio -- testimonio produced in making the demand for historical reparations via the 
courts.
For further clues on how to treat these texts in their specificity, I look to scholarly work 
on two narrative forms that offer distinct, but not unrelated, kinds of problems to the reader: 
slave narratives and oral history. In To Tell a Free Story: The First Century of Afro-American 
Autobiography, 1760-1865, William Andrews tackles the difficulties presented for any 
assessment of “the validity of the narrative as a product of an Afro-American consciousness” by 
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the heavy involvement of editors in the composition of early black autobiography in the United 
States:
Should an autobiography whose written composition was literally out of the hands of its 
black narrator  be discussed on an equal footing with those autobiographies that were 
autonomously authored by the black subject himself or herself? Many so-called edited 
narratives of ex-slaves ought to be treated as ghostwritten accounts insofar as literary 
analysis is concerned, especially when these works were composed by their editors from 
“a statement of facts” provided by the black subject [...] From a literary standpoint, 
however, it is not the moral integrity of these editors that is at issue but the linguistic, 
structural, and tonal integrity of the narratives they produced. Even if an editor faithfully 
reproduced the facts of a black narrator’s life, it was still the editor who decided what to 
make of these  facts, how they should be emphasized, in what order they ought to be 
presented, and what was extraneous, or germane. It was the editor who controlled the 
manuscript and thus decided how a “statement of facts” became a “fiction of factual 
representation,” [the phrase is taken from Hayden White] a readable, convincing, and 
moving autobiography (Andrews, 19-20).
The texts Andrews reads could be considered in terms of what Mark Sanders, in his reading of 
testimony given at South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, calls “advocative 
storytelling,” inasmuch as they are drawn from the archive of abolitionist literature, within which 
they constitute a major genre (Sanders, 83). Where Andrews tracks the labour of editors in 
producing literary texts, my interest is in the ways in which the lawyers in the “Mau Mau” case 
worked with interviews in translation in order to construct legal evidence in the form of a 
narrative through which the victims of colonial atrocities are said to “speak.” “Problems of 
origin, composition, editing, and control of manuscript,” writes Andrews, “[...] limit the 
conclusiveness of interpretive strategies that require a fully determinate text and identifiable 
“author-function” ” (Andrews, 22).  The methodological adjustment he makes in response to 
these complications is to subject only “autonomously authored black texts” to techniques of 
close reading. However this is not because there is nothing to learn about those texts he considers 
ghost-written by reading them closely, but rather because the argument of his book is specifically  
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about the politics of the very practice of writing for black Americans in the hundred years before 
Emancipation. My own focus is not on thinking the reparations claimants as writers per se, but as 
victims of colonial violence who participate in the production of story forms in order to advance 
their claim for historical reparations. As such, I will read the witness statements, but always 
keeping in view the ever-unsettled question of authorship and attending to the specificities of the 
textual production through which a version of their past is narrated. I read them instead as acts of 
memory and narration in which a distinctive version of “Mau Mau” as an event is articulated, 
and as texts in which a certain space is afforded the victims to speak and to narrate their re-
conception of their experience of anti-colonial struggle in terms laid out for them by a new 
human-rights based paradigm.
 Oral history is another textual form in which authorship functions in a manner other than 
that found in conventional literary or historical writing, and it is possible to think of the witness 
statements as texts produced by a particular practice of oral history tied to the legal case. In many 
ways, the process of assembling the witness statements closely resembles the kinds of techniques 
commonly applied by historians in handling oral sources. Alessandro Portelli’s reflections on 
form and meaning in oral history are especially suggestive here in thinking through the ways in 
which the witness statements are grounded, if not wholly circumscribed by, acts of remembering. 
Portelli theorizes oral history as the medium through which the working class speaks. However, 
he stresses that this speech is always mediated and that the historian is bound to this discourse in 
an ethical relationship. The working class, he writes, “speaks to the historian, with the historian 
and, inasmuch as the material is published, through the historian [...] the historian is responsible 
for the whole discourse” (Portelli, 56). Here, then, another possible model for theorizing the 
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witness statements as a heavily mediated form of autobiographical discourse comes into view, in 
which the role of the lawyer need not be thought in terms of ghostwriter, but as a legal 
representative whose work entails bearing responsibility for the witness statements.
 By Rebekah Read’s account of the interviewing and drafting process, the greatest 
difficulty was in constructing a precise chronology made up of specific dates attached to the 
events the victims recounted (Read). The imperative was to iron out any chronological 
discrepancies through successive interviews, at times jogging the victim’s memory so that their 
recollection aligned more consistently with published historical accounts of the period. This was 
a quite different narrative practice to oral history, in which errors and lapses of memory can 
themselves offer valuable forms of evidence. In The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, 
Portelli begins with a critical reading of a collective “error” found in oral accounts in which 
elderly people of Terni, Italy, recount the killing of a young man by the police. Portelli’s 
argument is that the flaws of memory which typically characterize oral sources are not a 
weakness but a strength: “errors, inventions, and myths lead us through and beyond facts to their 
meanings”(Portelli, 2). Oral sources, Portelli argues, are useful “not so much in their ability to 
preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory. These changes reveal their 
narrators’ effort to make sense of the past and to give a form to their lives” (Portelli, 52). These 
kinds of texts are especially compelling for Portelli because often they entail the reconstruction 
of past attitudes which may no longer coincide with the narrator’s present ones, staging a setting 
side-by-side of past and present selves. “[T]he act  of remembering,” contends Portelli, “is, itself, 
a historical fact operating in the longue durée dimension. It is the task of those who deal with 
history rather than chronicles, to study, not only the mechanics of the material event, but the 
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events of the remembering and the telling -- the patterns of the remembering and the forms of the 
telling -- through which we are able to perceive the “event” in the first place” (Portelli, 73). 
Although the construction of the witness statements was not exactly a work of oral history, 
nonetheless these texts do offer compelling examples of “ a setting side-by-side of past and 
present selves,” and, I think, ought to be analyzed as distinctive instances of “remembering” and 
“telling” that reshape our perception of the anticolonial struggle in Kenya in the 1950s in a 
manner intrinsically linked to the fact that these new narratives were written for the High Court 
in London, in search of reparation after half a century had passed.
III.  Narrating harms for the High Court
The witness statements are relatively rich in (auto)biographical detail. In this way, they run 
counter to the framing of the case in ‘Options for Justice’ (which I analyze in a later section of 
this chapter) as only about torture A much more limited form of testimony would certainly have 
been conceivable, especially as the claimants tended to cut to the chase in the interviewing 
phase, by beginning with the details of the worst atrocities committed against them. Rebekah 
Read explained to me that in a criminal case, a full account of a victim’s life and experience 
would be unnecessary because in criminal law the question of specific criminal actions 
predominates (Read). However, in a civil case the court must preoccupy itself to a far greater 
degree with the problem of quantifying the harm suffered by the victim. In order to do this, Read 
said, it is necessary for the prosecution to present considerably more in the way of “background” 
evidence -- pertaining to the victims’ upbringing, family life, and their experience after the 
crimes committed against them -- that makes the extent of harms suffered visible, with a 
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particular premium placed on trauma.12 The first requirement of the witness statements, then, is 
that they give an account that allows the reader to better quantify the harm inflicted on the 
victim. In order to do this, the witness statements follow a pattern that runs as follows: beginning 
with the details of childhood and early life before the war, the text then gives an account of how 
the victim came to be personally involved in the “Mau Mau” crisis, how they were apprehended 
and detained by the colonial authorities, the details of living conditions in the detention camps 
and the regime of unremitting violence to which detainees were subjected in each camp -- 
Wambugu calls these “stops on the torture tour” (Wambugu, 8) -- followed by an account of their 
eventual release and reunion with their families, detailed descriptions of their mode of life since 
their release and in particular the difficulties they experienced physically and psychologically 
due to what they had experienced in the camp. The claimants describe a variety of physical 
injuries and ordeals, but in each case there is a single experience, a single atrocity which forms 
the focus of the narrative -- castration/genital mutilation and sexual torture in all cases except 
Wambugu, who was beaten unconscious during the Hola massacre but somehow survived. 
Finally, each of the claimants give an account of their reasons for bringing the case (with the 
exception of Ciongombe, who passed away and whose statement was therefore never put into 
finished form).
 All five statements reflect critically and in detail on ordinary life under colonialism 
before the war. An early paragraph in Wambugu’s statement, for example, reads: 
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12 In addition to their statements, the claimants were all subject to medical examination and these 
reports were given in evidence; in English law one cannot claim psychiatric damage without being able 
to demonstrate that one suffers from a recognized psychiatric illness (Read).
I lived and worked on the farm [of a settler nicknamed Kibuthu]. Life in Kenya during 
British rule had benefits, they brought education and religion but what I did not like was 
that they turned people into slaves in their own country. The movement of Kenyans was 
restricted and we were made to work for settlers for  very long hours for very little money. 
The white people took all the good land and squeezed the Kenyans  into small areas of 
unproductive land. I wanted equality and to feel that I was not a foreigner in my own 
country. That was all that I wanted (Wambugu, 2).
Ndiki Mutua’s critique is especially detailed in its description of segregation, in addition to 
exploitation and theft of land:
Life during colonial times was very tough. Whoever made a mistake before a European 
employer or master was beaten mercilessly. They were special shops for Europeans and 
Asians to which Africans were not allowed access for purposes of trade. Even if we had 
money, Africans were not allowed entry into certain shops or hotels owned by either 
Europeans or certain Asians. They could only purchase goods and services from other 
Africans and a few Asians. Africans were not allowed to be seen in Nairobi without a 
work card and identity card. Without cards, Africans would be arrested, beaten severely 
and transported back to their reserves. The Europeans treated Africans like animals. 
Those employed by Europeans were given daily food rations which consisted solely of 
maize meal and skimmed milk. Africans were forced to pay head tax (poll tax) and 
whoever failed to do so was arrested, beaten and sentenced to six months imprisonment. 
There was no freedom within our country and we felt deeply oppressed. We wondered 
how we could suffer so much in our own country while the guests to our country 
prospered at our expense (Mutua, 3).
Like Wambugu, Mutua’s critique of colonial rule is underpinned by a sense of the irony of being 
oppressed in one’s “own country” by supposed “guests.” The quotidian violence he describes is 
intricately bound up with the workings of Kenya’s racial bureaucracy and its legal techniques, 
and is inseparable, in the picture he provides, from questions of diet, travel and freedom of 
movement, taxation, and paperwork. Whereas in those texts which express the demand for 
reparation in the collective “we,” such as in the letter to Gordon Brown, and the institutional 
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voice of ‘Options for Justice,’ both analyzed later in this chapter, the question of colonialism was 
avoided, in this claim the first-person witness statement turns out to be the legal genre in which 
critiques of colonial power are forcefully articulated, with no attempt to abstract colonial 
violence from its political context. In particular, it is in these texts that the collective “we” is 
available for the expression of the experience of colonized groups. This is not possible in the 
joint texts by which an early settlement out of court was sought, where the only viable sense of 
“we” denotes the claimants and their legal representatives. Rather than giving a picture of 
isolated or exceptional suffering, to the contrary, it is precisely in the life narrative of the 
individual victim that the argument is made that the legal and moral wrong of colonial 
oppression was an irreducibly social ordeal.
 The witness statement of Jane Muthoni Mara tells the story of a young girl, born in 1939, 
who spends her teenage years at the epicentre of the “Mau Mau” war. She was born in a tiny 
village in the district of Embu, in 1939, spent her childhood with her three siblings, living off the 
family’s small farm. As a pupil she wrote on the ground since there were no writing materials at 
her school, and she left school following the death of her father from an unknown illness. The 
date of her father’s death is uncertain, but is described as “quite a long period” before the war 
(Muthoni, 2). The statement includes a reconstruction of her political consciousness as a young 
girl, early in the text: 
Before the war I heard that there were white people running the country who used black 
home guards to fight ordinary Kenyans. I knew there was a problem with the whites and 
the farmers because the whites wanted to take our land. I had heard that the whites had 
occupied people’s land and then employed them to farm their own land. I remember that 
the people in Kenya were very bitter about what was happening about their land which 
was their livelihood [...] I heard that there were people called Mau Mau and that these 
were the people who were fighting against the whites who were taking our land. I also 
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heard that there were  many black people called home guards who had been recruited by 
the whites and who were fighting to get rid of the Mau Mau (Muthoni, 3).
The text thus begins not by framing the “Mau Mau” war through Muthoni’s perspective on that 
event as an elderly survivor of it, but rather attempts to reconstruct a description of what she 
knew of the political context at the time, from the perspective of the young Muthoni: “I heard 
that [...] I knew there was [...] I had heard that [...] I remember that [...] I heard that [...] I also 
heard that.” Each of these sentences could plausibly be attributed to the young Muthoni, the 
exception in this passage being, “I remember that the people in Kenya were very bitter about 
what was happening with their land,” which switches back to the perspective of the elderly 
Muthoni, speaking in the present. It also tacks (at least in the translation) from the past simple 
tense to the past perfect, when a consistent use of past perfect would clarify that these are 
Muthoni’s experiences prior to the war. The effect here is to blur the distinction between the 
consciously naive description of the political context as seen from the perspective of Muthoni as 
a young girl, and the “I” who narrates the statement so many years later, as if this broad brush, 
indistinct analysis of the situation were still Muthoni’s understanding today. This effect is 
sharpened by the lawyer’s translation of whatever words Muthoni actually spoke into 
formulations which read as somewhat vague and generalized in English: “the people in Kenya 
were very bitter about what was happening.” 
 The statement recounts Muthoni’s being forced to take the “Mau Mau” oath when aged 
around 14 years old, and the first occasion on which she prepares food for “Mau Mau” fighters, 
at some point in 1953, when her brother , who has joined the fighting in the forests, shows up 
unexpectedly with around 50 other men. This leads to her being put in charge of co-ordinating 
the efforts by women in her village to provide food and laundry services to “Mau Mau” fighters 
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who pass through the village from time to time. One important detail which appears in an earlier 
draft of the witness statement, from 2009, but which was cut from the version submitted as 
evidence, concerns the death of her brother and her sense of enduring loss: “Sadly I was unable 
to speak to my brother properly [on the occasion when she fed him and his companions] and this 
was the last time that I ever saw him. It makes me very sad to think that this was the last time 
that I saw him” (Muthoni 2009, 6). The first sentence appears in court testimony in slightly 
altered form; however the second sentence has been removed altogether. How does one read the 
excision of this reflection from the finished statement given in evidence? What could account for 
it? In the earlier version, this moment lends emotional texture to the early part of the narrative, 
but one explanation for its excision could be the way it tied part of Muthoni’s suffering in the 
present -- “It makes me very sad” -- to an aspect of her experience which is not directly 
connected to physical torture committed against her personally by the British, that is, harms that 
can be quantified for the purpose of the legal case. In this instance, the work of the lawyer as 
editor appears to be to limit the extent to which a sense of interiority is conveyed, except where 
this serves the exigencies of the case.
 The statement continues with a brief description of the experience of being subjected to 
the colonial strategy of “villagization,” forced to burn her home to the ground and build a new 
one at a different village as well as construct the fortifications surrounding it. Life in the village 
was heavily and violently policed by home guards constantly searching for “Mau Mau” and any 
villagers thought to be collaborating with them. The witness statement of Susan Ciongombe 
Ngondi, whose story parallels Muthoni’s in significant ways, is much more detailed on the 
experience of daily life during villagization. Ciongombe’s account details the work she 
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undertook for two to three years of co-ordinating the supply of food to “Mau Mau” fighters 
hiding in Kieni forest. Corralled into a village called Karia by the colonial authorities, she is 
raped by a home guard. Her assessment is that the district officer, who is identified by his 
nickname “Waikanja,” orders both African home guards and white soldiers to rape the women 
held in Karia. Ciongombe refers briefly to the death of her parents while held in Karia -- her 
father from malaria, her mother whipped by the local police -- and stresses the villagers’ 
continued efforts to assist the “Mau Mau” despite the atrocious conditions they were subjected 
to, and the “Mau Mau’s” “resourcefulness” in passing in and out of the fortified village 
undetected.
 From Ciongombe, we hear of the way customary funerary rituals were denied, with the 
dead buried in shallow mass graves. Her text goes into detail regarding the new rituals imposed 
by the colonial government, even when this does not bear directly on the particular injuries for 
which she is suing the U.K. government:
The bodies of the Mau Mau were burned in public. It would be one of the villagers who 
would be asked to get firewood for burning the bodies. The home guards would call the 
villagers to witness the leader being given freedom. The message was that the cause for 
which some of the villages were fighting would also go up in smoke. There were not 
many leaders captured (Ciongombe, 11-12).
While in Muthoni’s text, there are few instances of the people around her differentiating 
themselves amidst the general routine of suffering and abuse she recounts, in Ciongombe’s case 
her brief narrative contains several characters whose particularities bring texture and complexity 
to the narrative. She dwells on the figure of Mwangi Wa Mjogu [sic], a home guard whose 
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responsibility is to sell staple foods to the villagers, who were banned from growing their own 
(this, she says, caused many people to starve):
[Mwangi] sold food to us at the normal price. This man was sympathetic to us. Even 
though he was a home guard he would give free food to women and children or those 
who [sic] husbands had been killed. There were two types of home guards. There were 
some home guards who knew what they were doing. They were part of the struggle and 
were home guards only by name. Mwangi was a Mau Mau sympathiser (Ciongombe, 10).
This observation of the complexities of the political identities at play complicates the tendency 
towards categorizing these in terms of perpetrators (home guards, settlers, and colonial officials) 
and victims (those suspected of being “Mau Mau” or colluding with them), and lends the 
narrative additional depth. Similarly, while the other witness statements present an unremittingly 
bleak picture of life in the detention camps, Ciongombe’s statement includes her memory of 
“Madam,” the official in charge of the camp at Athi River:
She was a white woman. She was a kind nurturing [sic] woman who had a good sense of 
humour. She asked what she could give us to make us happy. She organised for our 
traditional food to be brought into the prison. She made us as happy as we could be in the 
circumstances. Madam saw our injuries and our infected wounds and asked us what had 
happened to us (Ciongombe, 17).
Here, Ciongombe offers a figure that the reader may be tempted to read as a double of herself, 
inasmuch as her compassion for the detainees for whom she is responsible is expressed through 
her recognition of the violence they had suffered -- “Madam saw our injuries” -- and her 
soliciting an explanatory narrative detailing “what had happened to us.” It is worth noting that in 
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Ciongombe’s case, her statement was never finished, that is, redrafted following subsequent 
interviews and submitted as evidence. It is possible that moments of this kind may have been 
excised from a final version, just as Muthoni’s enduring sadness over the loss of her brother was 
elided between the draft from 2009 and that filed to the court.
 There is no clear answer in Muthoni’s text to the question “what and who is the Mau 
Mau?” -- Padmore’s fundamental question back in the 1950s, and still the subject of dispute 
among historians. The figure is defined by its intractability, its elusiveness, as much in Muthoni’s 
witness statement as it is in many other historical accounts, and despite her brother’s 
involvement and her own experience of taking “Mau Mau” oaths, and many direct interactions 
with “Mau Mau” fighters: 
a few of us would take the food to a drop off point and leave the food with a scout. We 
then had to leave. At times, we peeped through the bushes to see who was collecting the 
food and who were the Mau Mau people but when I did this, I did not recognise any of 
the people there (Muthoni, 6).
The “Mau Mau” remain impenetrable to Muthoni as an object of knowledge; her witness 
statement shows her assisting them, but without recognizing them, without knowing who they 
are. Part of the way in which Muthoni’s account may establish credibility, then, is precisely the 
way in which the text disclaims special knowledge of “Mau Mau” “from within,” and constructs 
her as sharing in the common difficulty of resolving the question of what “Mau Mau” was and 
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is.13  In this sense, Muthoni’s account contrasts with the genre of the so-called “Mau Mau 
memoirs,” in which a major trope is their “insider” explanations of “Mau Mau.”
 Reading across the witness statements, the explanations that are offered for the very term 
“Mau Mau” are instructively contradictory. Ciongombe offers a translation of the term itself: 
“Mau Mau was Kiswahili. It stood for M-Muzungu: A-Arundi: U-Ulaya: M-Mafrika: A-Apate: 
U-Uhuru. This translated says “whites go back to Britain, black people to attain independence/
freedom”” (Ciongombe, 3). Wambugu’s account of the term, which appears in the early draft of 
his statement but was largely excised from the final version, is entirely different:
The good name of the KAU [Kenyan African Union] was tarnished by the colonial 
government through propaganda to prevent the movement from spreading. The colonial 
government began to call them “Mau Mau”. The “Mau Mau” were the KAU freedom 
fighters. Mau Mau means “Hau Hau” or “there there” in English. The British were unable 
to say “Hau Hau” and so used “Mau Mau” instead (Wambugu 2009, 3).
Wambugu’s translation of “Mau Mau” is of a piece with his personal experience of being 
targeted for arrest and brutalization as a member of the Kenyan African Union, and reflects the 
colonial government’s well-documented use of the term “Mau Mau” to conflate those political 
organizations in Kenya that were campaigning for greater autonomy as a single terrorist entity, in 
order to legitimate the massive repression from 1952 onwards. The same passage in the finished 
version reads: “The colonial government began to call [the KAU] “Mau Mau”. The “Mau Mau” 
were the freedom fighters” (Wambugu, 3). The lawyers’ decision to cut Wambugu’s fuller 
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13 An example of an account of the period which frames itself in terms of specialized, authentic 
knowledge of “Mau Mau” is Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau from Within: An Analysis of 
Kenya’s Peasant Revolt (1968).
translation from the final version of his statement again indicates a studied avoidance of the 
question of translation in general, and a concomitant tendency to reduce the complexity of the 
claimants’ responses given in interview regarding their understanding of the politics of the war.
 Two of the claimants suffered castration in the 1950s at the hands of Louvaine Dunman,  
a settler from Carmarthenshire in Wales who went by the nickname “Luvai” or “Lovey.” Nzili’s 
statement recounts his abduction by the “Mau Mau” and his experience of fighting in the forest 
war. He is the only one of the claimants who was a forest fighter; however his recollection that “I 
was involved in actual combat against the British army” was cut from his earlier draft. Also cut is 
a direct reference to the occasion in 1957 when he says he met the renowned guerrilla leader 
Field Marshal Dedan Kimathi. This may have been because Kimathi was captured by the British 
in October 1956. However in this case the impulse to iron out errors and misrememberings 
seems to dovetail with the lawyers’ strategic sense that evidence of their clients’ involvement in 
the armed struggle would weaken their claim as victims of torture. Instead, the account of Nzili’s 
time with the “Mau Mau” in the forest stresses the sense of peril he experienced in living among 
the “Mau Mau” and trying to evade capture by the British.  His account details his desertion from 
the “Mau Mau” and his arrest (for possession of a rifle) when he reaches the outskirts of Nairobi. 
Four days later he was pinned to the ground and castrated, having watched this being done to six 
men immediately prior. 
 Mutua’s account of his castration is virtually identical to Nzili’s. Both foreground the 
sense of futures lost as they reconstruct their devastation in the immediate aftermath. From 
Nzili’s statement:
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After I was castrated I thought I had been cut off from any sexual life and that I would 
never be able to marry and have children, which is a man’s pride. I felt completely 
destroyed and without hope. I could not see what the future held for me, I was useless 
and felt genuinely that it was better for me to die. It took years for me to find any hope 
but I have never really recovered from what was done to me at Embakasi on that day 
(Nzili, 7).
And from Mutua’s statement:
When I was back in the cell, I realised that I had been castrated. I felt that my life and my 
future were destroyed. I was wanted to die [sic].  I knew at that moment that I would 
never be able to have a family and a full life (Mutua, 8).
In Mutua’s case, he analyzes the particular form of torture chosen by the British as a specific 
response to his anticolonial commitments, consciously sabotaging the freedom for which he 
fought:
I was fighting for my land and for the future of the children and my family. The people 
who I was fighting against knew that I was fighting for this and they killed that future for 
me. My children could have been doctors or lawyers but I have been denied the 
opportunity of seeing them grow up to be these things (Mutua, 17).
From amongst the litany of atrocities committed by the British during the “Mau Mau” war, it is 
significant that four of the victims who were selected as test claimants had suffered torture aimed 
at their reproductive organs, as young people. In these cases the link between the past and the 
present (what turned out to be their future) is overdetermined and requires little in the way of 
rhetoric from either lawyer or claimant, or indeed imagination on the part of the reader, to 
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produce an undeniable sense of the effects of past violence lingering on in the present. This is 
because these tortures target the body’s capacity to reproduce; the damage is permanent, there is 
no question of healing. The experiences recounted by the claimants are so compelling as the 
grounds for reparation, then, precisely because the harms they suffered are plainly irreparable.
 Analyzing the South African TRC, Mark Sanders theorizes a quintessential “aporia of 
reparation.” That is, that restorative justice can never adequately repair what has been lost, but is 
instead a “perpetual remarking of default” (Sanders, 119-120). For Sanders, reparation always 
involves an uneven joining of monetary and symbolic recompense, but in neither form can 
reparation ever be “enough.” This sense of the constitutive inadequacy of any kind of reparative 
response to the experiences narrated in the witness statements could of course apply to many of 
the other kinds of violence and suffering recounted in them -- the blow to Muthoni’s hip with a 
rifle butt which makes her work as a farm worker painful more than half a century later, Mutua’s 
broken ribs which caused him excruciating pain whenever he happened to sneeze for the rest of 
his life, or the nine years during which Wambugu was detained without trial. However it is the 
victims’ accounts of the torture directed at their reproductive organs that is common to four of 
the five statements, and which forms the central event in all four of these narratives. While the 
evidence of the survivors’ bodies (as well as the stories told of their lives in the witness 
statements), makes risible any notion of attaching authority to the sanitized archive of Britain’s 
“civilizing mission,” the case offers no framework for comprehending the pattern of sexual 
torture and genital mutilation that make the victims’ experience especially compelling claimants 
of reparation.
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The single feature which all of the witness statements share is a particular staging of time. 
Temporality in these narratives is legible primarily through injuries inflicted on the body and the 
aftermath of those injuries. While dates are vague or uncertain, it is wounds and scars through 
which the passing of time is apprehended with the greatest certainty, grounded on the body 
through suffering. This accords with the statements’ raison d'être as stories told in making a civil 
claim, that is, stories which must respond to the imperative of quantifying the harms suffered by 
the victims. Wambugu’s statement is punctuated by moves between different camps and prisons, 
and the time in between is filled almost wholly with descriptions of unremitting beatings and 
killings. Some of these assaults leave scars, which become a reference point. His statement 
recounts the whipping he was subjected to on arrival at Lodwar in the summer of 1954: “I 
believe that some of the scars on my back were caused by this particular beating” (Wambugu, 8). 
The body and its scars serve as a kind of calendar or chronicle around which the past is 
reconstructed.  “I told my family about the torture I had suffered,” he writes, remembering his 
reunion with his family following his eventual release, “and showed them all the scars and 
wounds on my body from years of beating” (Wambugu, 23). The lawyers’ translation of 
Wambugu’s words into the phrase “years of beating” emphasizes the monolithic quality of this 
time as Wambugu recounts it (then, to his family, and now, to the High Court in London), by 
writing “beating” in the singular. In the English translation, the span Wambugu refers to is not a 
time in which a number of beatings took place, but rather a period composed of a single 
continuous assault.
 This structuring of time in terms of violence and pain is especially marked in the lengthy 
passages of the statements in which the lives of the claimants after their release and the end of 
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the “Mau Mau” war are narrated. The sections covering the fifty years or so between the war and 
the filing of the lawsuit are related under two headings: “Physical injuries” and “Pyschological 
injuries.” “The pain [in the back and ribs] was at its worst,” reads Wambugu’s statement, “in the 
early 1960s and gradually got better thereafter but I have had continual pain throughout my life.”  
Muthoni’s account of the way in which her injuries have troubled her, and continue to do so, is 
especially detailed: 
Immediately after my detention this [vaginal] pain was not so bad but it has become more 
intense and more frequent with age [...] At Gathithi I was struck on the right side of my 
back above my hip with a gun butt with such force that I could barely stand. Ever since I 
have been unable to lift heavy objects without intense pain which spreads up my back to 
my neck. I also feel pain when I walk at a fast pace. This pain has been bad ever since the 
beatings and has worsened as I have aged [...] I have to carry things because I am poor 
and cannot pay people to do it for me (Muthoni, 24-25).
This kind of passage is typical across the witness statements. Between drafts, it is possible to 
discern a clear pattern by which interviews subsequent to the 2009 versions must have been 
taken up in large part with having the claimants elaborate on their initially brief and general 
descriptions of their injuries. These narratives are stories which take as their subject the long 
traumatic effects of colonial violence on the bodies and psyches of specific, named individuals. 
In these statements, “Mau Mau” comes to stand for the context in which those people were 
tortured and then marginalized. There is little, if any, room for reflection on the event of 
independence or assessment of life in the postcolony, because the entire period following 
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independence is meaningful only inasmuch as it contains evidence of the enduring harms of the 
colonial counterinsurgency.
 There is also the question of forgiveness, which is only raised by the two claimants who 
suffered castration (we cannot know if this was in response to questions only they were asked by 
the lawyers, or whether they both happen to have addressed the subject independently.) In their 
statements, both Nzili and Mutua reflect on the possibility of forgiving Dunman more than half a 
century on. “I understand that Mr Dunman died in 2008,” reads Nzili’s statement, “[...] But I 
forgive him for what he has done to me. There is nothing I can do, the only thing I can do is to 
forgive. You cannot repay a sin with a sin. That will not give me back what has been taken from 
me” (Nzili, 18). Mutua expressed a quite different view: “If I saw Luvai again I would not spare 
him. What he did to me was so bitter and devastating that I cannot forgive him even though he is 
now dead” (Mutua, 15). From Mutua, on the one hand, we have the notion of forgiving as 
something he cannot do; from Nzili, on the other, the less conventional idea of forgiving as that 
which he cannot not do. Their responses are diametrically opposed, yet they share an 
understanding of themselves as subjects for whom forgiveness is not a matter of choice, subjects 
whose relation to past ordeals has been given rather than chosen, and both responses underscore 
the irrecoverable nature of their loss. The notion of forgiveness as a choice is nowhere to be seen. 
What interests me most here is the way Nzili and Mutua respond differently to their shared 
positioning as claimants of historical reparations. Despite a common experience of that 
predicament as unfree, and of their loss as irreparable, they nonetheless articulate markedly 
distinct perspectives on the nature of the limitations forced upon them. In some aspects, then, the 
lawyers work as editors to produce the effect of political homogeneity across the five statements 
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-- for example, in the way in which Wambugu’s deep commitment to the KAU, or Nzili’s remark 
about his having engaged in direct combat with the British forces, are either excised from the 
final version of their statement submitted in evidence or else de-emphasized. However, in 
another sense, the narratives are made compelling precisely by differentiating between the 
claimants and their individual responses to their ordeal, by producing a clear impression of the 
specificity of their consciousness and experiences.
 By virtue of the way the witness statements were constructed, and the question of the 
statute of limitations, each of the claimants gives an account of recently discovering they had the 
option of legal action as part of their evidence. These moments offer a glimpse of the claimants 
coming to terms with the lived experience of the shift toward a dispensation in which the past -- 
their past, specifically -- is said to have become available as never before in a form whereby 
moral and political claims expressible as legal proceedings may to a significant extent ‘right’ past 
wrongs. Paulo Nzili explains that prior to his initial interview with the K.H.R.C. in 2008, “I did 
not ever think I could take legal action for the torture I was subjected to and I had no idea at all 
that I could file a suit against the British government [...] I had no idea that I could sue anyone 
for what had happened to me” (Nzili, 16-17). He accounts for this with reference to his own 
poverty -- “I have never had enough money to even think about consulting a lawyer”14 -- and to 
Kenya’s independence rendering the question of state culpability ambiguous -- “After all, the 
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14 Jane Muthoni Mara makes the same point in her statement: ““I did not pursue this case earlier 
because I was not aware that I could pursue such a case against anyone. I did not go to see a lawyer to 
find out what my rights were because I did not realise that they would have been able to help me. I have 
never used a lawyer even once in my life and I really do not know what lawyers do. Also it is the case 
that I have never had enough money to consult a lawyer even if I knew that a lawyer could have helped 
me.” Wambugu wa Nyingi, likewise: “After 2003 the ban was lifted but I had no idea about the possibility 
of compensation. I live in rural Kenya. I have never been to see a lawyer because a lawyer would require 
money and I have nothing to give him” (Wambugu, 27).
Government in Kenya was a new government and it did not cross my mind that I could sue the 
Government of Britain in a court in London.” The legal proceedings opened up a new space for 
practices of memory that Nzili had until then attempted to foreclose: “I lead a desperate life. I 
was unable to work or to interact socially. I tried to put the past behind me but I had no hope. I 
was just waiting for death and it was all I could do to try to survive life in Kenya” (Nzili, 17).
Reading the witness statements, one finds little to support the idea that the reparations 
claim might have occasioned in the claimants novel ways of conceiving of themselves and their 
predicament; for example, towards a focus on their own personal injuries and away from a sense 
of the social and historical crises in which they were engaged participants. Rather these two 
dimensions remain knitted together. Ndiki Mutua explains his reasons for legal action as follows:
I am pursuing this claim against the British Government because the actions of the 
colonial officers ruined my life. I was not able to marry or to have children. I was a social 
outcast among my peers. I have never been able to work and build a life which I could 
have had if I had not been castrated on that day. I was never taken to a court, I was never 
told what I did to deserve this treatment. All I wanted was to push for Kenyans to have 
their own land but what I got was a destroyed life. I want to understand why this was 
allowed to happen and I want people to know what was done to me and other Kenyans 
before our country was given independence (Mutua, 21).
For Mutua, his suffering is of an inalienably political character, and his desire is for the 
reparations case to alter historical consciousness at the national level. He juxtaposes the legal 
claim with his earlier participation in underground veterans’ groups, and the demands they hoped 
to make of the Kenyan state: 
I would meet other Mau Mau veterans before 2003 but in secret, until the ban was lifted. 
We would meet and discuss how we sacrificed ourselves to free our country, how we now 
have nothing. We wondered at times if we could ask the Kenyan Government for 
something to compensate us for our sacrifices and suffering because the Kenyan 
Government knew about those who had fought for land and had ended up with nothing. 
We were Mau Mau and we had been banned. We had no rights so I did not think about 
suing anyone [...] Before I was contacted by [K.H.R.C. in 2008] I had no idea that it 
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would be possible to file a suit in London against the British Government [...] I simply 
never had any money to pay for a lawyer on any issue ever in my life. it was simply 
beyond me (Mutua, 20).
This can certainly be read in terms of the legal claim against the British displacing a set of 
political demands upon the Kenyan government, and in particular the question of torture (for 
which the British are no longer presumed to have impunity) displacing the broader social and 
political questions posed by the uprising, as a radical peasants’ movement, and its continuing 
exclusion from the national project. However, the picture here is complex. Mutua does not say 
that the earlier focus on the responsibility of the Kenyan government was misguided and that the 
correct mode of reckoning with the past turned out to have been the suit against the U.K. all 
along. Both states are culpable. By Mutua’s account, the intercession of the human rights agency 
at the moment of the belated attainment of political rights opened up the possibility of a measure 
of compensation for “our sacrifices and suffering”; however the question of postcolonial 
dispossession for which the Kenyan government bears responsibility does not go away: “those 
who fought for land and ended up with nothing.” 
 In this sense, while a new possibility has emerged for addressing the predicament of 
guerrilla fighters, and others implicated by the colonial state, after independence, this new 
possibility cannot, in and of itself, be said to effect a rearrangement of political subjectivity and 
desire at the fundamental level. But does it matter if a reparations claimant scripts his experience 
in this way, and resists in turn the opportunity to forgive? While Mutua doesn’t narrate a 
transformation from oppositional political subject to rights-bearing victim exercising legal 
protections, the conditions by which his claim is made against the British state -- as the work of 
human rights organizations who code his claim “non-political” on his behalf -- are such that his 
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individual testimony is set against the argument of the collective claim. It can be said that an 
important component of the way a reparations claim works is precisely this tension, and its 
resolution within a legal setting which gives far greater weight to institutional discourses than to 
personal testimony. In his densely suggestive critique of collective apologies for historic 
injustices, Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues that their “very conditions of emergence deny the 
possibility of transformation” (Trouillot, 185). A major condition of possibility, he writes, is “the 
attribution of [the independent self of liberal discourse] to states, ethnic groups and nations,” and 
it is this that underpins what in his estimation is the inherent irony of both collective apologies 
and reparations claims: “The very discourse of liberal individualism, the tropes of which now 
allow for the projection of apologetic collective subjects, is fundamentally opposed to the 
recognition of collective rights, including therefore reparative “affirmative” actions” (Trouillot, 
183). The compact through which the legal claim is initiated is not entirely stable; however, not 
only because of its implausible distinction between colonialism and violence, but to the extent 
that for all the compromises, the claim nonetheless cannot exist without opening up a space into 
which the victims may give an account, critically and reflectively, of their experience.
IV. “Not a colonial reparations case?”: framing the case against the British Government
The documents which constituted the legal claim were of two kinds: personal testimonies and 
joint statements, some of which were signed by the claimants while others were written on their 
behalf by their legal representatives. The joint statements act as an important frame for the 
personal testimonies, because the ways in which the past, and its bearing on the present, are 
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narrated diverges sharply across the different kinds of texts. The claimants, the K.H.R.C., and 
Leigh Day were eager for their case to be settled speedily, since the claimants were elderly and 
infirm. In 2009,  Leigh Day submitted a brief document to the British government, titled 
“Victims of British Torture in Kenya -- Options for Justice,” which articulated in outline the 
basis for the claims. Together with the letter addressed to Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
personally from Mutua, Nzili, Muthoni, Wambugu and Ciongombe, these established a 
normative framing for analyzing the claims and how they might be met. Proposals included the 
establishment of a welfare fund for victims to support their daily needs and medical and 
psychiatric treatment, the institution of a transitional justice scheme in Kenya focused on the 
Emergency period, and “community reparations” in the form of “targeted development 
assistance” as an extension of existing initiatives run by the U.K. Department for International 
Development (D.F.I.D.) and international NGOs such as Save the Children (“Options for 
Justice,” 7-10). However, these rather moderate proposals were not the only tactics used in 
seeking to bring the UK government to the negotiating table without the need for court 
proceedings.
 In “Options for Justice,” especial care is taken to figure the claimants as victims of a 
particular kind: elderly, frail, and only loosely or vicariously connected to the armed struggle 
against British colonialism:
Clearly, the Mau Mau themselves used brutal tactics. However, it is important to note that 
many of those tortured were not in fact members of the Mau Mau movement or only 
played a supporting role. Of the five claimants who have issued the test case; one spent 
nine years in detention but had never joined the Mau Mau, three of the claimants only 
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supplied food to the Mau Mau and one had surrendered in response to an amnesty when 
he was detained (“Options for Justice,” 4-5).
The text goes on to assert the a priori illegality of “the torture of any prisoner.” However clearly 
the proof of “systematic torture” isn’t sufficient to render immaterial the question of the 
claimants’ relative proximity to “Mau Mau” and its apparently constitutive “brutality.” The initial 
accusation is that the colonial regime tortured the wrong people; the second that it carried out 
torture in general. The British government is reassured that the demand is not for compensation 
for atrocities committed against those whom it might consider genuine “Mau Mau” fighters, 
whose torture is implicitly placed in a different and more ambiguous category. The demand for 
reparations is strengthened by foregrounding the claimants’ bodily suffering, specifically of 
“unspeakable acts of brutality, including castrations and severe sexual assaults,” while 
simultaneously eliding the question of political consciousness and playing down any 
participation in the violence of anticolonial struggle. This description of the claimants as outside 
of “Mau Mau” ‘proper’ recalls the British colonial authorities’ obsession with categorizing 
detainees on a spectrum denoting the extent to which they had been radicalized by the struggle 
for land and freedom -- from “black” (also referred to as “hardcore”) to “grey,”  and through to 
“white,” which denoted detainees that had been successfully “rehabilitated” (Elkins, 136).  This 
spectrum provided the organizing logic for the “Pipeline” system of detention camps and the 
routine interrogation and torture through which detainees were “screened.”15 Some 50 years on, 
the lawyers evidently considered, surely astutely so, that their clients would have more 
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15 See in particular Chapter Three, “Screening,” 62-90, and Chapter 5, “The Birth of Britain’s Gulag,” 
121-153, in Elkins, Imperial Reckoning.
favourable standing in the eyes of the British state if presented as frail survivors of atrocities they 
did little to provoke, rather than as oppositional agents of armed anticolonial struggle.
 Most crucially, they are figured as victims of colonial violence -- specifically 
counterinsurgent violence during wartime -- rather than colonialism per se; as victims whose 
demand for compensation endorses, even authorizes, from below, the uncoupling of colonialism 
from its violence. The text details “widespread and systematic torture by the British colonial 
regime in the 1950s and early 1960s during the repression of Kenyan independence movements” 
and “unspeakable acts of brutality at the hands of British Colonial Officials including arbitrary 
killings, castrations, sexual abuses and the systematic use of extreme violence.” It then recounts 
the clients’ view that “it is high time for Britain” to face up to its past (“Options for Justice,” 4).  
Yet the point is repeatedly made that the reparations claims pertain only to the ethical and legal 
spheres, and are quite separate from the political. Attention to the language of these documents 
reveals that in the initial phase, the demand for reparation was made principally through this 
repeated argument about the apolitical nature of the claim, and its irrelevance to any broader 
question about colonialism. “Options for Justice” begins with the following assertion:
this is not a historical reparations claim in general terms. The victims are not seeking to 
make a political point about colonialism. This case is about torture and it is driven by the 
surviving victims who live with the consequent injuries to this day and seek recognition 
of the injustice they have suffered (“Options for Justice,” 2).
Here, again, torture is said to displace, or perhaps absorb, any lingering political questions. The 
assumption here is that a bifurcation may viably be made between the ordeal of torture on the 
one hand, and the historical and political context for that crime on the other. That is, the victims 
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have suffered, but the claim based on that wrong needs to be understood as politically 
meaningless if it is to be “recognized.” This point is reiterated later on in the section delineating 
the “Objectives of the Claim”:
To repeat, they do not seek to make a point about colonialism or politics, the sole issue is 
the use of systematic torture and the devastating impact that policy had on their lives 
(“Options for Justice,” 7).
Again, the capacity for the “the use of torture” to be abstracted from “colonialism or politics” is 
insisted upon. The concluding appeal works through the same assertion:
We repeat that this is not a colonial reparations case. What drives this case are the 
individuals who are still alive and who have lived with the effects of torture for 50 years 
and who deserve justice. All the victims are  elderly and, in a few years, the vast majority 
will have died. We urge you to deal with this case proactively, constructively and with the 
urgency it deserves. This is a historic opportunity to right an injustice of enormous 
proportions which was exceptional in British colonial history (“Options for Justice,” 11).
Finally, a markedly similar formulation is offered, this time in the collective voice of the 
claimants themselves, in their letter to Gordon Brown:
Sir, this is not a case about colonialism or about politics. It is about a group of people 
who were tortured and who struggle to live with the consequences of that torture to this 
day. First and foremost, we seek recognition of the historic wrong which was done to us 
and an apology from the British Government (“Letter to Gordon Brown”).
The nature of a legal claim is that it seeks to minimize what is in dispute. This is why ‘Options 
for Justice’ asserts that “there is no factual debate that systematic torture of Kenyans by British 
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colonial officials during the Kenyan Emergency did take place on a vast scale,” and 
demonstratively closes off the question of colonialism itself. 
 What is it, then, that is denoted by “politics” and “colonialism” in  these framing texts? 
And how is their negation freighted, conceptually? Rather than emphasizing the absurdity of the 
notion that an historical reparations claim (“this is not a historical reparations claim in general 
terms”) by victims of systemic torture sanctioned by the British imperial government could be 
labeled “not about politics” and “not about colonialism,” such a reading can instead locate 
repeated invitations to redefine the terms “politics” and “colonialism,” for the purpose of the 
court case, through the constitutive exclusion of precisely those “unspeakable acts of brutality” 
that characterize colonial rule. Any doubts as to whether such distinctions are accurate, let alone 
responsible, are quelled by the fact that it is the victims of colonial atrocities themselves, in 
search of reparations, who nominally frame their injuries such that they are abstracted from the 
broader colonial system constructed through violence for the purpose of massive and enduring 
dispossession and exploitation, of institutional racism at all levels of the Kenyan state, and the 
reconfiguration of politics in Kenya in line with the requirements of the British colonial office in 
London. The case for reparations had to proceed through the repeated disavowal of these 
connections in order to succeed.16 The tortures go unexplained, are figured as egregious crimes 
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16 See Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals: Historical Apologies in the Global Era,” Interventions: 
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, Vol 2, Issue 2, 2000, 171-186.  Trouillot reads historical 
apologies as rituals which are meant to fail: “collective apologies are rituals in history, for history, which 
engage their participants as doers and as narrators, thus on both sides of historicity. Yet collective 
apologies cannot fulfil the promises of their purported assumptions and fail to reconcile these two sides 
of historicity even as they claim them both. They are abortive rituals, meant to remain infelicitous.” (173). 
He goes on to argue: “Jurisprudence is not the drive behind the wave [of historical apologies]. Rather, 
that wave can be read as the ritual overflow of a political impasse in this moment of world history when 
the inability to face structures of inequality -- or even to find a language that describes those structures 
and their consequences -- eventuates in the repetition of gestures that cannot meet their own criteria of 
performance” (184).
with no meaningful political or historical context. Unprovoked by the victims, and unmoored 
from the colonial system, the torture which the claim takes as its object is thus written out of 
history, available to thought only in an abstract, or perhaps mythical, form.17
 The personal testimony is most obviously necessary inasmuch as it contains evidence of 
atrocities. Everything else, those parts of the text in which the “victim” is manifest as a complex 
and difficult subject, would appear to be surplus to the central requirements of the legal claim -- 
except inasmuch as their being ignored or subordinated can be considered a necessary and 
constitutive trope of the reparations claim. We recall that, knowing the legal form of their 
demand and its generic limitations, the first inclination of the claimants when interviewed was to 
simply recount the salient details of the violence and brutalization they had suffered. It was the 
lawyers who then followed up with broad-ranging questions by which to construct a fuller life 
narrative, as context for the experience of the torture at issue. What then happened, by virtue of 
the nature of attempting to address the historical injustice as a problem for the courts, is that 
certain modes of political oppositionality were set under erasure as plausible responses to the 
past in the present. It is not enough for the claim to abstract itself from the political; what is 
required is that it include a difficult, complex, even intractable set of radical political challenges 
by marginalized and dispossessed people, and that these are included in such a way that they are 
recoded as mere background to the fundamental wrong, the experience of torture. The claimants 
are framed as apolitical victims, while at the same time given license to contradict this and to 
critique the very terms by which the claim is structured and advanced. They both speak and are 
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17 I am thinking here of Hortense Spillers’ argument, drawing on Roland Barthes, about the effects of 
what she characterizes as “The Moynihan Report’s” writing of “ethnicity” as “mythical time,” in “Mama’s 
Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” Diacritics, Vol. 17, No. 2, ( Summer, 1987), 64-81. 
“‘Ethnicity’ [as mythical time] freezes in meaning, takes on constancy, assumes the look and the affects 
of the Eternal.” 
spoken for, within an institutional framework in which Kenyan peasants, and their long 
experience of colonialism, are most legible as still-suffering, tortured subjects.
 The legal case narrates the experiences of anti-colonial revolutionaries as those of the 
victims of grave human rights abuses. This chapter begins with an epigraph from Ng!g" and 
Mugo’s play, The Trial of Dedan Kimathi (1976). Speaking as sentence is about to be passed 
down upon him by the kangaroo court, in the play’s final moments, the hero Kimathi offers a 
theory of justice in relation to empire that relies on a distinction between the court-room (at least 
the ‘imperialist’ court-room) and revolutionary struggle:
In the court of Imperialism! 
There has never and will never be
Justice for the people 
Under imperialism. 
Justice is created 
through a revolutionary struggle 
Against all the forces of imperialism. 
Our struggle must therefore continue. (Ng!g" and Mugo, 82)
The judge sentences Kimathi to death by hanging, whereupon the stage/court-room is taken over 
by “a mighty crowd of workers and peasants [...] singing a thunderous freedom song” (Ng!g" 
and Mugo, 84). Half a century after the real Kimathi’s execution, Ndiki Mutwiwa Mutua, Jane 
Muthoni Mara, Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Susan Ciongombe Ngondi, Paulo Muoka Nzili told their 
stories of lives disfigured by the atrocities of the “civilizing mission.” They traveled to London 
to put the old colonizer on trial. From the evidence of their five witness statements, none of the 
lead claimants were under any illusions that  the conditions existed under which anything 
approximating a satisfactory form of “justice” could be achieved by this. Nevertheless, they 
sought redress, and as they walked away from Downing Street together, they too sang a freedom 
song.
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Chapter II | Narrating harms beyond repair: A Grain of Wheat 
We know these stories in their Kenyan accents: the lists of the disappeared, the missing, the 
exiled, the murdered, the tortured, the raped. The political vernacular for this is “historical 
injustice.” I fear using the word “historical” relegates what happened to the past. I now use 
multigenerational damage to indicate ongoing harm and vulnerability [...] this damage extends 
to the ability to imagine something different, something not this, something that might be called 
freedom. -- Keguro Macharia
Care is the antidote to violence. -- Saidiya Hartman
!
Ng!g" wa Thiong’o’s third novel, A Grain of Wheat (1967), is the story of life on the Thabai 
Ridge as its people attempt to recover from the 1950s war and prepare for Kenya’s independence 
celebrations. The novel recounts the experiences of several characters whose experiences 
overlap, during and after the “Emergency,” the official colonial term which functions in the novel 
as a key periodizing concept. The novel thematizes millennial fantasies of messianism and 
redemption, as well as the extreme difficulty of recovering, or imagining recovery, from the 
social catastrophe of counterinsurgency and colonial rule.  The narration of memories is, for the 
most part, what happens in the text.18 The action of the novel mainly comprises characters 
struggling to remember events of the preceding few years and articulate these memories in a 
manner that speaks in some way to their yet more muddled and uncertain present. The narrative 
configures its present on the threshold of independence, and from that present a number of 
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18 The narrative is marked by detailed accounts of memory at work. For example, Chapter Eight begins, 
“Gikonyo could never remember in detail his experience on the first few days of his return home. 
Everything remained like a misty dream and he found it difficult to tell Mugo a coherent account of what 
really happened. Again he groped for words and occasionally threw his despairing arms in the air.” (140) 
Later in the same chapter, Mugo goes for a walk through the village at night: “As he walked through the 
night, many scenes in his life flashed across his mind; he would be frightened, thrilled, repelled, etc., in 
turns at each succeeding scene. And strangely everything ended in last night’s saying from the bible: he 
shall judge the poor of the people, he shall save the children of the needy, and shall break in pieces the 
oppressor. The words tickled something in him, they disturbed a memory. The memory was of a day in 
May 1955. Kenya  had been in a state of emergency for about two years. Mugo went to his shamba 
[...]” (142).
characters narrate their memories of prior moments, such as the weeks leading up to the arrest of 
Jomo Kenyatta and the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1952, the six years of intensive 
British counterinsurgency characterized by villagization (the conversion of villages into de facto 
internment camps) and the “pipeline” of detention camps for “screening” mainly those identified 
by the colonial government as Kikuyu, and finally the period from 1958 during which many 
detainees were released and returned to their homes. However, the narrative never situates itself 
in the thick of the war itself, among the forest fighters. Rather, that space is a constitutive 
absence.
# Inasmuch as the novel has a main character, a substantial portion of the narrative centres 
on Mugo, a former detainee who lives alone and longs for a quiet, private life. He has proven an 
especially perplexing figure to scholars of Ng!g"’s work. Mugo is a survivor of the Rira 
massacre, in which eleven detainees were beaten to death (a clear allusion to what became 
known as the Hola massacre, though Ng!g" doesn’t use that name).19 A popular idea of Mugo as 
a great hero of the anti-colonial struggle has emerged among his neighbors, despite the fact that 
the whole argument against British rule has been incomprehensible to him all along. This 
reputation is based on his intervention to prevent Wambuku (the lover of the guerilla hero 
Kihika) from being beaten to death by a loyalist soldier, as well as his refusal to confess the 
“Mau Mau” oath while in detention, his apparent imperviousness to coercion and torture and his 
status as a survivor of the Rira massacre. However, unknown to everyone but himself, prior to 
his detention Mugo betrayed Kihika to the British, who captured and executed him. Mugo is 
asked to speak at the forthcoming independence festivities, and specifically to expose the home-
guard Karanja as Kihika’s betrayer, after which Karanja would be executed as a kind of 
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19 See Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, especially 344-356. She concludes: “In the aftermath of Hola it was 
simply impossible for the British to remain any longer in Kenya” (Elkins, 353).
inaugural revenge-sacrifice for the new nation. He reluctantly agrees to this itinerary, but is 
tormented by guilt and doubt at the same time as he fantasizes that his survival at Rira has 
divinely ordained him as a popular leader. When the time eventually comes for him to recall his 
heroism, he instead confesses to his betrayal of Kihika in the novel’s climactic scene. 
# There is also the story of the carpenter Gikonyo, a freedom fighter turned entrepreneur, 
whose idyllic marriage with Kihika’s sister Mumbi, the most beautiful woman in Thabai and a 
metaphor for the nation,20 has disintegrated following Gikonyo’s confession of the oath and 
heavily overdetermined return from six years in detention -- “His reunion with Mumbi would see 
the birth of a new Kenya” (Grain, 121).21  He finds Mumbi has had a child by his rival Karanja, 
the colonial loyalist who was once Kihika’s best friend. Interspersed among the narratives of 
Thabai is that of John Thompson, a colonial officer, as he confronts the very last days of British 
rule. Thompson was responsible for the massacre at Rira as commanding officer (he specifically 
victimized Mugo in that role), after which he was re-assigned to a remote forestry research 
station at Githima. Karanja works in Thompson’s office, and dreads his impending departure -- 
“to Karanja, John Thompson had always assumed the symbol of white-man’s power, unmovable 
like a rock, a power that had built the bomb” (Grain, 176).
79
20 For a detailed account of Mumbi as an archetypal figure in the creation myth central to Gikuyu 
metaphysics, see Charles A. Nama, “Daughters of Moombi; Ngũgĩ’s Heroines and Traditional Gikuyu 
Aesthetics,” 139-149, in Carole Boyce Davies & Anne Adams Graves eds. Ngambika: Studies of Women 
in African Literature (1986). Nama reads Mumbi, alongside other “heroines” in Ngũgĩ’s fiction, as a 
“strong” character who represents “traditional values” and “the essence of Gikuyu existence” (144). I 
would suggest that Mumbi be read in terms of what Gikandi foregrounds as “the play of allegory and 
irony” in the novel (Gikandi, 107).
21 Also 133 “Six years he had waited for this day; six years through seven detention camps had he 
longed for it, feeling, all the time, that life’s meaning was contained in his final return to Mumbi. Nothing 
else had mattered” and women in general 121 -- “he clung to Mumbi and Wangari as the only 
unchanging reality”. Textual quotations are from the 1967 edition unless otherwise indicated.
# I read A Grain of Wheat as a fiction that offers a lesson in imagining irreparability -- 
forms of damage for which there is no prospect of repair -- and encourages thinking questions of 
harm and repair in a quite different register to that provided by the new revisionary histories and 
the lawsuit. Though the novel figures the harms suffered by the community it describes as so 
profound as to be irreparable, I argue that this should be thought of as part of the fiction’s 
decolonizing work and not as a departure from a properly oppositional itinerary. The chapter is 
divided into two sections. Firstly, I read A Grain of Wheat, attending in particular to the novel’s 
singular staging of time, the crisis its characters recursively encounter in remembering the events 
of their lives subject to counterinsurgency and narrating these memories. I analyze Ng!g"’s 
formal experimentation in writing Mugo’s messianic fantasies, and juxtapose these with 
Wambugu wa Nyingi’s nightmares recounted in his witness statement for the High Court in 
London, and detail the tentative figures Ng!g" offers for repair and renewal. The chapter’s 
second section examines the ways in which earlier readers articulated their sense of radical 
political orientation against colonial power in their scholarship on A Grain of Wheat. I show that 
a preoccupation with thinking through forms of colonial harm and the tenuous possibilities of 
repair has been an important aspect of some such responses, and not of others.
If it feels like my reading risks anachronism -- i.e. what does the novel do in relation to a 
reframing of the historical events it deals with some 50 years after its publication? -- then I hope 
at least to work towards what Cristobal Silva calls, in Miraculous Plagues (2011), a “productive 
concept of anachronism” (Silva, 12). Silva’s reading of Seventeenth Century political and 
theological writing in terms of the modern concept of epidemiology utilizes its anachronistic 
aspect as a means of “defamiliariz[ing] epidemiological analysis from its modern medical and 
statistical operations in order to read it as narrative,” and “defamiliariz[ing] narrative histories 
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that segregate medicine, theology, and law into their own specialized modern disciplines, and 
[transforming] our relation to the materials of literary history” (Silva, 11-12).22 I connect this 
capacity of anachronism to defamiliarize, identified by Silva, with J. Hillis Miller’s 
preoccupation with theorizing the possibilities of “anachronistic reading”:23 
A poem encrypts, though not predictably, the effects it may have when at some future 
moment, in another context, it happens to be read and inscribed in a new situation, in  ‘an 
interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets,’ as Jacques Derrida puts it in 
Specters of Marx. (Hillis Miller, 75)
Hillis Miller uses a range of terms for this “form of sign to sign relation across a temporal gap in 
the future rather than the past,” including “proleptic foretelling,” “prediction,” “prospective 
allegory,” “forecast,” “foreseeing,” and “future chiming,” concluding that “poetics has no good 
term for this,” and settling on “prefiguration” as the best approximation (Hillis Miller, 82-83). 
For my own reading of Ng!g", I am less interested in the question of authors displaying some 
kind of prescient or prophetic facility than I am in the emphasis Hillis Miller places, via Derrida, 
on a mode of reading that “transforms” (or in Silva’s terms, “defamiliarizes,”) the text.24
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22 The Oxford English Dictionary describes one sense of anachronism through the metaphor of 
“harmony”: “Anything done or existing out of date; hence, anything which was proper to a former age, 
but is, or, if it existed, would be, out of harmony with the present; also called a practical anachronism.”
23 J. Hillis Miller, “Anachronistic Reading,” Derrida Today, Vol 3 Issue 1 (2010) 75-91. See also J. Hillis 
Miller, “Waves Theory: An Anachronistic Reading,” in Communities in Fiction (2014).
24 Hillis Miller’s citation from Derrida is from his essay, “Conjuring--Marxism,” in Specters of Marx: The 
State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International (1993, English trans Peggy Kamuf 1994). 
Derrida does not himself make a connection between “an interpretation that transforms the  very thing it 
interprets” and anachronism; however the question of temporality is of central concern. Much of the 
essay is a critique of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) as “essentially a 
Christian eschatology” (76). For Derrida, the western liberal notion of the end of history -- that is, itself, 
“the capitalist paradise” (93) -- requires Christian figures and tropes in order to articulate itself, imagines 
itself as a kind of gospel (that text which, in the evangelical understanding, transforms its reader: the 
good news).
I. Re-reading A Grain of Wheat: Imagining the irreparable
In this chapter, I offer a reading of A Grain of Wheat as a text for learning how to imagine the 
irreparable nature of certain forms of harm. By “imagine the irreparable,” I mean that the novel 
narrates, and teaches the reader to notice, forms of damage for which there is no prospect of 
repair. The new historical work and the court case against the United Kingdom government have 
above all centred atrocities, especially torture, in reframing decolonization in Kenya and 
describing the harms for which the British government bears responsibility. By contrast, the 
novel narrates modes of damage to social and political life that extend well beyond colonial 
violence as inflicted on the body, such as the redirection of colonial violence as intensified 
gender oppression, the fracturing of community and family life, and the loss of valued modes of 
imaginatively connecting past, present and future, at both the personal and political level, 
including ways of imagining freedom. 
# Such a reading as I am proposing may ultimately supplement demands for reparations by 
introducing a different register -- a literary one suffused with irony and doubt -- for 
understanding forms of harm and possibilities for response in the present.  Approaching the 
novel with the question of repair in mind is a far from straightforward, perhaps counterintuitive, 
move. A possible name that I offer for this mode of reading is “anachronistic.” I argue that such 
an approach may lead a reader to dwell upon particular moments and textual details that reward 
closer reading than they have hitherto received, and this proves suggestive for rethinking the 
novel and deepening one’s sense of its richness and complexity. 
# A Grain of Wheat stages the depth of the social crisis in Kenyan society at the end of 
colonial rule. This is by no means limited to the relation between colonizer and colonized only. 
The problem of gender, and the relation of gender to colonial power, is a major theme in the 
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novel. To read the novel now, is to feel the profound limitations of reparation, its impossibility -- 
then or now. This is not to say that the novel is anti-reparative or even opposed to what we might 
term the politics of reparations, but rather that the novel may teach us to insist on the 
fundamental irreparability of colonialism at a time when efforts to claim reparations may entail a 
rhetorical strategy of uncoupling of colonialism, as a system of domination, from its atrocities. 
As a reader of A Grain of Wheat, one feels the depth of the crisis, the loss, the harms done, and 
something of the scale of the repercussions down the years. Whereas the testimony submitted as 
evidence is tasked with helping to “quantify the harms” of the victims, the literary here can help 
us to insist that the social harm is permanent, that (however desirable in themselves) financial or 
symbolic reparations, apologies, goodwill gestures and the disclosure of colonial papers from 
that era can never approximate to “making good” the damage that was done.
# On one view, A Grain of Wheat offers an unpromising text for productive re-reading with 
such questions in mind. Nowhere in the novel is there any articulation of the notion of British 
colonial power being called to account for the harms it inflicted on the society depicted in the 
narrative. The text displays no preoccupation with the question of reparation, at least not in 
anything resembling the terms through which that question is thought about today, as the 
uprising and counterinsurgency has been taken up as an exemplary case for righting the wrongs 
of the colonial past. Inasmuch as part of the work of the text is to figure a set of questions 
concerning life in Kenya after the Emergency period, the possibility of the demand for a measure 
of recompense from the colonial regime on account of its crimes forms no part of the novel’s 
imaginative horizon. 
# There are two fleeting moments (beyond the title and epigraphs) where something like a 
generalizable notion of reparation as a response to historical harm is figured. In both cases, the 
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task, or practice, of reparation is described at a remove from the formal political or judicial 
sphere. Early on, the narrator reports:
Mugo took refuge in reticence. People went on with their daily work, reconstructing that 
which had been broken. Elections came. People voted the Party into power and resumed 
their toil. (Grain, 77)
Here, following the account of Mugo’s speech in “Chapter Five,” the narrator describes the non-
specific “daily work” of an undifferentiated “people” in terms of the reconstruction of a 
generalized entity, “that which had been broken.” There is no sense of a special institution or 
moment in which this reconstruction or repair occurs. Instead, it is located within the quotidian, a 
mending by means of normalization, and even routinization. The perfunctory tone of the 
description of popular involvement in electoral politics serves to distinguish sharply between the 
“toil” of “reconstructing that which had been broken” and the political sphere, which is thus 
figured, somewhat ironically, as a realm divorced from the responsibility of repair. Later, Mumbi 
quarrels with her mother, who has encouraged her to return to her husband Gikonyo: 
‘I’ll not go back to that house. I may be a woman, but even a cowardly bitch fights back 
when cornered against a wall.’ Wanjiku felt with Mumbi. But hers was a delicate task of 
mending that which was torn. ‘We shall talk about it, my child,’ she said in a softened 
voice. (Grain, 206)
Like the earlier phrase, the precise nature of “that” which was torn/broken goes unspecified. The 
most obvious referent would of course be Mumbi and Gikonyo’s symbolically freighted 
relationship. Wanjiku’s “delicate task” is begun not through rhetoric or coercion, but by her 
opening up the promise of intimate future discussion between them. 
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# On both of those occasions in the novel in which the work of reparation is figured as the 
apt response to the repercussions of the reordering of everyday life brought about by colonial 
repression of the Land and Freedom struggle, then, that task is written of in terms of work to be 
done to address damage wreaked during the Emergency at the local level and in the intimacy of 
the private sphere. It is not that the British colonial regime is not depicted as bearing 
responsibility for the harms wreaked by both colonial rule in general and the counter-insurgency 
campaign of the 1950s in particular.  Yet the thought of the British, individually or collectively, 
being made to face any kind of reckoning is altogether absent: the location for repair is self-
evidently local.
# I read A Grain of Wheat as a tragic fiction. If the novel thematizes various ways of 
imagining a radical transformative social recovery from the depredations of British colonial rule, 
often through distinctly Christian rhetorics of  prophecy, divine providence, sacrifice and 
redemption, these are always narrated ironically as hopes with scant foundation in the 
characters’ material social and political realities. Bathetic motifs of failure and non-arrival run 
throughout the text, descriptions of hopes frustrated and aspirations come to nought: memories 
forgotten, appetites lost, sexual impotence and the absence of desire. The novel begins with 
Mugo struggling to sleep -- “He tried to shut his eyes. They would not close” (Grain, 3) -- and 
experiencing constipation -- “Several times he tried to force something out into the smelling pit. 
Failing, he pulled up his trousers” (Grain, 12). On his return from the camps, Gikonyo “failed to 
sleep. Six years he had waited for this day” (Grain, 133). This failure to rest is accompanied by 
an inability to remember and narrate: “Gikonyo could never remember in detail his experiences 
on the first few days of his return home. Everything remained like a misty dream and he found it 
difficult to tell Mugo a coherent account of what really happened” (Grain, 140).  In the late, 
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eponymous chapter, the loyalist Karanja reflects on his predicament in an eating-house in 
Githima. His tea “had gone cold, and he pushed it aside. Life was empty like the dark and the 
mist that enclosed the earth. He paid for the meal he had not eaten, collected his bag and guitar 
and walked towards the door” (Grain, 261).  
# This is a poetics of failure, of non-arrival, of anti-climax, of amnesia. Formal 
independence is days away for most of the novel, but none of its subjects can make any 
satisfactory connection between their immediate, deeply painful and traumatic past, and the 
political future which lies before them. A project of remembering falls flat here, at least in the 
assessment of the narrator: “the many wounds which our people had suffered were too fresh for 
the eye to look at, or the hand to touch” (Grain, 75). This is, crucially, not a disavowal or 
silencing of the memory of atrocities and suffering, but rather an acknowledgment of the 
complexity and pain entailed in any effort to translate embodied harms into a discourse with any 
sort of shared, social dimension, and of the immense delicacy required of any testimonial or 
reparative project. Mumbi enjoins Mugo to provide an authoritative testimony: “Speak to the 
living. Tell them whom the war maimed, left naked and scarred. The orphans, the widows. Tell 
the people what you saw” (Grain, 209-210). Here, testimony is invested with great authority, 
precisely for its capacity to be an authentic account of harms conceived principally through 
imagery of bodily injury. Such an account of what one has seen begins to sound like both 
testimony and prophecy, foregrounding the visionary aspect of that witnessing, its capacity to 
transform the present and future through a narration of ocular memory. “I saw nothing,” comes 
Mugo’s bathetic reply, characteristically shirking the responsibility and power offered him 
(Grain, 210).
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# The multiple instances of what Gikandi calls “the act of remembering as a narrative 
moment of forgetfulness” (Gikandi, 118),  are frequently linked with the narration of the 
experience of a disintegrating sense of temporality. Mugo’s act of heroism -- intervening to save 
Wambuku from being beaten to death -- is obscure to him: “the scene remained a nightmare 
whose blurred and broken edges he could not pick or reconstruct” (Grain, 196). Shortly after, the 
narrator offers Mugo’s thoughts: “Life itself seemed a meaningless wandering. There was surely 
no connection between sunrise and sunset, between today and tomorrow” (Grain, 198). This 
moment is reminiscent of another in which Mugo recalls Kihika entering his hut, thus rendering 
him suspect in the eyes of the colonial security apparatus: “A few minutes ago [...] the future 
held promise. Everything in the hut was in the same place as before, but the future was blank [...] 
He saw only prison and death” (Grain, 220). The novel’s staging of time involves lengthy and 
recurrent flashbacks, punctuated by sections set in the novel’s present. One of the novel’s formal 
accomplishments is the way in which it stages for the reader the profoundly vexed experience of 
temporality at the end of colonial rule that is thematized within the narrative.
# Much of the novel’s strangeness, and the source of many of the difficulties it has posed to 
critics concerned with reading the text as a coherent re-statement of Ng!g"’s political and critical 
positions, has to do with Mugo, the ambiguous main character, and especially his connection 
with Kihika. “The great irony of the novel,” writes Gikandi, “is that the Thabai community has 
come to invest all its desires and aspirations in this naked and hollow man” (Gikandi, 109). An 
orphan who struggles to construct intimate social relationships, and to whom anticolonial ideas 
are incomprehensible, Mugo can only dimly comprehend any political dimension to his 
persecution by colonial forces, yet is nonetheless consumed by messianic fantasies of himself as 
a redemptive popular leader. He is both hero and traitor, a witness to colonial brutality whose 
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confession of his own treachery turns him into Thabai’s scapegoat, both victim of the Rira (Hola) 
massacre and its miraculous survivor. A major part of his reputation is his well-known refusal to 
confess the oath under torture, though he insists to Gikonyo: “There was nothing to 
confess” (79). For much of the novel, as in its opening chapter, we find him paralyzed by dread 
and confusion. Mugo’s secret -- that he betrayed Kihika to the British, who then executed him -- 
weighs heavily because of the deep investment the villagers have placed in him as an heroic 
successor to Kihika -- “he is Kihika born again” says Wambui (Grain, 204) -- and especially in 
the power of his language. The speech he is asked to give at Thabai’s independence celebrations 
is freighted with profound metaphysical expectations; it is to be the authoritative, stabilizing 
account of the ever-uncertain past upon which the villagers may then construct their present and 
future. The investment of total moral authority in a single survivor, conceived of in allegorical 
terms as the personification of the freedom struggle, turns out to be a deeply problematic 
tendency, based on a delusion that only Mugo himself may remedy. Mugo is a uniquely ill-suited 
object of this collective desire for absolute moral clarity; indeed it is this unsuitability that 
defines his character.
# As a reader of A Grain of Wheat after Mutua & others vs FCO, I cannot fail to notice the 
uncanny parallel between Mugo’s experience of the Emergency and that of Wambugu Wa 
Nyingi, one of the five test claimants and the only one not to have suffered sexual torture and 
mutilation, and wonder about how to read this parallel, what to do with it. What would it mean to 
think of Mugo -- both hero and traitor, victim and perpetrator, a paradigmatic figure of moral 
confusion and ambivalence, complicity, vanity, amnesia, ignorance and messianic delusions -- 
alongside a reparations claimant like Wambugu? Thinking of Mugo and Wambugu together is an 
example of what I mean by productive anachronism.
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 The notorious Hola massacre of March 3,1959, was initially covered up by the British, 
but soon came to be seen internationally as the single outrage definitive of the end of colonial 
rule in Kenya. Wambugu gave a detailed account of his experience in his witness statement:
we were set upon by guards. I was battered on the back of my head and around the neck 
repeatedly with a club. I believe that the beating went on for up to 20 minutes. I saw one 
detainee very badly injured and his insides were exposed. All of a sudden another 
crushing blow hit the back of my head. I saw red and I passed out. All the 11 were killed 
with clubs and no firearms were used. I lost my friends, Migwe Ndegwa and a Turkana 
detainee. I lay unconscious with the 11 corpses for two days in a room where the corpses 
had been placed awaiting burial. The people who put me there thought I was also dead 
but I was in fact unconscious. A European doctor came to check the bodies. As he was 
checking the bodies he noticed that I was alive and I was taken to a hospital outside the 
camp. I regained consciousness on my second day in hospital, the third day after the 
incident. The other survivors informed me that I had laid with the dead for two days 
before I had been taken to hospital. They said, “you are so lucky, god loves you so much 
that you slept corpses [sic] for two days and survived.” (Wambugu, 21-22)
It is worth noting that Wambugu doesn’t mention a hunger strike as part of the context for the 
massacre, but rather a labour strike from the work of digging their own graves (most of the 
accounts I have read state the detainees were attacked after being told to dig a trench as part of 
the camp’s irrigation system, as part of prolonged colonial efforts to ‘break’ the ‘hardcore’ 
grouping within the camp).25 “When I was released,” reads Wambugu’s witness statement, “I 
would have nightmares about three times a week. I would dream about the murder of people at 
Hola” (Wambugu, 25). I want to try to connect this nightmare, mentioned by Wambugu in his 
statement which forms part of the project of “quantifying the harms” for the High Court in 
London, with a dream of Mugo’s, about the same historical event, a dream which constitutes 
perhaps the strangest moment in A Grain of Wheat.
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25 See for example survivor Paul Mahehu’s account in Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 346.
 Mugo’s survival of the same massacre (fictionalized as “Rira”) is fundamental to the 
esteem in which he is held by the villagers. “People say the man talks with God and receives 
messages from the spirits of the dead,” Mwaura tells Karanja in Chapter Ten. “Or how do you 
explain that at Rira he escaped while ten of those involved in the hunger strike died? And 
remember, he was leader?” (Grain, 181). The account of the massacre in the novel is as follows:
Among other things they wanted to be treated as political prisoners not criminals. #Food 
rations should be raised. Unless these things were done, they would go on #hunger-strike. 
And indeed on the third day, all the detainees, to a man, sat down on strike. Thompson 
was on the edge of madness. Eliminate the vermin, he would grind his teeth at night. He 
set the white officers and warders on the men. Yes -- eliminate the vermin.
But the thing that sparked off the now famous deaths, was a near-riot that took 
place on the third day of the strike. As some of the warders brought food to the detainees, 
a stone was hurled at them and struck one of them on the head. They let go the food and 
ran away howling murder! Riot! The detainees laughed and let fly more stones.
# What occurred next is known to the world. The men were rounded up and locked 
in their cells. The now famous beating went on day and night. Eleven men died.
This was foremost in the mind of Mugo as on the following day after his vision he 
walked towards Gikonyo’s home. In his miraculous escape from death, he now saw the 
guiding hand of fate. Surely he must have been spared in order that he might save people 
like Githua from poverty and misery. He, an only son, was born to save. The exciting 
possibilities of his new position agitated him and lured him on. He would tell Gikonyo 
his decision to lead the people of Thabai in the Uhuru celebrations. Thereafter, as a chief, 
he would lead his people across the desert to the new Jerusalem. (Grain, 152-3)
Mugo’s memory of the massacre produces a notion of himself as the singular, providential 
survivor, and in turn a full-scale messianic vision. There is no obvious basis for this fantasy; 
indeed, what stands out is the tenuousness of the connection between his memory of the 
massacre and the attempt to parse his survival in terms of a grand redemptive narrative. Mugo’s 
imaginative leap into this fantasy of his own survival as a kind of anointment has the effect of 
rendering the massacre politically meaningful as one part of a story of divinely ordained 
liberation, and this fantasy serves to displace any moment of mourning, of despair, of 
acknowledging the dead, of marking his own trauma. What is unbearable, and what the 
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messianic fantasy works to occlude, is the tragic possibility that the deaths have no positive 
political meaning whatsoever, that there is nothing to be done.
# This account of the massacre, and of Mugo’s memory of it, comes shortly after one of the 
most complex and peculiar moments in the novel, the end of Chapter Eight and the beginning of 
Chapter Nine. Mugo has a conversation with Githua in the teashop at Kabui, during which 
Githua tells war stories, of supplying bullets to Kihika and having one of his legs shot off by “the 
whiteman” (Grain, 145). (In the next chapter, General R tells Mumbi and Mugo that these stories 
are untrue, and that he lost his leg in a traffic accident) (Grain, 172). Githua pleads with Mugo: 
“Remember me. Remember the poor” (Grain, 145). Mugo’s fantasy while walking home then 
segues into a nightmare: 
He felt he could embrace the whole night, could contain the world within his palms. For 
he walked on the edge of a revelation: Gikonyo and Githua had brought him there. He 
remembered the words: he shall save the children of the needy. It must be him [...] Yes. 
He would speak at the Uhuru celebrations. He would lead the people and bury his past in 
their gratitude [...] In bed that night, he dreamed he was back in Rira. A group of 
detainees were lined up against the wall, naked to the waist. Githua and Gikonyo were 
among them. From another corner, John Thompson came holding a machine-gun at the 
unfortunate men against the wall. He was going to shoot them -- unless they told what 
they knew about Kihika. All at once, Githua shouted: Mugo save us. The cry was taken 
by the others: Mugo save us. The suppliant voices rose to a chanting thunder: Mugo save 
us. And John Thompson had joined the condemned men and he was crying out louder 
than all the others: Mugo save us. How could he refuse, that agonized cry. Here I am, 
Lord. I am coming, coming, coming, riding in a cloud of thunder. And the men with one 
voice wept and cried: Amen. (Grain, 146)
The epigraph for Chapter Nine, immediately following on the facing page, can also read as a 
postscript to the end of Chapter Eight, just quoted:
# And the Lord said, I have surely seen the afflictions of my people which are in Egypt, and 
# have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters; for I know their sorrows. 
 Exodus 3:7
 (verse underlined in red in Kihika’s Bible) (147, italics original)
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This epigraph directly juxtaposes the scene of Mugo’s dream -- his fellow prisoners and John 
Thompson lined up against the wall, crying out together for him to save them -- with the “cry” of 
the Israelites in Egypt, and the voice of God supplying the response they ask from Mugo.26 The 
next chapter, Chapter Nine, begins in a quite different register: 
Learned men will, no doubt, dig into the troubled times which we in Kenya underwent, 
and maybe sum up the lesson of history in a phrase. Why, let us ask them, did the incident 
in Rira Camp capture the imagination of the world? For there were other camps, bigger, 
scattered all over Kenya, from the Manda Islands in the Indian Ocean to the Magata 
Islands in Lake Victoria. (Grain, 149)
The move from the end of Chapter Eight to the beginning of Chapter Nine is one of the most 
difficult and formally experimental passages of the novel to analyze. There is Mugo’s dream, re-
imagining the Hola massacre as a kind of ritual acceptance of a messianic role for himself, able 
to ‘save’ both the racialized victims of colonial counterinsurgency and the colonizer. The most 
striking feature of the dream, in my view, is the switch John Thompson makes, from torturer and 
killer to Mugo’s noisiest “suppliant.” One might read this as a figure, emerging from Mugo’s 
dreamwork, for colonial power seeking a form of absolution from its victims. The connective 
tissue between chapters is its own text, the epigraph placed at the “edge” of the main narrative, 
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26 Throughout his writing life, and across his chosen genres of textual production, Ngũgĩ has invariably 
deployed a broad range of paratextual devices, including dedications, epigraphs, acknowledgments, 
prefatory notes and statements. In my view, this should be considered a central aspect of his writing 
practice. Perhaps the most famous of all Ngũgĩ’s paratexts is “A Statement” that precedes the 
“Introduction” to Decolonising the Mind (1986) in which he describes the book as his “farewell to English 
as a vehicle for any of my writings.” (Decolonising, xiv)
reporting divine speech and God’s recognition of suffering and oppression.27 Then there is the 
opening of Chapter Nine, at which point the Biblical register falls away, in favour of what 
Gikandi points to as the clearest moment at which the novel “parodies historicism [...] as a mode 
of narration” (Gikandi, 122). I read the form of the question as marking a distinction between 
future historians of Kenya and a collective -- an “us” formed through the text, comprising the 
author, the reader, the narrator, and/or the characters. The topic of inquiry is also significant. The 
notion of history as morally instructive is ironized as “sum[ming] up the lesson of history in a 
phrase.” The question enjoins attentiveness to the chanciness of the politics of sentimentality 
around atrocity when local experiences are routed through global circuits -- “the imagination of 
the world” -- and the tendency to think moral and political questions through singular episodes of 
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27 Gerard Genette includes a chapter on epigraphs in his study Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (1987, 
English translation 1997). Genette’s “rough” definition of the epigraph is “a quotation placed en exergue, generally 
at the head of a work or a section of a work” (Genette, 144). He then clarifies: “en exergue means off the work, 
which is going a little too far [...] the exergue is rather at the edge of the work, generally closest to the text.” One 
important potential function Genette attributes to the epigraph is its capacity of “commenting -- sometimes 
authoritatively -- and thus of elucidating and thereby justifying not the text but the title” (Genette, 156). Often, he 
argues, this takes the form of effectively explaining “a borrowing, an allusion, or a parodic distortion,” which 
supplies a text’s title. In such a case, for Genette, the supplementary use of an epigraph “is almost a must” (Genette, 
157). All of the epigraphs in (or at the “edge” of) A Grain of Wheat -- whether following Ng!g"’s dedication and 
author’s note or between ensuing chapters --are drawn from scripture and sustain the thematics of death (or 
suffering) and the prospect of renewal gestured at by the novel’s title. Genette considers several examples of texts in 
which the “epigrapher” is identified as the narrator, as one way of helping to “establish the narrator as [...] an 
imagined author” (Genette, 155). The epigrapher in A Grain of Wheat, certainly of those epigraphs said to be 
passages underlined in Kihika’s Bible, is ambiguous. With the exception of narrator-epigraphers, Genette’s wide-
ranging survey of epigraphs doesn’t mention any equivalent instance of an epigraph’s attribution belonging to a text 
or artifact from within the fiction itself. The fact that Kihika’s inscriptions are described in the epigraphs may help to 
explain in part why many critics, as we shall see, tended more or less to conflate Ng!g" with his narrator, and both 
author and narrator with Kihika. Genette is most alive to the epigraph as a moment of difficulty and obliqueness: an 
epigraph is an occasion when the reader’s “hermeneutic capacity,” he writes, “is often put to the test” (Genette, 158). 
The effect of puzzling a reader has, in Genette’s view, become one of the defining features of the epigraph as a 
literary trope: “The ordinary reader, when not helped by some editorial note, most often remains in a state of 
uncertainty as the epigrapher intended, and is often left to his conjectures or his indifference” (153).  Developing the 
notion of the epigraph as an invitation to conjecture or indifference, Genette concludes, with some relish: “The 
semantic relevance of epigraphs is often, as it were, random; and without the least ill will, one can  suspect some 
authors of positioning some epigraphs hit-and-miss, of believing -- rightly -- that every joining creates meaning, 
often the most stimulating or most rewarding: to think without knowing what you are thinking -- is that not one of 
the purest pleasures of the mind?” (Genette, 158).
brutality at the expense of a more structural analysis. The juxtaposition between Mugo’s dream, 
God’s speech reported in Exodus, and this ironic questioning of future historians is abrupt. 
Whereas Mugo’s speech flows into the Exodus verse, a thematic connection emphasized by the 
inclusion of the conjunction “And,” there is a sort of cut between the epigraph and the parody of 
historicism that begins Chapter Nine. Mugo, Thompson and the other detainees pray for 
redemption, the epigraph relates God’s recognition of suffering in captivity; however the act of 
salvation itself never arrives. Instead there is this curious questioning of historians-to-come 
regarding the relation between a single atrocity, exceptionalized within the global imagination, 
and the wider system of which that atrocity forms a part. What is being staged, it seems to me, at 
this peculiar joining of chapters, is an uneven and tenuous connection between the experience of 
suffering and the spiritual aspiration towards redemption, on the one hand, and the capricious, 
arbitrary, incomplete nature of moral response predicated on the writing of history for a global 
public. There is also the suggestive juxtaposition of the vision of the torturer-bureaucrat 
Thompson pleading with Mugo to “save” him (colonial power seeking absolution from its 
victims), and the historiographical focus on exceptional instances of colonial violence. This 
might be read as anticipating the personification of imperial power as an apologetic liberal self, 
as critiqued by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, for whom: “The very discourse of liberal individualism, 
the tropes of which now allow for the projection of apologetic collective subjects, is 
fundamentally opposed to the recognition of collective rights, including therefore reparative 
“affirmative” actions” (Trouillot, 185). The narrator in A Grain of Wheat ironizes the notion of 
colonial power attempting to absolve and re-legitimize itself through selective and strategic 
recognition of its most outrageous crimes. 
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# How, then, to think about this difficult dream of Mugo’s in relation to the nightmares 
Wambugu records in his witness statement? The different modes of discourse brought together at 
this chapter break in A Grain of Wheat speak to the capacity of the novel to sustain ambiguity, 
and to stage the experience and aftermath of suffering (and the different relations that may be 
constructed between that suffering and futurity) as especially intractable. Wambugu’s nightmare 
functions to provide evidence of harm and to assist the court in thinking harm in as empirical a 
way as possible. Without a detailed description of his dreams, they register as valuable evidence 
of the prolonged (but general) effects of the violations committed against him on his interior life. 
Mugo’s dream has no such evidentiary function, of course. One might read Mugo’s episodic 
sense of messianism as an effect of the trauma he has endured, deep spiritual and psychological 
harms figured on the level of prose as a distortion of his imagination and capacity to form both a 
rational explanation for himself regarding his experience of colonial brutality and a grounded 
understanding of his social relations after the fact. None of the three modes of response to the 
catastrophe -- radical individualism, appeals to divine providence, the writing of local histories in 
search of a global readership -- are convincing. The novel narrates the inadequacy of forms of 
redress and models a radical form of inquiry as its own response, a question to future historians 
about the relationship between the counterinsurgency in Kenya and “the imagination of the 
world.”
*
Inasmuch as the novel thematizes the aspirations of survivors towards renewal and repair in a 
sympathetic way, such moments are centered on the role of women and the possibility of child-
rearing. The relationship between Mumbi and Gikonyo, the carpenter, is a major narrative thread 
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through which a fracturing of imaginative forms of connection between past, present and future 
is narrated. In this case, the problem of gender is central. Gikonyo’s suffering in detention camps 
for six years figures principally as a young love thwarted, and the disruption of his romance with 
Mumbi, is central to the novel’s staging of the aftermath of the counterinsurgency as a crisis of 
emasculation, and of an ambivalent perspective on the masculinity under attack. Following his 
release from detention, we read: “The day of deliverance was near at hand. Gikonyo would come 
back and take the thread of life, but this time in a land of glory and plenty [...] Six years later, it 
was the image of the thread that still appealed most to Gikonyo’s imagination as he walked along 
a dusty road back to Thabai” (Grain, 120). Once again, the hoped-for future is given in a 
Christian messianic idiom of redemption.  His homecoming to Mumbi is highly overdetermined: 
“His reunion with Mumbi would see the birth of a new Kenya” (Grain, 121). Through these 
characters and the story of them he tells, Ng!g" adapts the Gikuyu creation story of Gikuyu and 
Mumbi into his fiction. The central concept of that myth -- a single heteronormative relationship 
as the life of an entire people -- is ironized through this inflated description of their personal 
reunion as a form of social rebirth. This is exemplary of the “constant switch[ing] the author 
makes between allegory and irony,” that Gikandi argues “generate[s] the energy of this 
novel” (Gikandi, 110). Gikonyo’s rival, the traitor Karanja, also invests his desire for Mumbi 
with great significance, expressed in frank patriarchal terms: “If he got Mumbi, his life would be 
complete. Uhuru and its threats would not, nothing would ever touch him, ill” (Grain, 239). 
Though the reader must prefer Gikonyo, both he and Karanja can only conceive of their desire 
for Mumbi in terms of a property relation.
# Gikonyo’s discovery, on his return, that Mumbi is pregnant by Karanja is narrated as the 
loss of a highly gendered, liberated future and the sense, instead, of an overdetermined assault on 
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his masculinity -- “everything had conspired to undermine his manhood” (Grain, 141). Ng!g"’s 
narrator is careful to specify the failure or deferral of the figures Gikonyo had constructed for 
himself in imagining possession of Mumbi as the telos of his captivity: “Life had no colour. It 
was one endless blank sheet, so flat [...] And who had thought of life as a thread one could 
continue weaving into a pattern of one’s desire?” (Grain, 132). Earlier: “The day of deliverance 
had receded into a distant future” (Grain, 123). Here female infidelity -- even where, as in 
Mumbi’s case, consent was out of the question -- poses a near-insurmountable problem to the 
anticolonial teleology as Gikonyo has imagined himself within it. 
# He fantasizes about killing the child (Grain, 132) before resolving instead never to speak 
of it, never to acknowledge it: “I would never talk about the child” (Grain, 138). This resolution 
is accompanied by a sociopathic turn -- “to live and die alone was the ultimate truth” (Grain, 
135) -- and later by his fantasy of reasserting his masculinity through gender violence: “He was 
angry with everybody [...] He would thrash Mumbi until she cried for mercy” (Grain, 200). 
Here, the colonial oppression to which Gikonyo was subject is redirected as violence (or the 
desire for violence) against women, indeed against the very person whose relationship with him 
had been anticipated as birthing “a new Kenya.” In A Grain of Wheat, gender is narrated as both 
the principal unexamined structure of an anticolonial nationalist imagination, and a structure 
through which colonial violence is refracted and embedded at the social level. This is especially 
clear in the scene during which General R confronts his father regarding the frequent abuse his 
mother is subjected to. “The son did not see a father, but a perpetrator of unprovoked violence, a 
petty colonial tyrant” (Grain, 240-241). His mother shocks him by taking his father’s side -- 
“proudly defending slavery,” as the narrator observes. The way in which forms of gender 
violence are interwoven with the structures of colonial power is a major theme of A Grain of 
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Wheat. Colonial violence is re-routed, through the emasculated survivor of the colonial state’s 
counter-insurgency, against Kenyan women.
# Mumbi’s child, nameless for the reader, is in my view an especially significant figure in 
the novel. The title of the final chapter, “Harambee,” has been read by Peter Nazareth as a play 
on the well known nationalist slogan -- “pulling together,” i.e. collective mobilization towards a 
common goal --  in terms of a more intimate question about “whether the fragments of the 
wounded souls can be pulled together” (Nazareth, 131-132). I find this thought highly 
suggestive, particularly for thinking through ways of analyzing the role of Mumbi’s child. The 
chapter begins with the memory of a freedom dream of Gikonyo’s: “Wamumu was Gikonyo’s 
last detention camp [...] As he dug canals, Gikonyo often looked out across the flat plains and 
saw the Mbere and Nyambeni hills that cut Embu from Ukambani. He knew the land belonged to 
Wakamba. Yet Gikonyo always imagined home and Mumbi as lying behind these hills” (Grain, 
277). The description of Mumbi as his longed-for home, and the way in which she is described 
as part of the landscape, are consistent with Gikonyo’s tendency to think of her in mythical 
terms. The final chapter is set in Timoro hospital, where Gikonyo is recovering from a broken 
arm. From that hospital bed, he remembers first conceiving of the project of “carving a stool 
from wood, a wedding gift to Mumbi” (Grain, 277). I quote at length in order to show the 
precise way in which Ng!g" connects the past (moment of captivity) with the present (moment of 
recuperation), using the dreamed-of stool as the point of connection between them:
The idea gradually took concrete shape as he worked in the sun amidst the river-decay 
and the muddy earth. He would carve the stool from a Muiri stem, a hardwood that grew 
around Kirinyaga, and Nyandarwa hills. The seat would rest on three legs curved into 
three grim-faced figures, sweating under a weight. On the seat he would bead a pattern, 
representing a river and a canal. A jembe or a spade would lie beside the canal. For days 
afterwards, Gikonyo thought about the carving. The men’s faces kept on changing; he 
altered the position of their shoulders, their hands or heads. How could he work a river in 
beads? Shouldn’t he replace a jembe with a panga? He puzzled over little details and this 
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kept his mind and heart away from the physical drudgery. He hoped to work on the stool 
as soon as he left detention. Lying in hospital, Gikonyo was again possessed by a desire 
to carve the stool. He had been in Timoro for four days. For the last three days he thought 
of Mugo and the confession [...] At night, he went over his life and his experiences in the 
seven detention camps. What precisely had all these years brought him? [...] It was on the 
fifth day that he recalled Mweya and his desire to carve a stool. He stirred in the hospital 
bed, careful not to lie on the plastered arm. At first it was a small flicker, the sort he used 
to feel at the sight of wood. Then, as he thought about it, he became more and more 
excited and his hands itched to touch wood and a chisel. He would carve the stool now, 
after the hospital, before he resumed his business, or in-between the business hours. He 
worked the motif in detail. He changed the figures. He would now carve a thin man, with 
hard lines on the face, shoulders and head bent, supporting the weight. His right hand 
would stretch to link with that of a woman, also with hard lines on the face. The third 
figure would be that of a child on whose head or shoulders the other two hands of the 
man and woman would meet. Into what image would he work the beads on the seat? A 
field needing clearance and cultivation? A jembe? A bean flower? He would settle this 
when the time came. (Grain, 277-279)
Throughout the novel, we encounter characters engaged in vexed, agonized moments of 
remembering, in which the relation between past and present is obscure and the reader is 
frequently disoriented. Here, at the novel’s closing, a moment of connection between past and 
present is narrated, through a combination of memory and Gikonyo’s imagination in the present, 
which has the effect of enlivening him, even as he recovers from injury. This is the only moment 
of its kind I can locate in the novel, a moment when flashback is generative, yielding a lively 
imaginative response in the novel’s present. This concluding scene is singular within the text, 
because the memory is not merely repetitious, a dead end, but, as anaphora often does in verse, 
leads to variation, improvisation. Gikonyo’s imagination is set to work revising and expanding 
upon his earlier desire, his freedom dream of the wedding-gift stool. 
# As Gikonyo enters into this creative reworking of aspirations that sustained him during 
the freedom struggle, it is also at this moment that he is at last able to acknowledge and 
recognize, however hesitantly, Mumbi’s child fathered by Karanja while in captivity during 
villagization. Mumbi visits him in hospital:
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# “You did not come yesterday,” he told her, accusingly. Mumbi sat on the bed and took her 
# time before answering.
# ‘The child was ill,’ she said simply.
# ‘What -- what is wrong with -- him?’
# “Just a cold -- or ‘flu.’
# ‘Did you take he -- him to the dispensary?’ (Grain, 279)
This is the first moment in the novel when Gikonyo speaks about Mumbi’s child. The child 
remains nameless, but Gikonyo (who internally has hitherto referred to the child as “it”) here 
acknowledges the child’s gender, the difficulty and significance of this recognition for him 
marked by his blundering over the pronoun -- “he -- him” -- even as he assumes a measure of 
responsibility for the child’s care and wellbeing. Thinking of the child as a figure for what the 
Emergency generated, I read this moment, allegorically, as an acceptance that while he cannot 
‘own’ the social and political conditions that have emerged following the freedom struggle in the 
sense of being sovereign over them (“the birth of a new Kenya,”) he is better served by engaging 
his responsibilities towards the legacy presented to him, especially through a practice of care, 
than by remaining circumscribed by a version of a masculinist anticolonial imagination whose 
hopes of owning the postcolonial future have been disappointed.
 # It is with what I read as Gikonyo’s faltering acceptance of a different orientation to the 
aftermath of he and Mumbi’s ordeal that the novel ends. On the very last page, he tells Mumbi: 
“Let’s talk about the child” (Grain, 280). She defers this -- “No, not today” -- and also rejects his 
suggestion that she return to their home and “see things don’t decay”:
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No, Gikonyo. People try to rub out things, but they cannot. Things are not so easy. What 
has passed between us is too much to be passed over in a sentence. We need to talk, to 
open our hearts to one another, examine them, and then together plan the future we want.
As she leaves his bedside, Gikonyo once again thinks of the wedding gift stool and gives the 
novel’s very last image: “I’ll change the woman’s figure. I shall carve a woman big -- big with 
child.” Gikandi offers a pessimistic reading of the novel’s ending: 
It is significant that the novel ends with stories built around subjects (Karanja, Mugo, 
Wambui and Warui) who call attention to the complex -- and undoubtedly ironic -- 
problems on which the foundational narrative of independence will be built, and not those 
characters (Gikonyo and Mumbi), whose allegorical or symbolic function is obvious. 
Gikonyo will carve a stool to commemorate Mumbi’s role as the mother of the nation, but 
such utopian gestures will not resolve the problems embedded in the stories of failure and 
betrayal associated with people like Karanja and Mugo (Gikandi,126). 
This reading is faithful to the sense of hopelessness conveyed by the novel as a whole, and is an 
especially helpful description of Ng!g"’s technique of juxtaposing fleeting idealistic visions of 
recovery with more grounded accounts of the quotidian and tragic experiences of the novel’s 
characters. However, I wish to direct special focus to the particular way in which Ng!g" resolves 
what Gikandi terms Mumbi and Gikonyo’s “belief in historical restitution” (Gikandi, 126). 
Gikonyo marks the difference between his emerging mode of constructing Mumbi as the object 
of his desire and what had gone before: “in future he would reckon with her feelings, her 
thoughts, her desires -- a new Mumbi.” Though the narrative centres Gikonyo’s experience, and 
with it his optimistic assertion of a future he will be able to fashion for himself, the ending is 
highly ambivalent on the prospects for repair. Mumbi’s figure of “try[ing] to rub out things,” is a 
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textual metaphor: there can be no “easy” erasure, nor will a mere “sentence” suffice. Instead, she 
calls for lengthy and intimate deliberation between them as the only viable response to the harms 
they have suffered. Rather than dwelling on the wound (the key trope in reframing the 
anticolonial struggle in terms of human rights abuse), Ng!g"’s text offers the child -- both the 
“illegitimate” son Gikonyo has learned to acknowledge and the child he re-imagines himself 
having with Mumbi -- as the lingering figure at the ending of this novel of life in the aftermath of 
the catastrophe of colonial rule. A child is not something to be healed or bandaged, does not 
anticipate a scar on the body or speak directly of prior violence, but is rather, primarily, another 
subject in need of permanent care, nurturing, education. Tragic as the novel surely is, Ng!g"’s 
text leaves its reader with this fragile figure for thinking questions concerning redress.
II. Early critical readings of A Grain of Wheat
In his major study of Ng!g"’s corpus, Simon Gikandi (2000) has pointed to the limitations of 
“reading Ng!g"’s [literary] works through his ideological pronouncements,” and periodizing 
those works accordingly, rather than thinking of them as what Gikandi calls, “a continuous -- and 
often agonized -- search for the narrative forms that might best represent the complex culture of 
postcolonial Africa and as a reflection of the contradictions inherent in any attempt to synthesize 
aesthetic forms and cultural formations in a continuous state of flux” (Gikandi, pp.1-2). Gikandi 
marks his surprise that, “given Ng!g"’s struggle with the crisis of representation in his non-
fictional writing [...] so many critics have written on his ideological dilemma as if it were 
independent of aesthetic problems” (Gikandi, p.11). This is, in my view, a salutory critical 
intervention within literary scholarship on Ng!g", which has overwhelmingly understood the task 
of reading Ng!g" as one of rationalizing his literary work in relation to his critical reflections on 
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writing and politics, of bringing the fiction and the non-fiction of particular periods of his career 
into some sort of alignment, even agreement.28 The governing assumption has been that his 
criticism and his literary production may be read as a single, more or less coherent statement. As 
Gikandi argues, this trait has tended to flatten out the complexities and ambiguities of Ng!g"’s 
critical thought, just as it has produced scholarly readings that have usually been more attentive 
to whatever might be construed as his fiction’s ideological content than to its literary 
experimentation: the narrative form, rhetoric, irony and metaphor he has committed to paper. 
In this section I offer an account of the major preoccupations that I notice in reading 
earlier critical work on A Grain of Wheat, from the debates about the nature of Ng!g"’s 
“commitment” begun in Transition and in the early numbers of African Literature Today during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, to the scathing 1990 attack on Ng!g"’s early “bourgeois fiction” by 
Ali Mazrui and Lupenga Mphande, and the emergence of the novel’s relationship to written 
history as a central question for criticism. Critics have made use of a number of different but 
related frames in making arguments concerning the radical emancipatory politics (or otherwise) 
of Ng!g"’s fiction. Key framing concepts in this regard have included: “commitment,” 
revolution, revisionist history, and Fanonism. In this dissertation I contest the notion that the 
politics of repair should be thought of in opposition to earlier, properly emancipatory forms of 
politics. The second part of this chapter routes this question through a range of earlier critical 
scholarship on A Grain of Wheat. My reading shows that some of those critics whose work 
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28 Ngũgĩ’s own early reflections, in his “Author’s Note” to Homecoming (1972) on the relationship 
between his essays and his novels is pertinent: “ The present collection of essays is an integral part of 
the fictional world of The River Between, Weep Not, Child, and A Grain of Wheat. Most of them were 
written at about the same time as the novels; they have been the products of the same moods and touch 
on similar questions and problems. There are differences. In a novel the writer is totally immersed in a 
world of imagination which is other than his conscious self. At his most intense and creative the writer is 
transfigured, he is possessed, he becomes a medium. In the essay the writer can be more direct, 
didactic, polemical, or he can merely state his beliefs and faith: his conscious self is here more at 
work.” (Homecoming, xv)
asserts a radical itinerary struggled to parse the ways in which A Grain of Wheat thematizes the 
profound and permanent nature of the harms inflicted by counterinsurgency (and concomitantly 
the great difficulty of recovery and repair), and found it hard to assimilate the formal qualities of 
the novel with Ng!g"’s own theories regarding the political function of the literary. However, 
Peter Nazareth, who also understood the political character of his study in radical terms, was 
interested in understanding the specific ways in which the novel stages questions of harm and 
repair. He found no contradiction between his sense of A Grain of Wheat as both a text 
committed to emancipation, and a fiction that narrates the counterinsurgency as a catastrophic 
event of a kind for which no form of redress could be adequate. 
Derek Elders’ review of A Grain of Wheat appeared in the very first number of African 
Literature Today in 1968. Elders’ appreciation for the novel was focused on what he saw as the 
complexity of its characters by comparison with those in Ng!g"’s first two novels, Weep Not, 
Child and The River Between. “These characters are not postulates in an illustrated debate,” he 
writes, “but people living with a recognizable identity as individuals, living their lives and facing 
their problems in a vividly caught environment” (Elders, 52). For Elders, the literary quality of 
the text was to be found in what he termed its “moral ambiguity”: “the inner lives, the personal 
aspirations of the chief characters are brought into conflict both with each other and with Uhuru 
[...] It is to Ng!g"’s credit that, in this novel, he fully recognizes that the compromises and 
disappointments of personal life are not solved by a political ‘new deal.’ Uhuru is not the easy 
solution to problems: it is their inescapable context” (Elders, p.52).29 The major flaw Elders 
locates in the novel is what he describes as the “paste-board” depiction of John Thompson, the 
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29 Eustace Palmer echoed Elders’ views on this question in his chapter on Ngũgĩ in An Introduction to 
the African Novel (1972): “In the depth of its psychological penetration and the power of its 
characterization, in the subtlety of its narrative technique, in the density of its texture, and in the 
sophistication of its language, it exceeds all expectations raised by the two earlier novels.” (24)
colonial officer, and especially his career shift “from the visionary-turned-bureaucrat to the brutal 
head of a detention camp” (Elders, p.53).30 The theory of literature here, as it emerges in reading 
Ng!g"’s text, is that literature works in a different way to critical or political discourse because 
literature, for Elders, ought not to express anything so vulgar as an argument. Elders makes no 
mention of Ng!g"’s non-fiction in his review, instead praising Ng!g" for not allowing political 
concerns and commitments to ruin his novel. Not all of Ng!g"’s critical readers have responded 
in the same vein, by any means; however the central place of a marked position on the proper 
relation between political writing and the literary has been a hallmark of criticism on Ng!g"’s 
fiction.
! The following year, in the very next issue of African Literature Today, Ime Ikiddeh put 
forward a different response in his essay, “James Ngugi as Novelist.” 31 Like Elders, Ikiddeh 
thought of A Grain of Wheat as a text that represented a culmination of Ng!g"’s literary craft, 
demonstrating its development in relation to the earlier, more “simple” novels (Ikiddeh, 9). 
However, as he praised the novel’s relative complexity -- “a panoramic drama [...] a galaxy 
compared with earlier novels” -- Ikiddeh pondered the ramifications of the text’s pattern of 
flashbacks to conjure “past-with-the-present” in relation to an overdetermined sense of what the 
text -- as Ng!g"’s -- ought to be (Ikiddeh, 8):
If a finger was to be raised against A Grain of Wheat it would be pointed at this very 
facet, this artistic excellence in organization. For the problem of the writer in achieving it 
becomes the problem for the reader. The distinction between the past and the present is 
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30 Among Elders’ most ambiguous statements in his review is the following highly suspect claim: “it is 
unfortunately easy for an African writer to remain unaware of the resonances of the language and hence 
unwittingly invite the wrong kind of ironic response from a European reader.” (53)
31 Several years later, Ikiddeh would write the ‘Foreword’ to Ngũgĩ’s first collection of essays, 
Homecoming: Essays on African and Caribbean Literature, Culture and Politics (1972).
sometimes so blurred that the reader loses his way and finds himself in a tangled mesh. 
Ng!g" is too much a believer in the social responsibility of the writer to pursue any art for 
art’s sake. It is for this reason that one would raise a finger not of indictment but simply 
of caution. It is a case of clarity of story unwittingly sacrificed for the art of the novel. 
(Ikiddeh, 9)
I find this to be a very suggestive moment in thinking about how Ng!g"’s fiction has often been 
read. In sharp distinction from Elders, for whom the text’s narrative complexity and ambiguity 
was a sign of literary merit, for Ikiddeh the critical problem he constructs for himself is how to 
demonstrate that the text’s literary effects -- and specifically its figuring of overlapping 
temporalities -- have not strayed too far from Ng!g"’s stated conception of writerly 
responsibility. 
# A key term in the early criticism on Ng!g" was “commitment.” 32 What, these readers 
wished to discover, was the precise nature of his fiction’s commitment, and how was this 
commitment disclosed on the level of the text? While a postgraduate student at Leeds alongside 
Ng!g" (the pair had been friends since their days at Makerere), Peter Nazareth initiated a debate 
on these questions through the letters page of Transition, elaborating a position on the connection 
between literary expression and a text’s social and political context, by focusing on the situation 
of “the African writer” and Ng!g" in particular. Nazareth’s first letter was a response to the 
review of Weep Not, Child by M. M. Carlin which appeared in Transition 18 (1965). In a similar 
vein to Derek Elders’ later review of A Grain of Wheat, Carlin had offered fulsome praise for the 
novel on account of what he took to be its detachment from political questions:
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32 For a sense of the centrality of “commitment” as a question for critical debate during this period, see 
for example three essays included in Black Orpheus, Vol. 3, Issue 2, (1968): Ali Mazrui, “The Patriot as an 
Artist,” 14-23; Okot P’Bitek, “The Poet in Politics,” 29-33; and Ezekiel Mphahlele, “Writers and 
Commitment,” 34-39.
In general, this book is too delicate in feeling -- the delicacy can be felt in many different 
parts, for example in the love of Mwihaki -- to be classified as a simple ‘committed’ work 
[...] Nobody wants that dull dog, the People’s Artist, with his Mission and his 
‘realism’ (which is remote from reality); and certainly East Africans can be grateful that 
their future has been spared this example. (Carlin, p.54)33
Nazareth’s quarrel with Carlin’s reading was as much about the conception of literary production 
underpinning it as with Ng!g"’s novel itself. “Of course,” he writes, “certain areas of human 
experience are personal and individual and, in order to explore them, the artist should remain 
committed only to the truth of his vision and sensibility. But when writing about individuals in a 
changing present-day society, the African writer cannot but be committed; that is to say, unless 
he is perfectly satisfied with the status quo, unless he thinks the new society is ordered in the best 
way possible and change is not desirable” (Nazareth, “The African Writer and Commitment,” 
Transition 19, 6). “I suggest,” he continues, “that several African writers in independent Africa 
will find themselves committed to a kind of socialism -- that is, to a society in which there are 
not inequalities by the very way it is ordered [...] The realm of literary prophesy is a dangerous 
one, but I think that when James Ngugi comes to write a novel dealing with the problems of 
present-day Kenya, he will probably be committed to a kind of socialism [...] There is no such 
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33 Carlin: “These scenes of violence are perhaps mainly responsible for the reaction of some English 
readers against the novel; who maintain that the treatment is the opposite of dispassionate -- that the 
work is closer to propaganda than it is to art. This view depends I think on arithmetic: the atrocity-count 
of Weep Not, Child, -- if that’s the way you wish to judge the matter -- most definitely disfavours the 
Europeans; and since the violence does come through so shockingly, the result is generally 
discomforting to Western and especially to English readers. But a work of art is not an account-book. 
The fair-mindedness -- the artistic detachment -- of the author comes in the implicit assessment of the 
act of violence itself, and of the human beings involved in it. The point is this: Are the Mau Mau Heroes? 
Are the Settlers the Villains? Is there ‘good’ violence and ‘bad’ violence? The answer is, no. In one 
quarter of opinion this answer will reluctantly be accepted; in another it will not be a recommendation.” 
M. M. Carlin, “Politics and the Artist” review of Weep Not, Child, in Transition 18 (1965) 53.
thing as the uncommitted writer; there is only good art and bad art” (“The African Writer and 
Commitment,” Transition 19, 7).
# Nazareth’s letter was met with a scathing reply from one T. E. W. Rickord of the Bank of 
West Africa in Uyo, Eastern Nigeria. Rickord upbraided Nazareth and his argument as “both 
naive and illogical,” before explaining that while it was “the duty of the creative writer (as 
opposed to the propagandist) to reflect society in all its aspects, not as a deliberate exercise in 
condemnation or approval but rather to enable the community to benefit -- if it so wishes -- from 
a lucid exposition of itself,” nevertheless, “an honest recognition of existing social questions [...] 
should not be allowed to dominate the purely literary considerations of the work.” Despite the 
bombastic tenor of his prose, Rickord’s point had some subtlety to it. His particular suspicion 
was that reading contemporary African fiction (he cites “Achebe, Ng!g", Ekwensi, Nzekwu and 
others”) for “commitment” at that specific moment, during a time of such profound historic 
upheaval, might not yield much insight. “Because Africa is in transition,” he concluded, “neither 
its present nor future may be easily assessed and, in these circumstances, commitment can only 
take the form of abstract moral or political advocacy” (Rickord, 6-7). As I re-read Rickord’s 
letter, I notice with some surprise that I am drawn to certain elements of his critique: his sense of 
the literary as a flexible, non-coercive space and of literary effects as contingent, the idea that 
literary production is not exactly (or not only) an intentional thing, the demand he moves toward 
for a more nuanced sense of “commitment” as a critical term, and indeed his appreciation for 
nuanced commitments.34
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34 “All experience is personal, and all visions relative,” writes Rickord (6).
# # Nazareth responded to Rickord at some length in Transition 24, offering a 
detailed taxonomy of “commitment,” and differentiating the term from “dogmatism.” Once 
again, it was Ng!g"’s fiction that provided the central example:
Mr Ng!g"’s concern is for the lives of individuals, whether Gikuyu or European, and to 
point out what effect the Mau Mau movement had on their lives, rather than to make only 
an abstract statement such as could be made in a political speech or a history book. But 
what view towards the Mau Mau movement emerges from this novel [Weep Not, Child]? 
The view of the colonial government and the Western press, the view accepted by Robert 
Ruark in Something of Value, namely that it was an atavistic and evil movement? The 
answer is clearly “no”. Instead, Mr Ng!g" points out that however great the tragedy 
brought into the lives of individuals, this tragedy was really caused by an unjust social 
system and the conflict caused by the attempt of the Mau Mau movement to destroy it; 
therefore Mau Mau was necessary, and insofar as it was necessary, it was good. Is this not 
being committed? (Nazareth, #“Commitment and the African Writer,” 7)
Here, Ng!g"’s commitment, as expressed through his text, is read in terms of a corrective to 
colonial discourse (the white press, Ruark’s bestseller), and is exemplified by the capacity of his 
fiction to stage the irreducibly social form of the harms inflicted upon individuals, by the novel’s 
narration of the tragic character of the anticolonial struggle in Kenya.
# Nazareth concludes his letter by mentioning that he had studied alongside Ng!g" both at 
Makerere and at Leeds: “While writing his third novel, Mr Ng!g" told me that he had come to 
believe that any good African creative writer writing about East African society would find 
himself committed to socialism. So let us wait for Mr Ng!g"’s third novel and see whether or not 
this emerges from his writing” (Nazareth, “Commitment and the African Writer,” 8). Nazareth 
carried this very question with him into his rich collection of essays, Literature and Society in 
Modern Africa (Kenya Literature Bureau, 1972). Titled, “Is A Grain of Wheat a Socialist 
Novel?” Nazareth’s essay on Ng!g" began by recounting the author’s encounter in Paris with a 
copy of Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth “a few weeks” prior to his beginning work on 
A Grain of Wheat. “Fanon’s thesis [glossed by Nazareth as independence’s requirement of mass 
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revolutionary violence] seems to be a description of Ng!g"’s approach in A Grain of Wheat,” he 
writes:
Set in the actual and historical context of Kenya, Ng!g"’s novel describes the attempts 
made by Kenyans to get back their land, beginning with Waiyaki and Harry Thuku. We 
are shown how all peaceful attempts fail and then how the only alternative left is guerrilla 
violence. The novel shows that it was only violence that could win independence for 
Kenya and this is why the Mau Mau movement begins. Independence is finally won -- or, 
to use Ng!g"’s own word, “regained.” The novel begins during the last days of Self-
Government, a few days before Uhuru. (Nazareth,129)
What interests me about Nazareth’s reading here is the way in which what he notices about the 
novel’s narrative structure -- the fact that it begins, as Nazareth points out, on the brink of 
independence and doesn’t in fact structure itself according to any grand historical sweep -- 
doesn’t impede his description of the novel in terms of a chronological account of the Kenyan 
freedom struggle. Reading allegorically, Nazareth argues that the single droplet of water, which 
we encounter Mugo staring at nervously at the very beginning, “is a symbol of violence.” In 
Nazareth’s account, The Wretched of the Earth thus becomes a frame text within which to read 
for the “commitment” of Ng!g"’s fiction. Thus, he connects the water droplet/violence with a 
sense of woundedness -- what he calls physical and spiritual “maiming” -- that he finds in each 
of the novel’s characters. He urges that Ng!g"’s characters in A Grain of Wheat be read alongside 
Fanon’s case-histories in the penultimate chapter of Wretched:
[...] not only does he want to show how Kenya gained its independence but also he wants 
to find out what happened in the process to the souls of the people. Thus this novel has 
not only a historical setting but also what we might call a psychological sub-text. What 
do people feel #and think? How do people react to events? [...] he wants to find out 
whether there is any hope that any of the scarred souls may regain their wholeness. This 
is the significance of the title of the last chapter, Harambee, which is the slogan of 
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“pulling together” used by President #Kenyatta but which, in fact, asks whether the 
fragments of the wounded souls can be pulled together. (Nazareth, 131-132)
Intriguingly for my purposes, Nazareth’s reading of the novel for “commitment,” alongside, and 
in terms of, Fanon, leads him to this elegant reflection on the question of repair. The shared 
national project of ‘Harambee’ is refigured in Ng!g"’s text, for Nazareth, as the assemblage of 
“the fragments of the wounded souls” into a new form. Drawing on Fanon, the question of harm 
and the possibility of repair is shown to be fundamental to the text’s staging of decolonization, 
and not an afterthought to a more properly political narrative about the attainment of 
independence.
# His inquiry into the nature of the novel’s “commitment,” and most specifically its 
“socialism,” inclines Nazareth’s reading towards conclusions that offer interpretations of the text 
in terms of a set of personal ideological and political positions held by Ng!g" and expressed 
through his fiction. Citing Kihika’s vivid justification for the armed struggle and its use of 
violence in Chapter Thirteen (216-217), Nazareth concludes: “From these words and from the 
significance of Kihika in the structure of the novel, it is clear that Ng!g" sympathizes with the 
Mau Mau movement, that without the Mau Mau, there would have been no independence for 
Kenya” (Nazareth, 145). In A Grain of Wheat, Ng!g" “provides a rationale for Mau Mau in 
intellectual terms,” Nazareth concludes. “This rationale is provided not only in the story but also 
in the words of Kihika” (Nazareth, 148). In this reading of A Grain of Wheat, with a focus on its 
rendering of Kihika (and by extension the Land and Freedom Army) as heroic, Ng!g" is thought 
to more or less ventriloquize through Kihika, whose belated appearance in the narrative serves to 
underscore, rather than detract from, his centrality as a presence in the novel.
I think about Kihika and his speech differently. Several of the novel’s paratexts, such as 
the one immediately following Mugo’s dream, are figured as artifacts produced within the fiction 
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itself, supplied with care from the pages of Kihika’s Bible, which functions as a kind of lingering 
textual presence behind the text of the novel as it resurfaces in the gaps between the novel’s four 
parts. Through these citations, Ng!g" affords a glimpse of the executed guerrilla fighter Kihika 
(who “speaks” in the novel only inasmuch as other characters recount or remember dialogue with 
him), as a careful reader of Old Testament scripture.  At the same time, these epigraphs draw 
attention, for me, to the loss of Kihika as interlocutor within the narrative, since underlining is an 
ambiguous gesture. This raises the question of the precise terms in which Kihika might have 
thought about the underlined phrase, what it was exactly that drew him to underline this 
particular sentence in which the suffering of the Israelites (“their sorrows”) is linked to hopes of 
an emancipated future via the decisive agency of God in recognizing the suffering of the 
oppressed, and providing the assurance of divine control over their destiny. In other words, the 
question of what kind of reader Kihika was is raised, but may only be guessed at. The quality of 
the thinking behind the underlining, the possible rationale for his use of differently coloured 
pens, and the ways in which Kihika might have attempted to connect his own circumstances as a 
guerrilla leader with the plight of the Israelites in Egypt remain obscure, undecidable, and it is 
this ambiguity to which Ng!g" directs our attention through the epigraph and its provenance. 
Moreover, Ng!g" sets his own text against this earlier scene of reading (also a scene of 
inscription), specifically of the anticolonial hero’s ambiguous reading in  Christian eschatology. 
It is this scene to which the novel forms a response and from which, indeed, it takes its very 
name: A Grain of Wheat. The martyred Kihika’s consciousness -- and by extension the “Mau 
Mau” struggle more broadly -- is thus constructed as a problem of memory to which there can be 
no adequate or straightforward response.
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# In my view, the epigraphs’ effect of marking the loss of Kihika as reader is significant for 
reading the text today. This is because Kihika, as both theorist and martyr, offers sacrifice as his 
political model for rendering suffering meaningful and ordering the future based on past harms 
and loss: 
In Kenya we want a death which will change things, that is to say, we want a true 
sacrifice. But first we have to be ready to carry the cross. I die for you, you die for me, we 
become a sacrifice for one another. So I can say that you, Karanja, are Christ. I am Christ. 
Everybody who takes the Oath of Unity to change things in Kenya is a Christ. (Grain, 
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Ng!g" revised one sentence from this passage for the second edition, published in 1987, as 
follows:
In Kenya we want deaths which will change things, that is to say, we want true sacrifice. 
(Grain, 1987: 95)
What is most noticeable is the centrality of not just suffering but death to his anticolonial vision. 
In the revised 1987 edition, Kihika depicts “true sacrifice” consistently as a collective project, 
whereas in the 1967 edition Kihika gestures towards a single messianic person or event --  
proposing “a death” and “a true sacrifice” -- before contrastively describing a shared, reciprocal 
practice of sacrifice. Ng!g"’s revision elides that earlier tension between the individual and the 
collective; twenty years on, the 1987 Kihika figures anticolonial sacrifice as more of a shared 
endeavour.  
# I read the novel as staging a disorientating loss of faith in Kihika’s messianic vision, as it 
narrates the failure of the “deaths which will change things” to form the central, structuring focus 
for a new social order. All prophetic language -- a major preoccupation in Ng!g"’s early fiction - 
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is, in A Grain of Wheat, subject to the ironies characteristic of the form. The demand that the 
logic of sacrifice be fulfilled -- and that the deaths and atrocities suffered be thus rendered 
politically meaningful, politically and socially efficacious -- is ironized throughout the novel, 
most of all because neither the narrator nor any of the characters is capable of furnishing an 
authoritative or accurate account of “what really happened,” of sifting anticolonial heroes from 
traitorous collaborators, happenstance from intentionality, victims from perpetrators. 
There is little sense in the novel that the ordering of Kenya’s political present in such a 
way as to honour the sacrifices made in the struggle for independence is not a desirable goal, but 
rather that -- at least within the fictive world of the novel -- it is simply unfeasible, an impossible 
hope. The need for a fresh articulation of a just social vision, one not tied so directly to a 
messianic anticolonial narrative, is deeply felt as Ng!g" writes his text in the mid-1960s. I want 
to suggest that whereas postcolonial readers of Ng!g"’s text have tended to hold on to the 
anticolonial desire for “deaths which will change things,” a contemporary reading, framed by the 
reparations claims, is more inclined to notice the ways in which the novel narrates a profound 
dissatisfaction with those totalizing modes of imagining decolonization that depend upon 
deterministic religious tropes, such as sacrifice and salvation. Part of the harm one feels in 
reading A Grain of Wheat is precisely the loss of the revolutionary anticolonial faith articulated 
in his distinctly Biblical mode by Kihika, a faith that through militant struggle -- and especially 
through suffering and death -- the structures of oppression set in place by colonial power could 
be displaced by a new condition, freedom.
To return to Nazareth, his placing of Ng!g"’s novel “within the framework of actual 
Kenyan history” (Nazareth, 150) is another trope among earlier readers of A Grain of Wheat, for 
whom the text’s relationship both to historical events and historical writing was of great 
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importance. Shatto Gakwandi, then teaching at Makerere, read A Grain of Wheat alongside 
Ousmane Sembene’s Les bouts de bois de dieu (1960) in his chapter titled “Commitment” in The 
Novel and Contemporary Experience in Africa (1977). His reading links the question of 
“commitment” with the sense of Ng!g"’s project as a rewriting of history. “Ng!g"’s novels,” 
writes Gakwandi, “are ‘committed’ in the sense that colonialism is the constant object of attack. 
The author-narrator is entirely on the side of revolt, stressing the atrocities of the colonial 
administration and the heroism of the forest rebels who are fighting against colonial 
domination” (Gakwandi, 108). However, like Ime Ikiddeh before him, Gakwandi criticizes the 
structure of time in the novel, its constitutive external analepsis, for making it “difficult for the 
reader to gain a clear picture of the pattern of events” (Gakwandi, 118). This, as well as what 
Gakwandi perceived as a failure to connect the local circumstances in Rungei with national 
politics, produces “a gap between the plot and the political theme over which the structure of the 
novel strains and sometimes appears to be in danger of breaking.” Here,  a reader in search of 
“commitment” finds A Grain of Wheat to be a frustrating text, one whose singular qualities can’t 
quite be made to align with what it is that Ng!g" is supposed to be doing.
! Harish Narang’s essay, “Prospero and the Land of Calibans: A Grain of Wheat,” provides 
a clear example of this. “It will be our endeavour,” writes Narang, “firstly to discover his point of 
view [regarding “Mau Mau”] from his writings and secondly evaluate this first vis-a-vis [...] the 
truth about the struggle as enumerated [...] by major participant historians like J.M. Kariuki, 
Karari Njama, Bildad Kaggia and Oginga Odinga” (Narang, 130). Narang’s essay offers one of 
the sharpest examples of the tendency to read Ng!g" as a sort of undercover revisionary 
historian, whose literary license only afforded his writing greater veridicality than official 
scholars of history, and his fiction as a repository of historical truths. Narang cites the early 
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description, folded into Mugo’s recollections, of the deaf-mute Gitogo being shot in the back by 
a white soldier as he fled to protect his elderly mother and the ironic narrator’s conclusion: 
“Another Mau Mau terrorist had been shot dead.” (Grain, 6) “With this one sentence,” writes 
Narang, “Ng!g" had nailed all those lies which talked of “Mau Mau” terrorists being killed in 
“encounters” with the troops” (Narang, 132). Here the principal effect of narratorial irony in the 
novel is taken to be the making of an historical corrective, through the revelation of particular 
truths about the struggle (the presumed tellers of “those lies” comprises both settler propaganda 
and published histories by the likes of Margery Perham and L. B. S. Leakey). It is Ng!g"’s 
fidelity to what Narang calls “actual events” which forms the basis of Narang’s response to 
Ng!g"’s text. The two fundamental historical points Narang sees Ng!g"’s novel making 
(principally through the reported speech of characters such as Kihika and Mugo) are, firstly, that 
“the struggle was a just one” (Narang, 137) and secondly, that the British carried out all kinds of 
atrocities -- “naked brutalities” (Narang, 138) -- and inflicted great suffering. Of the early 
description of Kihika’s torture -- “Some say that the neck of a bottle was wedged into his 
body” (17) -- Narang writes that Ng!g"’s is “an artistic understatement” by comparison with “the 
stories of detainees in Manyani, Hola and Lari camps” (Narang, 134). Ng!g"’s text is thus read 
not only alongside other novels, such as Meja Mwangi’s A Carcase for Hounds (1974), but also 
alongside, and in terms of the tradition of, memoirs and histories of the period. “Mixing fact with 
fiction,” Narang concludes, “Ng!g" creates a unique picture of the freedom struggle, which is 
truer than history and more imaginative than ordinary fiction” (Narang, 140).35 Ng!g"’s novel 
was read and valued in this instance -- but also, I want to suggest, by a significant number of 
other critics and scholars -- as a singular kind of literary text, one that made certain kinds of 
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35 This closing remark of Narang’s is suggestive; however unfortunately he does not elaborate on the 
imaginative limitations of “ordinary fiction” by comparison with Ngũgĩ’s.
specific truth claims which placed it in a separate genre from both historical discourse and 
fiction, while engaging in both of these modes.
! Readings such as Narang’s were undoubtedly shaped by Ng!g"’s own critical writing, and 
particularly by his repeated marking of a crucial default in the historiography of “Mau Mau.” As 
early as 1963, in his highly critical review of Fred Majdalany’s State of Emergency: The Full 
Story of Mau Mau (1963), Ng!g" urged: “I think somebody with intellectual honesty should 
write the full history of Mau Mau as a cultural, political and economic expression of the 
aspirations of the African peasant masses, putting it in its revolutionary context” (Homecoming, 
p.29). A widely-held assumption among earlier scholars and critical readers appears to have been 
that Ng!g" regarded himself as that “somebody,” and there was no reason as a reader of his 
fiction to regard it in anything other than these terms, as itself a version of the “full history” for 
which Ng!g" longed. Nor has such a conception been limited to Ng!g" alone. His work is an 
important object of analysis for Barbara Harlow in her major study, Resistance Literature (1987), 
a work which theorises resistance literature as that literature which undertakes “the active 
reconstruction of interrupted histories” (Harlow, 200). In my own reading, I do not dismiss this 
notion of Ng!g"’s text by any means. Rather, I try to show that the grip that this specific notion of 
the fiction’s historiographical task has exerted on readings of A Grain of Wheat might be usefully 
loosened. 
# David Maughan-Brown concludes his materialist critical study, Land, Freedom and 
Fiction: History and Ideology in Kenya (1985), with a chapter on Ng!g", much of which is taken 
up with a reading of A Grain of Wheat (Maughan-Brown, 230-265). The novel, he argues, 
“offers a privileged site for symptomatic reading to demonstrate its ability to ‘locate’ fictional 
effects in the determinate play of ideological contradiction” (Maughan-Brown, 231). He thinks 
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of the novel as “a crisis text,” which “displays at every level of its construction the effects [...] of 
an insoluble tension between the residual (Christian) liberal humanism of the earlier works and a 
(secular) ‘liberationist’ humanism en route towards the discovery of a set of historical materialist 
categories capable of informing a new, revolutionary practice of writing/cultural 
production” (Maughan-Brown, 231) He disagrees explicitly with readings proposed by 
Gakwandi and Nazareth regarding what he terms the “image of Mau Mau.” Where those two had 
sought to demonstrate the positive representation afforded the Land and Freedom Army in 
Ng!g"’s early fiction, Maughan Brown argues that “Mau Mau” remains an “extremely equivocal”  
figure throughout Ng!g"’s first three novels, precisely because of the strength of his attachment 
to the “liberal-humanist” (bourgeois) form of the novel, most especially its emphasis on the 
individual consciousness (an attachment formed at Makerere and latterly the English department 
at Leeds), and most clearly visible in terms of A Grain of Wheat’s debt to Conrad’s Under 
Western Eyes (1911) (Maughan-Brown, 247-248).36 Maughan-Brown thinks of Ng!g"’s early 
fiction as a problematic embryonic phase in his development into a sophisticated Marxian -- and, 
most importantly, Fanonian -- novelist, from Petals of Blood (1977) onwards. Good fiction, for 
Maughan-Brown, is properly Fanonian fiction. Thus, in his reading of Petals of Blood, the novel 
succeeds due to Karega’s final speech, as, in Maughan-Brown’s reading, “The ‘wretched of the 
earth’ have been transformed from objects of pity or abstracted solidarity into, at least notionally, 
the subjects of History” (Maughan-Brown, 246).
# By contrast, Maughan-Brown faults A Grain of Wheat for becoming preoccupied with 
giving an account of individual consciousness, at the expense of the collective or community, 
which might have yielded the explanation for the success of the Land and Freedom Army as a 
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36 See Obumselu, E., A Grain of Wheat: Ngũgĩ’s debt to Conrad,” The Benin Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1
(1975), 80-91.
social formation and military force, which is what Maughan-Brown is, in the last analysis, 
looking for from the text: 
If everyone is the victim of the guilt of his or her private desires and vainglories, # then of 
course a traitor is no more than ‘the mirror held up to (individual) nature’ -- which merely 
leaves the novel with the difficulty of explaining how it was that government forces 
numbering 50,000, and having the collaboration of tens of thousands of home guards, 
took four years to neutralise whoever it was -- a motley gang of bandits with half-crazed 
leaders? -- they were fighting against. And of course this is what A Grain of Wheat so 
spectacularly fails to touch on. (250)
Reading the 1967 novel through the later works, Petals of Blood and Devil on the Cross,  and the 
sensibility he finds expressed in those novels, Maughan-Brown is able to rationalize reading A 
Grain of Wheat in terms of what he understands as its constitutive absence (i.e. properly Marxist 
politics). This leads Maughan-Brown to some provocative claims regarding the relationship 
between fiction and ideology, a central critical preoccupation of his book. The “crisis” of the 
novel, in Maughan-Brown’s view, is “the dominance of an ‘unconscious’ aesthetic ideology 
(deriving from a liberal humanist literary education) over a far less secure cultural 
nationalism” (259). 
# Among the richest readings of Ng!g" as an historian-novelist is the work of Carol 
Sicherman. In her 1989 article, “Ng!g" wa Thiong’o and the Writing of Kenyan History,” 
Sicherman offers an account of “the emergence of Ng!g"’s mature understanding of the role of 
history in African literature and of his own role in rewriting Kenyan history” (Sicherman, 347).37 
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37 Sicherman’s has been an invaluable contribution to scholarship on Ngũgĩ. In writing this chapter, I also 
consulted Carol Sicherman, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, the making of a rebel : a source book in Kenyan 
literature and resistance (1990), and Carol Sicherman, Ngũgĩ wa Thiongʾo : a bibliography of primary and 
secondary sources, 1957-1987 (1989).
“Ng!g"’s career-long emphasis on Mau Mau,” is for Sicherman, “a form of resistance to [...] 
betrayal by oblivion,” and “a monument in words to the heroes of the forests” (Sicherman, 362). 
The “mature” Ng!g", she argues, “intends to make his compatriots see the history of Kenya for 
the last hundred years as the story of resistance to colonialism -- and to neocolonialism.” The 
Ng!g" who wrote A Grain of Wheat in the 1960s is constructed as a kind of pre-cursor to the 
Ng!g" proper who wrote Petals of Blood (1977) and also made a series of minor revisions -- 
historical corrections in Sicherman’s view -- to the second edition of A Grain of Wheat published 
by the African Writers Series in 1987. The crisis to which his fiction forms a response (though 
only belatedly fully consciously) is a crisis of historiography:
Although the official history of colonial times has gone, no comparable assured version 
has replaced it, for three main reasons: first, the particular historical bias imparted in the 
waning days of colonialism to the first post-Independence generation of African 
intellectuals, a bias incorporated in language; second, the absence of substantial written 
documentation for much of the precolonial past, which poses formidable problems of 
reconstruction from oral, linguistic, and archaeological sources; and, third and most 
important, the continued politicizing of intellectual discourse in the period following 
independence. (Sicherman, 355)
In analyzing A Grain of Wheat as Ng!g"’s corrective to colonial and neo-colonial historiography, 
Sicherman emphasizes those aspects of his fiction which have tended to aggravate historians, his 
“carelessness with details and [...] promoting of myth as history” (Sicherman, 359). She gives a 
persuasive account of “The weight Ng!g" gives to what ‘is said,’ to ‘rumor’ and ‘gossip’ as 
agents in forming the imaginative life of his people [...] he knows that actual historical force of 
what ‘is said’ -- its role in politics.” Evidence of “Ng!g"’s skill as a literary-historical artist has 
been citation of his novels by social scientists to illustrate their points,” argues Sicherman, who 
nonetheless regrets what she perceives as an ongoing “sibling rivalry” among historians and 
literary critics in relation to Ng!g" (Sicherman, 360-361). 
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# However, the body of historical scholarship on the Kenyan War of Independence is much 
altered since Sicherman’s essay. While work by the likes of Elkins and Anderson cannot be said 
to have addressed fully the three problems Sicherman points to underlying what she perceives as 
the enduring historiographical bias (though Elkins’ work, notably, is based primarily on oral 
sources), I would argue that these histories of the late colonial period have in fact effectively 
“replaced” the “official” colonial version, having comprehensively turned “civilizing mission” 
narratives on their head. The new histories narrate the Kenyan War of Independence more in 
terms of systemic colonial atrocities than as “a cultural, political and economic expression of the 
aspirations of the African peasant masses [...] in its revolutionary context” -- that history for 
which Ng!g" longed in the early 1960s -- however they certainly render colonialist accounts of 
the event implausible.
# The final critical reading of A Grain of Wheat that I examine is the one offered by Ali 
Mazrui and Lupenga Mphande in a sweeping 1990 essay in Ufahamu, “The Historical 
Imperative in African Activist Literature.” 38 The key thinker Mazrui and Mphande connect to 
Ng!g"’s literary production is Walter Rodney, especially his conception of “history as a political 
weapon of revolutionary struggle [...] historical reconstruction directed towards freeing the 
minds of the oppressed” (Mazrui & Mphande,48). “In the field of African literature,” they write, 
“there is no other intellectual who is a better known practitioner of the Rodneyian notion of 
“history as a weapon” than the Kenyan writer Ng!g" wa Thiong’o [...] like Rodney, Ng!g" draws 
no boundaries between his academic work and his political activities, between principle and 
practice” (Mazrui & Mphande, 51). In their reading, the early novels (up to Petals of Blood) 
involved “writing about the Mau Mau from a colonially-recorded liberal point of view,” since 
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38 Ali Mazrui and Lupenga Mphande, “The Historical Imperative in African Activist Literature,” Ufahamu 
18 (2), (1990), 47-58.
they are said to be based on “sources recorded and preserved by colonialists” (Mazrui & 
Mphande, 50):
the treatment of Mau Mau in Ng!g"’s pre-Petals of Blood novels differs in a substantial 
way from Petals of Blood and the novels after it. In particular, the history in pre-Petals 
works is essentially reformative and lacks the punch that would jolt Ng!g"’s readers into 
expunging the myths purveyed by colonial misinformation. This was the time when 
Ng!g" was still James Ngugi, a yet-unliberated product of colonial education whose 
writings, making a fetish of principles like “reasonableness,” “fairness,” and 
“objectivity,” could only blunt even the most critical of our minds [...] Beginning with 
Petals, Mau Mau is featured in a more radical, pungent manner, not as a past qua past, 
but as a living past woven into the intricacies of present life and whose silent throbbings 
are felt throughout today’s society. (Mazrui & Mphande, 51-52)
The critical rhetoric chosen by Mazrui and Mphande in making this familiar periodization of 
Ng!g"’s work is worth attending to, particularly the “punch” as the figure for imagining a radical 
novel’s effects (literary work as a fist, rather than the gun assumed by Ng!g"’s own well-known 
figure of the Barrel of a Pen (1982) ). The proper relation of the later works to history is to effect 
a “jolt” against “myths” and “misinformation,” challenging in a fundamental way the established 
historical “truth” regarding the Kenyan War of Independence, as well as the texts and 
methodologies through which that truth was constructed. The range of the fiction’s literary 
effects is thought to be circumscribed by Ng!g"’s biography and intellectual development, which 
is considered in terms of a simple linear progression from bourgeois liberalism (James Ngugi) to 
the Rodneyian revolutionary (Ng!g" wa Thiong’o) who writes Matigari. A key term that indexes 
this progression is “relevance” (53). For Mazrui and Mphande, Ng!g"’s later novels were more 
relevant to the present in 1990, not merely because they were more recent but rather because the 
political and historical positions they were seen to articulate were more obvious, less ambiguous 
and more radical than those to be found in the earlier fiction.
# Decades earlier, Mazrui advanced the case for consciously distorting the history of the 
Land and Freedom Army as part of a straightforward national revolution. In his review essay on 
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J.M. Kariuki’s memoir “Mau Mau” Detainee (1963) , “On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship,” written 
while at Makerere, Mazrui advocates “Kenya’s need for a selective memory,” in order to “build 
up unity in Kenya” (Mazrui, 23-24). “Next to forgetting past enemies,” argued Mazrui, “the most 
important element in building up national consciousness is perhaps the faculty of remembering 
past heroes.” Anticipating that, “Kenya’s history is going to be written afresh,” Mazrui looked 
forward to a “rechristening” of the “Mau Mau rebellion,” as “the Kenyan war of independence,” 
or “the Kenyan Revolution,” the rethinking of 1953-1963 as “the Revolutionary Decade, starting 
with the outbreak of the Mau Mau insurrection and culminating in Uhuru itself ten years 
later” (Mazrui, 24). 
# A striking feature of the way Mazrui’s earlier text imagines the re-writing to come is the 
manner in which the experience of those who suffered colonial brutality figures as the evidence 
of the event’s revolutionary credentials (and not as a means of critiquing colonial power for 
failing to live up to its own liberal pretenses). “The idea of blood comes near to being a defining 
characteristic of a revolution,” he writes, “such that a completely  bloodless revolution falls short 
not only of being “glorious” but of being a “revolution” at all” (Mazrui, 25). The torture 
described by Kariuki is rendered euphemistically in Mazrui’s reading of it: “he was indeed called 
upon to suffer a little under what can only be described as torture” (Mazrui, 26). 
# Mazrui thinks of the central place of sacrifice in defining a revolutionary event, and 
especially the prominence given to the figure of “blood,” as a specifically Christian trope, a 
religion which “finds it necessary to measure love in drops of blood” (Mazrui, 26). He further 
distinguishes between “self-sacrifice” and the suffering of pain merely as a victim: 
there is [in relation to figure of “blood” within nationalist discourse] the link between 
blood and just pain -- something which is not identical with self-sacrifice by any means. 
Self-sacrifice implies volition -- whereas pain can be inflicted on someone who is not 
given any choice in the matter. In the case of the self-image of the Mau Mau self-sacrifice 
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was, if you like, a reaction to the preceding pain of land starvation and racial humiliation. 
This kind of pain -- arising as it did from the substantial white settlement -- put Kenya in 
a class by itself among East African countries. Kenya had suffered in a way none of the 
others had. I remember talking to a young Kikuyu in New York at the time that Nyerere 
first declared himself publicly on the side of an East African Federation. My Kikuyu 
friend said: “It is easy enough for Nyerere to take the larger view and offer to give up 
Tanganyika’s sovereignty before he has even won it. Only someone who has not suffered 
for his little plot of land can be so cosmopolitan. (Mazrui, 27)
Suffering is given radical political meaning as sacrifice, and as “moral preparation for 
independence” in Mazrui’s terms, by differentiating between those freedom fighters who 
essentially chose to suffer as part of political struggle (those who responded, like Kariuki, to a 
“call,”) and those who are understood as passive victims of violence. The experiences of such 
victims -- Mugo in A Grain of Wheat is a fictional exemplar -- occupies a problematic place in 
the new script Mazrui envisions for “Mau Mau” as a revolutionary event, since their pain has no 
obvious function within the narrative of revolution and the construction of a unifying consensus 
around Kenyan liberation. Mazrui is interested in the sheer cruelty of the colonial security 
apparatus, but only inasmuch as it helps to support his case (made without reference to Fanon, in 
the same year as the first  English translation of The Wretched of the Earth was published), that 
“there must be a double-standard of moral evaluation” regarding the atrocities committed by 
either side, because “an atrocity committed by someone who is supposed to stand for law and 
order must always be more reprehensible than one committed by an offending citizen” (Mazrui, 
28). 
# In fact, Mazrui is profoundly uninterested in dwelling on accounts of colonial brutality, 
and (whatever ironies may be at play) his euphemistic reading of Kariuki’s torture as “a little” 
suffering can be read as conveying a certain embarrassment around the scene of the tortured 
freedom fighter -- it is certainly not a scene to be foregrounded for its own sake, even as it 
occupies a central place within the proposed revolutionary-sacrificial economy. Read together 
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with his much later essay with Mphande on Ng!g", one can mark once again the absence of 
interest in suffering bodies as a concern in delineating militant literary production from earlier 
bourgeois forms. To focus on narratives of torture would, in Mazrui and Mphande’s terms, 
involve an excessive attachment to the individual consciousness as the subject of fiction and a 
concomitant sentimentality that has, in their terms, little apparent connection to the revolutionary 
masses as the correct subject for literature depicting the struggle. In the rendering of the crisis 
which Mazrui commends, the experience of suffering becomes a discursive object through which 
radical political claims are to be justified. There is no moment for vulnerability, still less for any 
discourse on trauma, on violence’s lasting effects at either the psychological or social level.
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Chapter III | Reading Something of Value after the Hanslope Park Disclosure
I can recall no instance when I have felt the forces of evil to be so near and so strong [as the 
“Mau Mau”]. As I wrote memoranda or instructions, I would suddenly see a shadow fall across 
the page -- the horned shadow of the Devil himself.  -- Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1951-1954, Memoirs of Lord Chandos (1962)
… the development of an indigenous British racism in the post-war period begins with the 
profound historical forgetfulness -- what I call the loss of historical memory, a kind of historical 
amnesia, a decisive mental repression -- which has overtaken the British people about race and 
empire since the 1950s. Paradoxically, it seems to me, the native, home-grown variety of racism 
begins with this attempt to wipe out and efface every trace of the colonial and imperial past. 
Clearly, that is one effect of the traumatic adjustment to the very process of bringing Empire to 
an end. But, undoubtedly, it has left an enormous reservoir of guilt and a deep, historical, 
resentment. It’s not possible to operate surgically so directly on popular memory without leaving 
scars and traces. -- Stuart Hall, “Racism and reaction” (1978)
Repair in its radical form is a two-way street. Narratives that figure enduring harms play an 
important role in reparations demands, and so too do those that construct a sense of enduring 
responsibility for such harms. This is how Frantz Fanon theorizes reparations for colonialism: 
“This help should be the ratification of a double realization [une double prise de conscience]: the 
realization by the colonized peoples that it is their due, and the realization by the capitalist 
powers that in fact they must pay [leur est dûe]” (Fanon, 103).39 While the other chapters in this 
dissertation are especially concerned with narrations of harm, this chapter focuses on the 
question of responsibility and investigates ways in which literary texts can help to effect in 
readers something like the second aspect of the “double prise de conscience” described by 
Fanon. 
 How might a reader be seized by a realization along the lines of: “I must pay?” What 
texts might invite such a response? I am thinking here of something like a literary corollary to 
126
39 See my ʻIntroductionʼ for the full context for this quotation.
the work of “reparatory history” as it has been theorized by Catherine Hall in relation to New 
World slavery. The kind of historiographical work Hall envisages -- exemplified by her own 
project, Legacies of British Slave-ownership -- focuses on the UK and “the need to develop a 
different understanding here of Britain’s involvement in the slavery business and our 
responsibilities, as beneficiaries of the gross inequalities associated with slavery and 
colonialism” (Hall, 16). An important concept in Hall’s thinking, that of the “implicated subject,” 
is taken from Michael Rothberg’s efforts to develop “a new category describing the implication 
of people in events that are temporally or spatially distant and in which they have not played a 
direct role either as perpetrators or victims” (Hall, 7).40 Reparatory history, for Hall, seeks to 
“awaken a sense of the responsibilities of ‘implicated subjects’ who have benefitted culturally, 
economically and politically from the hurts inflicted on others [...] Acknowledgement can mean 
that those implicated in oppression can align themselves with the oppressed and try to 
repair” (Hall, 13-14). For Rothberg, the concept of implicated subjects offers a “supplement” to 
the categories of victim and perpetrator and a way of moving beyond the “small-scale, 
decontextualized scene” within which violence might otherwise be analyzed. He defines the 
concept as: 
 a large and heterogeneous collection of subjects who enable and benefit from traumatic 
 violence without taking part in it directly [that] emerges in relation to both historical and 
 contemporary scenarios of violence [...] it describes the indirect responsibility of subjects 
 situated at temporal or geographic distance from the production of social suffering. It 
 helps direct our attention to the conditions of possibility of violence as well as its 
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40 Hallʼs citation is from an unpublished paper by Rothberg, ʻOn being a descendant: implicated subjects 
and the legacy of slaveryʼ, Utrecht, June 2013.
 lingering impact and suggests new routes of opposition [...] a general category to describe 
 modes of responsibility beyond the criminal guilt of the perpetrator (Rothberg).
In this chapter, I investigate some of the possibilities literature might hold in producing such a 
sense of ‘implication’ in a reader. My case study is Robert Ruark’s now obscure bestseller, 
Something of Value (1955). I analyze the ways in which the novel “helps direct our attention to 
the conditions of possibility” of the counterinsurgency against the Land and Freedom Army, 
through its narration of a truncated white supremacist romance that figures colonial violence 
against “Mau Mau” as essential for the protection and maintenance of the social and economic 
structures of racial capitalism, manifest in the banal bourgeois culture of property and pleasure 
and a patriarchal ordering of gender and sexuality -- all based on the reproduction and 
exploitation of African labour. Whereas the reparations claim at the High Court framed the acts 
of sexual torture and mutilation as singular atrocities perpetrated within a “small-scale 
decontextualized scene,” this kind of sadistic violence is narrated in the novel not merely as the 
aberrations of obscure and singularly evil individuals who lived long ago and far away, but as the 
product of a set of more or less familiar values and norms connected to enduring political and 
social structures.
 I think of my reading of Something of Value as a partial and imperfect way of countering 
the intensive and systematic destruction of colonial government documents, a purge through 
which we British have attempted to evade responsibility for the crimes and abuses of colonial 
rule, especially during the ‘Emergency.’ The novel, I argue, functions as a kind of archive, but 
not in the same way as either the surviving “migrated archive” or those colonial records that 
were destroyed. This chapter shows that one of the achievements of the reparations demand 
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formalized as Mutua and Others vs. FCO was to secure the so-called Hanslope Park Disclosure 
-- the release of a tranche of sensitive files pertaining to Kenya and many other former colonies 
that the UK government claimed was “lost” -- and the evidence it contains of the “state bonfire” 
through which the British sought to write out and erase its obligation to Kenya and Kenyans after 
independence. The loss of these files is permanent and irreversible. The documents destroyed by 
colonial officials were not, of course, records of some ideal or settled historical truth; like any 
such archive, they would have been woven with silences and elisions. However, they would 
certainly have contained the kind of evidence through which historians might have insisted upon 
the scale and severity of the violence and abuse of colonial rule, and the need for accountability. 
But since such records of bureaucratic knowledge and administration of the counterinsurgency 
will never be available, I look to Something of Value as a novel that functions as an ‘archive of 
sensibility,’ a narrative that spoke of and to a transnational white supremacist imaginary, within 
whose terms the Land and Freedom Army’s challenge to whiteness in Kenya could only be 
answered by the most extreme forms of violence if white supremacy was to be maintained.
 The chapter is divided into three sections. I begin by returning briefly to Ng!g"’s A Grain 
of Wheat to consider the role of the colonial bureaucratic archive in that text, and as a way of 
joining that archive with Something of Value. In the second section, I expand on Ng!g"’s 
suggestive image of the defeated colonial administrator/murderer blankly contemplating the 
records of modernizing government as his mind wanders -- despite himself -- to memories of the 
atrocities that have ruined his career, and analyze the files contained in the Hanslope Park 
Disclosure and especially the detailed records of exhaustive document destruction. What does 
one read, when what remains in the colonial archive are “Destruction Certificates?” I give an 
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account of some of the painstaking work by bureaucrats to expunge whatever might be regarded 
as “embarrassing” from the colonial archive, in anticipation of independence. The third section is 
a reading of Something of Value. I argue that the novel narrates the atrocities of the 
counterinsurgency against the Land and Freedom Army as the product of the patriarchal and 
racial capitalist ordering of Kenyan society, rationalizing extreme colonial brutality through the 
structures of feeling this order gave rise to among its beneficiaries.
I. Ng!g"’s John Thompson
The figure through whom the exercise of colonial power is staged in A Grain of Wheat (1967) is 
the character John Thompson. Something of Value also has a character named John Thompson, a 
settler who perpetrates lurid atrocities as the sidekick to the novel’s hero Peter McKenzie, but 
about which the reader learns little else as regards his upbringing, family background, and 
interior experience. Ng!g" cites Ruark in an early essay, “The Writer and His Past,” (published in 
Homecoming in 1972 but originally given in 1968 as a paper to the Kenya Historical 
Association.) Ruark is mentioned alongside Rider Haggard as a writer whose work perpetuates 
racist mythology, and was “readily accepted and applauded by European audiences” (Ng!g", 
1972, 42). His re-writing of Ruark’s John Thompson can be thought of in terms of “writing 
back,” as he borrows this most generic of English names from the earlier novel, taking a minor 
character and remaking him as a complex and compelling figure -- a character as invested in 
Britain’s civilizing mission as he is in the counterinsurgency, and a personification of the false 
distinction between the two.
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 Early in A Grain of Wheat, we find Ng!g"’s John Thompson stationed as the 
Administrative Secretary at the Githima Forestry and Agricultural Research Station. The traitor 
Karanja runs errands for him, and forms the main connection between Githima and the 
community at Thabai that is the focus of the novel. Thompson had been a District Officer -- 
meeting Queen Elizabeth II on her 1952 visit in a state of “rapture” (Grain, 48) -- before being 
seconded to the detention camps during the Emergency “to rehabilitate Mau Mau adherents to a 
normal life as British subjects” (Grain, 54). The massacre at Rira, and the ensuing scandal is 
described as “the tragedy of his life [...] Thompson’s name was bandied about in the House of 
Commons and in the world press.” His reassignment to the obscurity of Githima makes him “an 
exile from the public administration he loved. But the wound had never healed. Touch it, and it 
brought back all the humiliation he had felt at the time.” Through Thompson, Ng!g" narrates 
decolonization, from the perspective of the colonizer, as an experience defined by the problem of 
shame and how to negotiate it. 
 In Ng!g"’s text, Thompson personifies the connection between the most notorious forms 
of colonial violence and the apparently benign, liberal, rationalizing institutions of colonial rule. 
He moves from one to the other, as both brutal camp commander and faraway facilitator of 
agronomic research. Ng!g"’s emphasis on Thompson’s sense of woundedness is significant: 
Thompson is the character through whom the disintegration of various forms of imperial desire is 
staged in the novel. His fanatical attachment to the monarch -- “he would have done anything for 
her, would have stabbed himself” (Grain, 48) -- and the wound/shame he carries with him after 
the atrocity, is combined with descriptions of the grandiose visions of personal flourishing within 
the imperial order, aspirations he is forced to abandon. A student of the work of the architect of 
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the policy of indirect rule, Lord Lugard, Thompson as a young man meets “two Africans who in 
dress, in speech, and in intellectual power were no different from the British” (Grain, 62). On 
this basis he begins to expound a sweeping description of a glorious liberal imperial future: “one 
British nation, embracing peoples of all colours and creeds, based on the just proposition that all 
men are created equal.” He starts drafting a manuscript, grandly titled Prospero in Africa: “In it 
he argued that to be English was basically an attitude of mind: it was a way of looking at life, at 
human relationship, at the just ordering of society.” 
 On the eve of independence, Chapter Five narrates Thompson leafing through his 
accumulated notes for Prospero in Africa. These notes record his shifting reflections as the 
Emergency deepens. Along with expressions of his zeal for the civilizing mission -- “To 
administer a people is to administer a soul” -- his early entries are preoccupied with naive 
ramblings about the possible relationship between “primordial trees” and “primitive minds,” 
before descending into embittered, self-justifying white supremacist cliches: “One must use a 
stick. No government can tolerate anarchy, no civilization can be built on this violence and 
savagery [...] Every white man is continually in danger of gradual moral ruin in this daily and 
hourly contest with the African” (Grain, 64-65). Finally, he reads the record of his encounter 
with Mugo following his betrayal of Kihika: “Remember the African is a born actor, that’s why 
he finds it so easy to lie. Suddenly I spat into his face. I don’t know why, but I did it” (Grain, 
65). One might choose to read Thompson in terms of the deterioration of his liberalism during 
the Emergency, and historians of the period have been careful to distinguish between how the 
crisis was understood and analyzed differently across the political spectrum, in Kenya as in the 
UK (Cooper 1988, Lonsdale 1990, Anderson 2010). However, the effect of Ng!g"’s irony doesn’t 
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so much emphasize distinctions between liberal and right-wing thinking as draw attention to the 
profoundly racist quality of his earlier liberalism, and how easily his once exalted principles of 
egalitarianism and progress under totalizing British rule merge into more vulgar expressions of 
white supremacism within the same document.
 An aspect of Thompson that draws my attention is that for much of the time the reader 
spends with him, Ng!g" has him at his desk, contemplating the files that surround him. Riven 
with disillusionment at the impending withdrawal of formal colonial rule, he attempts to shut out 
the reality of his situation by focusing on these files. Yet they prove to be an especially 
troublesome object of contemplation:
John Thompson -- tall, a leathery skin that stuck to the bone -- did not go to Nairobi but 
remained at Githima during the lunch-hour going through the motions of working: that is, 
he would stand, go to the cabinet by the wall, pull out a file and return to the table, his 
face weather-beaten into permanent abstraction, almost as if his mind dwelt on things far 
away and long ago. His thin hands and light eyes went through each file carefully before 
returning it to the cabinet [...] Thompson contemplated the clean blotting-paper on the 
table, the pen and pencil rack, the ink-bottle, the whitewashed office walls and the ceiling 
as if seeing a pattern that held the things in the room together: but his mind only hopped 
from one thought to the other.
This description of the colonial administrator performatively examining the paraphernalia of 
colonial administration works through the dissonance between the formal, rigidly organized 
machinery of colonial government (the files on “land development,” the writing materials, etc.) 
and the diffuse memories of his personal experience in Kenya. Ng!g" offers a figure for colonial 
power experiencing decolonization through a practice of distracted reading of its record of itself, 
and of the mind that personifies that power continually leaping beyond and outside the colonial 
office to another kind of archive, of personal memory, that (though comparatively disordered) is 
far more germane to the predicament the colonizer has brought himself to.
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 By this point, Ng!g" has already established Thompson as an especially fastidious 
bureaucrat, liberal ideologue and murderous white supremacist: “John Thompson had, over the 
years, developed a mania for writing letters. He scribbled notes to everyone [...] Even when it 
might be easier to see an officer personally he preferred to send a letter” (Grain, 42). The manic 
quality of his writing of memos described here foreshadows the narration of his scanning of the 
files, his sudden fury at Mugo and spitting in his face, and his Kurtzian frenzy ahead of the 
massacre at Rira: “Eliminate the vermin, he would grind his teeth at night [...] Yes -- eliminate 
the vermin” (Grain, 152), further emphasizing his embodiment of both rational liberal 
bureaucracy and genocidal racism. Having sent Karanja away with a note for his wife, 
Thompson “resumed his blank stare at the mass of paper on his table” (Grain, 42).
 The undifferentiated, un-answering agricultural files Thompson pretends to examine can 
provide a useful set of cues for thinking about the Kenyan colonial archive and its vexed role in 
relation to attempts to make sense of Kenya’s decolonization. On its own terms, Thompson’s 
performance of  methodical bureaucratic labour -- his “going through the motions” -- makes for a 
phony review of the colonial record. However, he ends up contemplating precisely those 
blanknesses produced within his colonial office that the prose begins to catalogue: the 
“whitewashed” walls, the “clean blotting paper” corresponding to his own “blank stare.” 
Thompson seeks an escape from his crimes, his shame, and from the collapse of formal colonial 
rule and the attendant assumptions and teleologies in which he has been absolutely absorbed in 
fashioning a sense of himself. The filing cabinet, itself a key technology of modern imperial 
government, and the files it holds, provide neither comfort nor absolution, but rather an 
experience of vacancy: the files and their painstaking protocols can be read methodically, one 
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after the other, but meaningful work of memory as Ng!g" figures it here occurs only when the 
mind wanders from these serried papers. 
One can glimpse, in Thompson’s “blank stare” and the other images of white vacancy in 
this scene, a connection with the “formulas of erasure” and “silencing” that Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot tracks in his well-known argument concerning the ways in which the historiography of 
Haiti has figured the Haitian Revolution as an “unthinkable” event (Trouillot, 96). For John 
Thompson, it is not the emergence of the black revolutionary subject as the bearer of 
Enlightenment ideals that needs most urgently to be erased, silenced, made unthinkable. Rather, 
it is a figure of white savagery and sadism that he cannot bear to recognize as himself. The 
colonial archive, which he himself has helped produce, is rendered unreadable to him in this 
moment, neither a site of knowledge nor a technology of colonial command and control, but 
rather an experience of vacancy and distraction. 
The scene of John Thompson in his office in A Grain of Wheat bears a striking 
resemblance to the historical role played by the notorious colonial officer Terence Gavaghan, 
“chief architect of the dilution technique,” who was later tasked with implementing the massive 
purge of incriminating colonial files (Elkins, 2015, 862).41 (Wambugu wa Nyingi encountered 
Gavaghan while detained at Mwea Camp, where Gavaghan was camp commandant). As Elkins 
puts it: “Known for implementing the systematic destruction of bodies and minds in Kenya’s 
detention camps, Gavaghan was now rendering documents to ash in colonial incinerators while 
ensuring that others would be permanently held under lock and key. The British colonial 
government’s chief torturer in Kenya became one of its chief archivists in the final days of rule.” 
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41 The “dilution technique” was a system of beatings and other forms of abuse which aimed to break the 
resistance of those detainees identified as the most uncooperative from within a group. For a detailed 
history of the “dilution technique,” see Elkins 2005, 319-332.
Whether or not Ng!g" had specific knowledge of Gavaghan, his “writing back” to Ruark’s novel 
involved re-imagining a shallow character who does little but carry out extreme violence as a 
figure whose experience combines the high-sounding aspirations of liberal imperialism with 
explicitly exterminist thinking. Ng!g"’s rewriting of John Thompson enjoins special focus on the 
colonial bureaucratic archive and its function in relation to decolonization and models a response 
to Ruark’s novel that is about using aspects of that text in order to highlight the implication of 
those supposedly benevolent aspects of colonialism  in its worst atrocities.
 
III. “Dumped in very deep and current free water”: How the British colonial government 
destroyed its “embarrassing” archive
In addition to financial compensation, a state apology, and the public memorial in Nairobi, 
Mutua & Others vs FCO also occasioned the “Hanslope Park Disclosure,” the release of 300 
boxes of secret government files from the last years of British rule in such colonies as Kenya, 
Cyprus, Malaya, Ceylon and Aden (Elkins, 2011, 741). Known as “migrated archives,” these 
files were brought back to Britain rather than passed on to new national governments at 
independence. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office claimed it had lost the files, but the court 
ordered FCO to locate them, and make them publicly available as evidence. The new archive’s 
most famous phrase -- the statement by which it has come to be framed -- comes from a memo 
written to the Governor of Kenya Evelyn Baring by the administration’s attorney general Eric 
Griffith-Jones in 1957. “If we are going to sin,” he wrote, “we must sin quietly.” In Along the 
Archival Grain (2009) Ann Stoler cautions wariness of “the seductions of state secrets,” pointing 
out that the “codes of concealment are the fetishes of the state itself” (Stoler, 26). The state secret 
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is always, for Stoler, an invitation to disclosure. But what, then, might be the politics of 
disclosure itself as an archival form, or process? The new series at Kew, “FCO 141,” is marked 
by the history of its fraught, drawn-out production; that is, the material circumstances of its being 
burnt up, thrown into the Indian Ocean, migrated, hidden away, and then released -- “disclosed” 
-- under court order, 50 years after the “facts” it sets out to record. The disclosure is a fragment 
of an archive, made up of material that was considered not worth the burning, but worth keeping 
secret nonetheless. Too dangerous to pass on to the new nation, the disclosure (which of course 
was not then a disclosure) was absorbed by the British state and had its secrecy reinforced under 
the official ruse of absent-mindedness. Alongside lists of files lost forever in what the 
newspapers took to calling the “state bonfire” of the 1950s and early 1960s, there are neat 
notecards on bright white paper, dated 2012 or 2013, which detail the witholding of particular 
portions of the disclosure for at least another 50 years under the exemptions of the Freedom of 
Information Act. Withholding the disclosure of those secrets which must remain secret even at a 
time when the depths of colonial depravity in Kenya is well beyond serious question, the archive 
is made unreadable afresh, or at least unreadable as an artefact expressive of a final reckoning 
with the history that produced it. Not only a record of Britain’s long and uneven disengagement 
from colonizing processes, the disclosure must be read as an archival practice constituted 
through irrecoverable absences, both old and new; a practice that helps ensure that the question 
of British responsibility for colonial abuses remains a live one. 
The historians that have published research on the newly disclosed files foreground those 
records that evidence the organized, irreversible destruction of large quantities of colonial files, 
focusing on these as much as on the contents of the other surviving papers. Noting that “the vast 
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historiography on the end of the British Empire has been largely devoid of archival skepticism,” 
Elkins argues that the brutalities catalogued in her own Imperial Reckoning and David 
Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged “broke the field’s code of silence” and caused “discomfort” 
among fellow historians by calling into question the authenticity of the available colonial archive 
(Elkins 2015, 853-854):
The Hanslope files reveal in extensive detail the degree to which the British colonial 
government directed and orchestrated -- at home and in Kenya -- the purging of evidence 
pertaining to the formulation and use of systematized violence [...] The information on 
document destruction and removal is, in my opinion, the most important new evidence 
found in the Hanslope Disclosure (Elkins 2015, 860).
Likewise, Aoife Duffy’s work on the newly declassified material “pieces together a picture of 
administrative subterfuge, suppression of facts, and whitewashing atrocities, threaded through 
with official denial, which long outlived its colonial genesis” (Duffy, 490). She concludes that 
“an accountability deficit is the legacy of detention without trial as it was practiced in colonial 
Kenya.” Prior to the Hanslope Disclosure, Elkins observes, there was “not a single file on 
document destruction [...] nor a single destruction certificate” in the East African Series of the 
British National Archives. The discovery and availability of such records serves, in her view, “to 
undermine a carefully tended British fiction” of archival probity (Elkins 2015, 864).42 What 
remains to be read,  in Elkins view, is not only the colonial archive but also “its ashes” (Elkins 
2015, 867). 
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42 See also: David Anderson, “Mau Mau in the High Court and the ‘Lost’ British Empire Archives: Colonial 
Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2011) 
699-716.
But how, exactly, does one go about reading “ashes”? This vexed readerly desire  
resembles the desire for historical reparation in key respects. A certain moral imperative 
overrides the conviction that an itinerary of historical reparation (or a reading of the destroyed 
archive) is simply unfeasible; it refuses to be bound by the irreversible nature of acts of colonial 
destruction and instead undertakes to seek tenuous, ever-uncertain ways of countering the harms 
of that violence, while paradoxically insisting upon the irreparable nature of those harms as the 
very ground for that work. Stoler has commended the scholarly development, when confronted 
by imperial “ruins,” of “tactical methodologies keenly attentive to the occluded, unexpected sites 
in which earlier imperial formations have left their bold-faced or subtle traces and in which  
contemporary inequities work their way” (Stoler 2013, 3). By focusing on the ongoing nature of 
empire’s ruination, Stoler contends, one can “reposition the present in the wider structures of 
vulnerability, damage, and refusal that imperial formations sustain” (Stoler 2013, 9). In the 
Hanslope Park disclosure, one is faced by the ongoing ruination of the colonial archive as much 
as with its preservation, with these contradictory processes shaping the archive’s political 
meaning today. “To think with the ruins of empire,” writes Stoler, “is to emphasise less the 
artifacts of empire as dead matter or remnants of a defunct regime than to attend to their 
reappropriations, neglect and strategic and active positioning within the politics of the 
present” (Stoler 2013, 11). In this way, imperial ruins can be transformed into artifacts through 
which to contest the concerted effort of colonial power to “sanitize the past and lay claim to the 
future” (Elkins, 2013, 852).
The witness statements in Mutua & others vs FCO offer their own theory of the colonial 
archive, calling its authority into question. It was the court proceedings that prompted the 
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Hanslope Park Disclosure and occasioned new knowledge of the archival purge. The witness 
statements made by the claimants are texts that present a radical challenge to the colonial 
archive, making truth claims that necessitated the re-ordering of the colonial record. The formal 
qualities of a bureaucratic archive, as opposed to the legal claim, are crucial to consider here. 
Brian Larkin writes: “Weber long ago argued that the point of files was to separate the 
management of information from the human body (memory) making possible external sources of 
information and thus the formation of large-scale institutions. ‘Bureaucracy develops the more 
perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized.’ ” (Larkin, 2017, 14; Weber 1978, 975). The witness 
statements ground their claims not on paper records, but on the evidence of the victims’ own 
bodies: scars, cracked bones, aches, swellings, mutilated and defunct organs. “I told my family 
about the torture I had suffered,” reads Wambugu’s witness statement, “and I showed them all 
the scars and wounds on my body from years of beating” (Wambugu, 23). In making the legal 
claim, the bodies of the claimants are made to function as a precarious counter-archive, bearing 
truths that point to the distortion of the colonial archive and its concomitant failure to fulfil the 
Weberian function of externalizing information from the body.
 When the colonial government resolved to destroy its own files, decisions had to be 
taken about how exactly to go about it. Who would decide which files should be destroyed and 
by what criteria? How would they destroy them? What record would be kept of that destruction? 
The key file within the ‘migrated archive’ that addressed such questions is a memo dated May 3, 
1961, from the colonial secretary. This memo ordered that the independent Kenyan government 
should not inherit papers that:
(a) might embarrass Her Majesty’s Government or other governments;
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(b) might embarrass members of the Police, military forces, public servants or others 
(such as Police agents or informers);
(c) might compromise sources of intelligence;
(d) might be used unethically by Ministers in the successor government. (FCO 141/6957, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, “Disposal of Classified Record and Accountable 
Documents”)
On 13th May, 1961, a second memo followed, from the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Defense in Nairobi. This circular, which I came across in duplicate on numerous occasions 
across different files, is titled “The Designation ‘Watch’,” and details the division of government 
records into “Watch” and “Legacy” material:
(a) those papers (to be designated “WATCH” material) which must only be seen by 
“authorised” officers (as defined later), and which will ultimately have either to be 
destroyed or to be removed to the United Kingdom; and
(b) all those other papers which may safely and appropriately be seen in the course of 
duty by persons who may not fit the definition of the “authorised” officers, and which 
will eventually be inherited by an independent Government. Such papers constitute what 
may be entitled for convenience “LEGACY” material. (FCO 141/6969)
The memo does indeed go on to define who could and could not be “authorised” for the task, 
namely government officials who were “a British subject of European descent.” In another 
memo a few months later, T. Neil, Permanent Secretary to the Chief Secretary, further specifies 
that “No non-European secretary must be allowed to know of the existence of this system,” 
though he admits that actively restricting African assistant secretaries access to “Watch” material 
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may itself risk “embarrassment” (FCO 141/6969, “Security Documents”). This term recurs in the 
Permanent Secretary’s memo on “The Designation ‘Watch’,” as he repeats the language used ten 
days prior by the colonial secretary. The first of the “Basic Principles” of the Watch/Legacy 
distinction is given as follows:
The aim, which should be clearly understood as fundamental to the whole exercise, is as 
follows:-
To ensure that, while leaving as much material as possible for the unimpaired functioning 
of the succeeding independent Government, and for the proper recording of the past, 
nothing is made available to individuals nor to that future Government, which may
(a) prejudice the security of the Commonwealth or of any friendly state; or
(b) embarrass H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government], the present or any future Kenya 
Government, or any friendly Government
(c) give a political party in power an unfair or improper advantage over an opposite 
party by the possession of delicate information liable to be exploited in a party 
interest; or 
(d) endanger a source of intelligence, or render any individual vulnerable to 
victimisation. (FCO 141/6969)
“Embarrassment” was no incidental choice of words, but a key term in rationalizing the purge 
within bureaucratic parlance. A draft of a May 1963 letter from the Chief Commissioner to 
Provincial Commissioners,  regrets the discovery of “a number of files which would cause us 
considerable embarrassment if they fell into the hands of the next Government” (FCO 141/6979, 
draft letter from the Chief Commissioner’s Office, “Provincial and District Records,” May, 
1963). The examples given include “Personal files [...] on African political personalities,” 
“Interrogation reports on Mau Mau terrorists, lists of loyalists and lists of Mau Mau gangs,” and 
“Inquest files e.g. Inquiry into the deaths of the Hola Works Camp Detainees.” Files on all of 
these subjects are contained in the Hanslope Park disclosure, including the interrogation reports 
of both General China and Field Marshal Dedan Kimathi.
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It’s important to note that preparations for the purge had been underway years before the 
Colonial Secretary’s memo of 1961. Practical steps were taken to prepare colonial officials for a 
purge in the months following the Hola massacre of March 3, 1959. The unsealed files include 
the responses of many different colonial offices of state to a memo sent out from the Chief 
Secretary on August 17, 1959, “Method of Destroying Classified Documents” (FCO 141/6971). 
Each department provides specific details regarding “routine destruction” and “emergency 
destruction” (methods used, estimated destruction rate by weight of paper). These responses 
varied widely, and officers commented freely on the nature of the “emergency” being imagined. 
E. Behrens of the Treasury wrote on August 27, 1959, that “The incinerator used is stated to be 
capable of destroying 600 lbs. within six hours but it is understood that such a degree of heat 
would be generated that it would not be possible to use it again until the following day.” The 
Ministry of African Affairs had responded two days earlier, writing, “By this I imagine is meant 
the destruction of our Secret papers in the event of a national emergency,” before estimating that 
it would take “35 hours, or perhaps 4 # working days, to destroy our total accumulation of 
Secret documents.” M.J. Howard at the Attorney General’s office offered a still more dramatic 
range of options:
I am not sure quite what form of emergency you envisage. Our present buildings are of 
wood and were I believe first condemned in 1915. Were they to catch fire, I surmise that 
all our secret papers -- and indeed all our other papers -- would be destroyed in some 20 
minutes. However, if we were required for some other reason ourselves to destroy our 
secret papers I think that if all the European staff in Chambers were to assist we could do 
so by fire in about an hour.
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The files also demonstrate that word of the purge had leaked out. Britain’s leading historian of 
decolonization, Margery Perham, wrote a letter addressed to “Sir Patrick”: “It is believed in 
academic circles over here that [documents dealing with Mau Mau] are to be destroyed [...] But 
we who study history feel very deeply that no documents ought to be destroyed” (FCO 141/6971, 
Letter from Margery Perham, September 28, 1961). Exactly two weeks prior, the Guardian 
newspaper had published a report on what it termed the impending “State Bonfire.” Bonfire was 
indeed the preferred method -- Elkins describes how “ a dark cloud literally hung over Britain’s 
imperial retreat [...] smoke from burning documents threatened to interrupt Independence Day 
ceremonies,” but other methods were used as well (Elkins, 2015, 852). J.A. Cumber, the 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, wrote the Chief Secretary that, “it is estimated 
that under proper supervision, a bonfire would dispose of approximately 1120 lbs per 
hour” (FCO 141/6971, “Method of Destroying Classified Documents,” September 24, 1959). A 
month later, M.J. Chard, Civil Secretary to the Police, suggested pouring petrol on the papers 
first, adding that “a more efficient method of destruction would be by the use of an appropriate 
corrosive acid. Acid could be poured on the files, if they were placed in the concrete open drain 
which runs through this Headquarters” (FCO 141/6971, “Destruction of Classified Waste,” 
October 14, 1959). The initial memo from the Colonial Secretary in May 1961 specifies that “it 
is permissible, as an alternative to destruction by fire, for documents to be packed in weighted 
crates and dumped in very deep and current-free water at maximum practicable distance from the 
coast” (FCO 141/6957, letter from the colonial secretary, May 3 1961, “Disposal of classified 
records and accountable documents”). There are many detailed “destruction certificates” among 
the newly available files. All of these were titled, “The Designation ‘WATCH,’” and in numerous 
144
later cases, such as a certificate dated June 18 1963, just a few months shy of Kenya’s formal 
independence, the colonial official certifies not just the destruction of a particular tranche of 
files, but also of the special rubber stamps used to mark ‘Watch’ material with a distinctive 
purple “W” (FCO/141/6975, “The Designation ‘WATCH’”). By that point, evidently, the job had 
been pretty much done.
 How does one read the colonial archive as it records its own destruction? As is well 
known, Stoler has commended a move from archive-as-source to archive-as-subject, an approach 
to the archive that is less to do with the extraction of information, and more an ethnographic 
exercise (Stoler, 2009, 44 and 47). In the case of the newly released files on the destruction of 
“sensitive” documents in Kenya, such an approach seems especially apt. After all, the experience 
of reading a document such as “List of Files to be Destroyed” (FCO 141/6975) can only 
exasperate with its tantalizing line-items naming files nobody will ever see again: “C.S. 
10/13/1A “Mau Mau” (Detention Camps),” or “C.S. 27/10A (W) Appeals by Detainees,” or 
amongst a section of the list that is a succession of African-run magazines and broadcast outlets, 
“24/42A Articles for publication in the USA.” At the bottom of the list, which runs to many 
pages, two lines in blue handwriting and an illegible signature stamped with “Office of the 
Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs and Administration”: “Certified destroyed by fire in 
my presence on 18th June 1962.” 
Stoler’s particular sensitivity is to the ways in which colonial documents articulate 
feeling. She writes: “a discourse that both speaks of and expresses sentiment is everywhere in the 
colonial archives” (Stoler, 2009, 60). The sentiments expressed in the files on Britain’s archival 
purge in Kenya articulate anxieties of two principal kinds: firstly, with the arduous, time-
145
consuming aspect of the work itself -- as Elkins points out, one official noted that it “may well 
cause you to tear your hair out” (Elkins, 2015, 861). In the key memo sent widely to colonial 
officials within Kenya on May 13 1961, cited earlier, the “Conclusion” is an apologetic note: “It 
is regretted that this urgent and inescapable task will involve some officers in much tedious 
work” (FCO 141/6969, “The Designation ‘Watch’”). Secondly, and most prominently among the 
files I have reviewed, colonial officials express a profound fear of, and aversion to the experience 
of “embarrassment.” I want to take this choice of words seriously, as a key term deployed in 
explaining and rationalizing the purge, and in organizing the relationship between the apparatus 
of colonial rule in Kenya and posterity. “Embarrassment” was clearly and consistently the name 
used by colonial officials to designate that which they wished to forestall as Britain struggled to 
come to terms with the end of its formal rule. The term has a long life within the history of 
British colonial anxiety over challenges to empire. Klose cites colonial secretary Arthur Creech-
Jones writing in March 1949 that emergent international norms regarding human rights could 
potentially become a serious “source of embarrassment” for colonial powers (Klose, 219).43 The 
same anxiety underpinned British opposition to including the right to petition in the human rights 
covenants of the United Nations and European Council: “London expected a flood of petitions to 
the United Nations from individuals and discontented political groups from the colonies, which 
“may land the United Kingdom in considerable embarrassment internationally”” (Klose, 44).44 
In his 1978 essay “Racism and Reaction,” Stuart Hall figures the construction of Britain’s 
“historical amnesia” in terms of an “operation” on the popular memory that leaves “scars and 
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43 Klose cites: Secret circular memo, 25102/2/49, 28 March, 1949, The National Archive, DO 35/3776.
44 Klose cites: “Enforcement of the International Covenant of Human Rights,” memorandum, 1948, The National 
Archive, CO 537/3413.
traces” (Hall, 145). This offers one way of thinking about the processes of document destruction 
in Kenya: as another set of wounds -- albeit wounds of a figurative kind as opposed to those of 
Nzili, Mutua, Muthoni, Wambugu and so many others -- inflicted by the same colonial 
government. This archival erasure then, can also be thought of in terms of irreparable damage 
that nonetheless demands some form of reparatory response. This chapter is an attempt at such a 
response; as I seek to stage, through a reading of a novel that is a work of the white supremacist 
imagination in Kenya, something of the kind of “embarrassment” the colonial government 
undertook so meticulously to prevent. What was it about “embarrassment” in particular that 
made it feasible as the spectre against which the immense cover-up could be narrated within the 
colonial bureaucracy? The term in its administrative application can be usefully thought of as a 
euphemism for something like accountability or responsibility. Indeed, the survival of the records 
that were not destroyed, and which have now been belatedly disclosed, is itself, in David 
Anderson’s view, symptomatic of anxieties concerning future accountability: 
Some within the colonial establishment were deeply uncomfortable with the wholesale 
# destruction, concealment and removal of these archives, while others were equally 
# determined to ensure that records should not be revealed to the public that would damage 
# reputations. Not everyone, therefore, wanted to destroy the evidence of colonial action: 
# for some, it was critical that a record should #survive – if only to protect midranking 
# officers from accusations that they had acted without the instruction and direction of their 
# superiors (Anderson 2015, 156-157).
 
A term like accountability or responsibility would have carried far greater moral and legal 
weight, whereas the notion of Britain’s crimes in Kenya being merely “embarrassing” offers a 
framework for thinking of them more in terms of error or accident as opposed to atrocities 
produced in a structural and systematic fashion (just as the empire itself was said to have been 
acquired “in a fit of absence of mind”). 
147
IV. “There’s always that drop of blood that you forget to hide”: Reading Something of Value as 
an archive of sensibility
One reason I include an analysis of Something of Value in this dissertation is because, more than 
any other single text, this novel was responsible for exporting “Mau Mau” as a racist trope 
through which black resistance to white domination is reduced to savage, atavistic violence. The 
term continues to be used in this way today -- for example, in 2017 the Columbia University 
political scientist Mark Lilla criticized Black Lives Matter for using what he called “Mau Mau 
tactics” in confronting Hillary Clinton and other politicians during the 2016 U.S. election 
(Remnick).  In his history of the many political and cultural entanglements between colonial 
Kenya and the United States, Mau Mau in Harlem?: The U.S. and the Liberation of Kenya 
(2009), Gerald Horne writes that “In many ways it was Ruark who defined Kenya -- and by 
inference the continent as a whole -- for the U.S. audience [...] Ruark’s testosterone infused prose 
helped him to leapfrog the pack and become one of the nation’s most popular writers. ” (Horne, 
125-126).45 Marshall Clough describes Something of Value as the “best known account of Mau 
Mau” (Clough, 38). In his essay, “The Writer and His Past” (1972), Ng!g" analyzed Ruark’s 
fiction alongside the novels of Rider Haggard, as a variation on the Western: “The African 
character [...] is either a noble savage with gleaming white teeth and assegais, or else a sub-
human crook waiting in the dark to harm the white adventurer” (Ng!g", 1972, 42). The critique 
of Ruark and Rider Haggard, as well as “so-called liberal writers” such as Elspeth Huxley and 
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45 Horne is likely referring not only to Ruark’s fiction but also to his highly lucrative success as a columnist, 
“syndicated in 104 newspapers, published five days a week, fifty days a year” (Horne, 122). For a highly 
sympathetic biography of Ruark, see Hugh Foster, Someone of Value: A Biography of Robert Ruark, (1992).
Alan Paton, forms the context for Ng!g"’s account of “the African novelist’s” attempt to “restore 
the African character to his history” in that essay (Ng!g", 1972, 43). 
The commercial success of the novel was reflected  when Ruark “set a record when he 
received $300,000 from MGM for cinematic rights that was reputedly the largest single price 
ever paid for a novel to date. It sold over 120,000 hard cover copies in the United States and an 
unprecedented 140,000 hard cover copies in Britain, where 15,000 was considered large; it was 
eventually translated into about a dozen languages” (Horne, 221). The framing of the novel in its 
marketing was unambiguous. As Horne notes: “A publicity poster for the novel featured an 
African with a machete facing a European with the inscription: ‘the most dangerous big game in 
Africa -- man’ ” (Horne, 125). Horne’s interest in the novel is focused on the many ways in 
which Ruark, a writer from North Carolina under Jim Crow, exploits the Kenyan scene of 
resistance to white supremacy to comment on the situation at “home.” But it was also a novel of 
great importance in the U.K. and in Kenya itself. The sales figures alone indicate the popularity 
the novel enjoyed among its British readership, and contemporary British propagandists in 
Kenya expressed approval of his writing (Horne, 127). The Hollywood version, featuring Rock 
Hudson and Sidney Poitier, began with an introduction by Winston Churchill. 
However, as with so many literary works that enjoyed great popularity during the 
colonial period, both Ruark and Something of Value have fallen into obscurity. The novel was 
most recently published by Safari Press, a niche publisher of books on “hunting and firearms,” 
but is currently out of print. The epigraph for this chapter is Stuart Hall’s argument that the roots 
of indigenous British racism were to be found in a “profound historical forgetfulness [...] a kind 
of historical amnesia, a decisive mental repression,” that formed part of the “traumatic 
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adjustment” of the loss of Empire (Hall, 145). However, Hall doesn’t think about this shared 
psychic loss only in terms of absence or vacancy; instead he figures it as “an enormous reservoir 
of guilt [...] a deep historical resentment [...] scars and traces.” I want to suggest that Something 
of Value is a text whose cultural history enacts the process Hall describes: a novel of immense 
influence and popularity that fell into more or less complete obscurity once its damage was done. 
What to do with such a text, what to make of such an artifact of popular imperial literary 
discourse? I want to resurface Something of Value as one way of counteracting colonialism’s 
powerful technique of organized, structural amnesia. The very text that once helped fix “Mau 
Mau” as a racist trope for its many readers and enjoined them to imagine the conditions for 
perpetual white supremacy in Kenya, can now be turned against its earlier function, can be made 
to speak differently as a revenant that colonial power and its beneficiaries would prefer remain in 
convenient obscurity. Although the novel’s displacement from its former position of great 
cultural prominence is of a different order to the bureaucratic destruction of official records, both 
forms of displacement have an amnesiac effect and can, I think, be usefully considered as 
interrelated aspects of the history of the repression of the public memory of Britain’s rule in 
Kenya.
A number of scholars have reflected compellingly on the ways that novels may perform a 
distinct kind of archival function in relation to official orders of knowledge. In “The Lives of 
Infamous Men,” Michel Foucault argues that since the seventeenth century, literature has been 
defined by its “obligation to tell the most common secrets [...] it has the duty of saying that 
which is most resistant to being said” (Foucault, 173-174). “An art of language was born,” he 
writes, “whose task was no longer to tell of the improbable but to bring into view that which 
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doesn’t, which can’t and mustn’t, appear” (Foucault, 173). Marco Codebò reads Tomás Eloy 
Martínez’s El Cantor de Tango (2004) as “a repository of records,” and writes of a tradition of 
“the archival novel” (Codebò, 564). Such works, he argues, “inspire” a special “type of reading”: 
“their readers cannot apprehend an individual, be it an object, a character, a story, without also 
perceiving the arrangement that enables that very apprehension. This is exactly what occurs in 
the archive, where approaching a record also entails taking into consideration the series where it 
belongs as as well as the pieces of hardware -- files tags, shelves -- that make archival order 
possible” (Codebò, 567-568). In Codebò’s reading, El Cantor de Tango makes the crimes it 
describes more meaningful by arranging them within the text’s narrative form. However, the 
archival novel as he describes it, is positioned differently in relation to power than a state 
archive: “All the crimes whose records are stored in El Cantor de Tango went unpunished for 
political reasons [...] By becoming an archive of the police’s and the legal courts’ blunders, El 
Cantor de Tango brings to the fore the innate bias in favor of the rulers that characterizes the 
practice of the archive. It proves that something must have gone wrong in the functioning of the 
legal archive if no official repository can store proofs against those who perpetrate political 
violence on behalf of the powerful” (Codebò, 573-574). What I find especially suggestive about 
Codebò’s thinking about the “archival novel” is his sense of the genre’s special capacity to 
render individual entities meaningful through narrative, on the one hand, and on the other the 
trope of narrating those crimes -- specifically those that can be termed “political violence on 
behalf of the powerful” -- which are elided or else expunged from the official record. In this 
chapter I investigate Something of Value’s relation to the Hanslope Park Disclosure and all the 
files on Kenya destroyed by the British in the 1960s, and also think through the ways in which 
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the novel, whose author was explicitly allied with colonial power, nonetheless narrates the 
violence of counterinsurgency against the Land and Freedom Army in a way that might “inspire” 
a reader to “perceive the arrangement” -- the underlying social and political structures -- that 
made such violence possible and (from the perspective of colonial power) necessary.
In a distinct but related vein, Allan Pasco’s essay “Literature as Historical Archive,” 
argues that historians of eighteenth century France must pursue “a broad education  in the novels, 
plays, poems, and essays of the period,” as texts that provide access to “the way individuals think 
and feel” that is especially valuable in a field of study in which there are few of what Pasco calls 
“primary sources” (Pasco, 389). “Different archives,” he writes, “need to be exploited to reveal 
how people felt” (Pasco, 376). This notion of literary texts -- particularly those that respond to 
and hold appeal for a mass audience -- as an archive of feeling speaks to the sense in which 
literature may have evidentiary value for historians, but chiefly in relation to subjective, interior 
experience of the kind that cannot be reduced to exact or empirical data, evidence of the kind that 
requires an ambiguous form of expression. “Novelists and playwrights,” Pasco observes, “[give] 
form to public attitudes, insecurities and yearnings [...] mind-sets and cultural reality [...] stories 
frequently reveal history, especially its motivations” (Pasco, 380-382). These are especially 
important considerations, I think, for reading Something of Value, because not only does it 
perform some of the kinds of archival work described by Codebò, but it is a novel that expresses 
“the hopes and fears, the dreams” (Pasco, 387) of white settlers in Kenya in a way that the 
colonial government archive would never record, in those files that survive nor those that were 
destroyed. 
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 A novel such as Something of Value can be useful, precisely because it is a fiction of 
unabashed white supremacist chauvinism, in making sense of the highly gendered forms of 
colonial torture that both typified British counterinsurgency and then became central in making 
the legal claim for compensation. Such tortures are so horrifying as to run the risk of being 
narrated merely as isolated outrages, signs of pure evil, rather than as actions that were a 
characteristic expression of the imaginative and political structure of white supremacist 
patriarchy when confronted by the struggle for land and freedom. Far from being sadistic 
aberrations in relation to the notional moderation and restraint of colonial rule (an idea conveyed 
by the durable, officially constructed fiction of “minimum force” that has been critiqued in 
painstaking detail by Huw Bennett (Bennett, 2013)), the novel teaches us to “read” the castration 
and genital mutilation suffered by the claimants, and so many others, as meaningful political 
acts. We might think of such atrocities as the enactment of a bourgeois politics of gender and 
sexuality whose unraveling structured narrations of the uprising and counterinsurgency for the 
titillation and enjoyment of a large international white readership. By narrating these violations 
as expressions of a familiar liberal-bourgeois set of cultural norms and values, the novel 
implicates those readers for whom these form a recognizable part of their own cultural 
background. Rather than telling the story of the counterinsurgency from the perspective of 
colonial institutions such as the police, the pseudo-gangs, the army or the offices of state, the 
novel places the kinds of harm for which repair has been sought via the courts in recent years 
within a very different kind of narrative, one especially concerned with the intimate space of the 
white settler home as a locus for desire and personal development, and with the exploitative 
labour practices that sustain it.
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 In general terms, Something of Value narrates the (perversion of the) coming-into-
manhood of Peter McKenzie and Kimani wa Karanja, the combatants through whom the two 
sides of the broader struggle are personified. It is also a romance. The Land and Freedom 
struggle is staged, ad nauseam, as the interruption of a grand pastoral imperial romance, and as 
that form of African sociality and violence that calls into question the teleologies of the genre 
and the forms of desire it expresses: home, property, the prosperous heteronormative white 
family. A key technique in the novel’s polemic against African freedom is to make the reader 
experience the frustration of this generic interruption over and over again, and one feels it most 
of all via the narration of white heteronormative desire thwarted and thrown into crisis. The 
novel tells a story in which the atrocities of counterinsurgency are inextricably linked to -- 
indeed, are narrated as an expression of -- colonial gender politics, and the intersection of gender, 
race and class at the end of colonial rule in Kenya.
 Something of Value is a lengthy novel divided into three “books.” The New York Times 
reviewer described it as “explosive [...] the most sensational novel of the year [...] a high-voltage 
shocker [...] huge and frightening [...] Ruark’s massive report on the Mau Mau [...] an 
astonishing virtuoso performance [...] a pile driver of a book” (Barkham). The reviewer was at 
least astute to connect the effects of the novel, most especially its staging of machismo power, 
with its sheer size. I wish to draw attention to the way the novel as a whole stages castration and 
sexual torture as a meaningful response to the specific threat posed by “Mau Mau” to a cherished 
white patriarchal order.  While the last of the three “books” centers on the forest war, most of the 
novel is in fact an account of the pleasures of affluent white settler life: “in a mood of leisurely 
expansiveness as the author pictures the exuberant hospitality of the colonists, the expert 
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gunmanship of the white hunters, the lordly relationship between the white bwanas and their 
“Wogs” [...] the easy-going Kenya Ruark first came to know and love” (Barkham). Through the 
reported speech of its white characters, the novel is filled with racist epithets and clichés, such as 
the inability of Africans to feel pain (Ruark, 202), lack of rational thought (Ruark, 479) and 
inability to comprehend temporal concepts: “an African understands right now. He doesn’t 
understand tomorrow, and he forgets yesterday, because he’s got no sense of time. Time means 
absolutely nothing to him” (Ruark, 201). A key tension in the novel arises from the difficulties 
Ruark experiences in crafting a narrative that supports the dense array of racist ideas expressed 
within it, while at the same time sustaining some sense of complex subjectivity in Kimani and 
Karanja, the only two African characters whose interior experience is described in any depth.
 The first book, “Home,” tells the story of Peter’s childhood and adolescence, and the 
marriage of his sister Elisabeth (“She had her [late] mother’s blue-black hair, and her mother’s 
translucent skin that never tanned, and her mother’s delicate bones, and her mother’s unbending 
will”) to a neighboring farmer, Jeff Newton (“a big, shambling, friendly fellow with a 
Newfoundland’s eyes and a Newfoundland’s manner, but he was basically as hard as the shale of 
the land from which his dead father had forced a life” (Ruark, 11).46 The young Peter is 
established as Kimani’s “brother-playmate” having been cared for as an infant by Kimani’s 
mother following his own mother’s death. “We sort of grew up together,” he tells Jeff, who then 
explains that Peter must end any sense of intimacy with Kimani: “what you have to know about 
blacks is that blacks are blacks, and one thing you don’t do is argue with them. You tell them [...] 
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46 Ruark frequently deploys this highly repetitive style in order to convey a sense of the doughty moral 
virtue of the white characters, and the simplicity of their desire, as in, “Jeff was a farmer, and a good 
farmer, and all he wanted to be was a better farmer” (Ruark, 12).
you aren’t going to see the white man and the African on even footing out here. There’s no place 
in the scheme for it for a long time. These people just aren’t out of the trees long enough. They 
were eating each other and selling each other just yesterday” (Ruark, 40-41). A key event in the 
novel comes when Jeff strikes Kimani and Kimani doesn’t retaliate. His father Karanja perceives 
this unanswered insult (in Ruark’s telling) as inflicting a “thahu” (curse), bringing bad luck to the 
family. Karanja’s wife gives birth to twins, but having been born feet first they are immediately 
killed in order to “fulfill” the “thahu” (Ruark, 85). Karanja and the midwives are arrested, and 
later die in prison, while the reader’s sympathies are directed without irony towards the British 
judge who having passed sentence “went home and got hopelessly drunk off brandy and 
wept” (Ruark, 139). 
 In order to finally allay the “thahu,” Kimani attacks Jeff with a spear and flees the farm, 
presuming he has killed Jeff and will face capital charges if caught. Peter, supposedly possessed 
of a problematic intimacy with Kimani (though this is never narrated in the novel except 
inasmuch as he refuses to assault him) reflects: “What a pity. Now Kimani will never get to be 
my gunbearer. And I would have let him shoot the guns once in a while. Maybe even at a 
lion” (Ruark, 145). The portrayal of Kimani at the end of “Home” is as a sympathetic object of 
condescension. He has no capacity to understand the circumstances in which he finds himself. 
“Poor little bugger,” is how Henry describes him. “Caught halfway between yesterday and 
tomorrow and not quite sure of either” (Ruark 141). While Peter resolves to become a “white 
hunter,” Kimani absconds from his designated role as gun-bearer, and from a future in which 
their putative intimacy across racial lines could have been sustained precisely through their 
adherence to the normative racial hierarchy. Here, white supremacy is figured as a benevolent 
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practice of protection for black subjects defined by their inability to apprehend or navigate 
modernity. This perspective was typical among both white settlers, represented since 1946 by the 
Electors’ Union, and Kenya’s postwar governor Philip Mitchell, who advocated “equal rights for 
all civilized men,” as they sought to navigate the contradictions of supporting colonial rule at a 
time when new international norms were emergent concerning human rights and self-
determination, and empire appeared increasingly out of time (Klose, 64-65). 
 A joke repeated numerous times in the first two books of the novel is the description of 
white characters in “African” terms.47 For example, the novel begins with the image of Peter, as 
a young boy, removing his clothes and smearing his face and body with mud in order to 
personify “a thousand Masai [...] on a cattle raid” in a make-believe game (Ruark, 3). Later, 
when Peter and Holly’s marriage is being planned, the respective parents engage in a lengthy 
charade of a “formal Kikuyu marriage call,” mimicking what they understand to be local 
matrimonial customs and gender roles: “It appears that young Peter wa Henry has observed this 
girl from afar and finds her comely [...] He badly needs a woman to fetch firewood and dig 
around the planting on his shamba” (Ruark, 355). More often than not this joke about the 
confusion of racial hierarchy is made within discourse on family and gender. The first book 
invites a direct comparison between the rituals through which “white” and “black” gender roles 
and structures of desire are performed, interspersing preparations for Jeff and Elisabeth’s 
wedding with an account of Karanja’s marriage to his first wife Kamore, narrated as an extended 
flashback while he is imprisoned. Karanja’s wedding is recounted as a ritualized rape (Ruark, 
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47 Luise White: “if Mau Mau violated the boundaries between rulers and ruled, so did its repression. Settlers and 
soldiers alike were to boast that Mau Mau was defeated by white men who pretended to be black. White men 
donned old clothes and black face, yellowed their eyes with a diluted potassium solution, and accompanied Kikuyu 
countergangs into the forest in broad daylight” (White, 15).
127), and Kamore’s married life of hard agricultural and domestic work is juxtaposed directly 
with the “comic” image of Jeff and Elisabeth cutting their wedding cake “with a panga, 
appropriately,” before their luxurious honeymoon (Ruark, 128). The joke here works by 
trivializing the kind of gendered and racialized labour Kamore performs on the previous page 
(cutting firewood),48 and integrating that trivialization among the pleasures of the opulent white 
marriage ritual. The form of this joke (like Peter’s image of the future Kimani rejects -- “he 
could have been my gun-bearer”), replicates the socio-economic model for racial cohesion in 
colonial Kenya, offering a shorthand scene of intensive physical labour by Africans and decadent 
leisure for whites.  The family will later be attacked by guerilla fighters armed with pangas, a 
perversion both of the implement’s ‘proper’ use as agricultural tool and its apparently genteel, 
humorous appropriation to cut the cake. There are no such jokes in the final book, “Mau Mau,” 
as the uprising disrupts the established white supremacist order and its system of racial 
capitalism, within which everything designated “African” was available for exploitation as a 
figure of fun.
 Another joke that runs through the novel is the trope of figuring violence against Kikuyu 
people (and Africans more broadly) in terms of “hunting,” the repeated emphasis on the 
continuity between Peter’s career as a “white hunter” of wild animals in “The Young Warriors” 
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48 A reading of the significance of Kamore cutting firewood can be informed by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
Rediker, Ch. 2, “Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water,” in The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Commoners, and 
the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (2000), 36-70.
and then in the forest war in “Mau Mau,” as “a professional hunter of people” (Ruark, 535).49 
(His sidekick, John Thompson, assists him with both of these endeavours.) This parallel is hinted 
at throughout the novel through the use of hunting jargon such as “game,” “collect,” and the 
explicit comparison of those under attack with various animals when hunted. It is made 
absolutely explicit towards the novel’s ending: “Mau Mau had become a sport” (493). Peter is 
described “hunting Kikuyu as he used to hunt rhino” (Ruark, 397): “Man, but this was a real 
hunt. There must be a hundred dead ones in the meadow. The vultures would feed heavy from 
this one[...] He walked among the dead, looking at the faces. They did not impress him much as 
people” (Ruark 459). Ahead of the assault on Kimani and his family that ends the novel, Peter 
declares his intention as follows:
I’m allowed at least one trophy for my troubles. I never used to shoot any trophies for 
myself. In the Mau Mau thing I have shot only wart hogs and camp meat, so to speak [...] 
I want a special souvenir for me. Something for the wall. I will see if I can’t find my old 
boyhood chum -- General Kimani, if you please -- General Kimani, and ask him why he 
had to go and get slapped by Jeff Newton so that he started off the whole goddamned 
string of events that wound up with me not having any wife because Kimani cut off my 
sister’s husband’s head. I will collect old Kimani and hang him on the wall so that I can 
point him out to guests as the beginning and the end of all my troubles. I don’t know 
anybody else’s got a general on the wall over the fireplace (Ruark, 535).
The novel’s emplotment, awkwardly summarized in Peter’s speech here as “the whole 
goddamned string of events,” figures this atrocity -- the wanton display and celebration of black 
death -- as a justified form of revenge for Kimani’s emasculation of first Jeff and then Peter. 
Peter duly “collects” Kimani’s “headskin” (Ruark, 556) right at the end of the novel, and the 
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49 The figure of the “hunt” was a major trope of colonial discourse on Mau Mau. Fabian Klose writes of the white 
settlers’ interpretation of the state of emergency as the “opening of the hunting season” on Kikuyu, Embu and Meru 
people (Klose, 71). This was supported by policy: “Entire stretches of land were declared “forbidden zones” in 
which anyone could be shot without warning” (Klose, 75). The colonial policeman Ian Henderson’s memoir (with 
Philip Goodhart) of his capture of Dedan Kimathi is titled The Hunt for Kimathi: The Strangest Man-Hunt in 
History (1958).
“round heavy object” he carried in a black rubber poncho forms a key part of the final tableau, 
expressing the belated restoration of white patriarchal authority and a resolution to the crisis 
inaugurated by the attack on the Newton farm. The trope of counterinsurgency as hunting runs 
alongside, and blurs into, the novel’s explicit discourse on genocide. A thought loosely attributed 
to “soldiery, noisy young men who held cocktails as casually as they carried their shoulder-slung 
machine weapons” is: “This Mau Mau job was a bit for an exterminator, not a soldier. They 
should’ve left it to the bloody old settler in the first place” (Ruark, 492). Peter’s genocidal 
imagination works by figuring those he kills as excrement: “the bodies lay sprawled about in 
their own shiny-black blood [...] they did not look like bodies so much as flat excrescence, like a 
cow pasture seen from a low angle [...] It was a shame to use a really good gun on the filth you 
had to shoot these days” (Ruark, 460). “I’m still thinking of myself as the brother-in-law of Jeff 
Newton and the brother of a girl named Elisabeth McKenzie who hasn’t got terribly much of a 
face these days,” Peter explains a few pages earlier. “I will be quite happy to implement an 
orderly process of scientific elimination and work my careful way up from the bottom until I 
reach Jomo [...] I’ve got heaps of time” (Ruark, 443). While this is partially staged as a symptom 
of Peter’s psychological disintegration, the turn to absolute dehumanization is nonetheless 
framed and rationalized consistently in terms of revenge for the violation of the white family, and 
white femininity in particular.
 The work of Luise White requires mention here, specifically her essay “Separating the 
Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality and Terrorism in Central Kenya, 
1939-1959” (White, 1990). In her nuanced reading of the ordering of gender, race and class 
under “colonial capitalism,” White argues that the colonial response to the Land and Freedom 
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Army was defined by its desire to “dismantle the gender in revolt” (White, 19, 4). Colonial 
policies sought to discipline African male labour by regulating and controlling African family 
life, sexual behaviour, housing and urban planning. However, while some favoured policies in 
support of “a British vision of calm and productive African families” (White, 25) and a 
“stabilized urban work force,” there was also support for conditions to encourage “increased 
migrancy and decreased urbanization”: “The state’s attempt to cull a respectable working class 
from the laboring poor made distinctions in gender, in sexuality, in differential access to 
cohabitation. This amounted to the construction of two forms of manhood deployed in urban life, 
and it may be possible to speak of two male genders, whose literacy and skills informed the ways 
they conducted themselves as men” (White, 9). White argues convincingly that a key 
achievement of the Land and Freedom Army was to decolonize “the allocation of family life,” as 
evidenced by the specific ways in which both the Kenya Riigi and the Kenya Parliament  quickly  
established new norms for relationships and sexuality within their community (White, 12). The 
pipeline of detention camps, White argues, was structured around the idea that: “Rehabilitation 
was to do [...] what  colonial capitalism had prevented male migrant labor from doing for itself: 
removing men from their families, socializing them in new norms, and returning them to family 
life as a reward for their hard work and new discipline [...] The cure for Mau Mau was to 
dissolve the two genders” (White, 19).
 White’s analysis can assist in thinking through the preoccupation with gender, and with 
castration and genital mutilation in particular, that figures prominently in Something of Value (a 
key text in disseminating “Mau Mau” as a specific racist trope internationally), as in Ndiki Mutua 
and others vs FCO (in which the British government is held accountable for the systematic 
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torture that characterized its counterinsurgency). The novel’s final “book” is full of descriptions 
of what Peter terms “a great many dirty things that needed doing” (505). Among the many 
tortures described in the text are:  “the business of the safari ants and the molasses” (Ruark, 474), 
the insertion of a live snake into a woman’s vagina (Ruark, 450), beatings on the feet and 
genitals (Ruark, 448), “hoisting a man clear of the ground by a loop around his penis and rocking 
his head steadily the while to refresh his memory” (Ruark, 449), numerous castrations and the 
cutting out of eyes and tongue (Ruark, 467-473). A key point here is to notice that Something of 
Value not only rehearses sensationalized racist cliches concerning the politics and practices of 
“Mau Mau,” it also narrates in a lurid way the spectacle of white power torturing and destroying 
the rebel black body. That is to say that in its most popular and influential iteration, the racist 
myth of “Mau Mau” didn’t rely solely on writing African resistance as savagery against innocent 
white women and children. Rather, that myth articulated itself in a way that included precisely 
those kinds of atrocities that would later come back to trouble the old colonial power when re-
articulated within the discourse of human rights as obvious and egregious violations. The 
American South where Ruark grew up was a culture in which lynching formed part of the 
tradition of public entertainment and leisure. One way of thinking about Ruark’s novel of Kenya 
in relation to its enormous Anglo-American readership would be in terms of that tradition, with a 
community of white readers called forth by their shared titillation and enjoyment of the scene of 
terror as the guarantor of white domination.
Such tortures are consistently narrated as the inversion of the similarly gruesome oaths 
sworn by the forest fighters. While the descriptions of colonial torture are extremely detailed, 
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moments of introspection among the torturers are few and brief. The following is the most 
sustained such moment.
God Almighty, forgive us, Peter thought. Look at me. A bloody-handed murderer, as bad 
as the Mau Mau, maybe worse, because we do it absolutely coldly. Come home from a 
hard day’s work. The little woman says brightly: “And what did you do today, dear?” And 
you reply: “Nothing very much, sweetie. Cut the balls off one chap, some stranger or 
other. Plucked out a few eyes and hacked off a tongue and oh yes, I almost forgot. We 
also chopped five heads. What’s new with you? The new cook improving, or shall I cut 
off his h-- Shall we sack him and look for a new one?” And what would I like for 
Christmas this year? I wonder. A new pair of pliers to pull out tongues with? A new panga 
to cut off heads with? [...] And just yesterday I was a blushing bridegroom off for 
America [...] Peter put his face in his hands and wept. The hands still smelled of whatever 
it was they smelled of. (Ruark, 473-474)
This narration of Peter’s thoughts culminates in his adoption of the “protoform (eyes down, head 
averted)” of shame (Sedgwick, 36). His fantasy works by figuring the grotesque intrusion of his 
atrocities into the typical discourse of domestic settler family life; the expression of those 
atrocities as both bourgeois labour performed within the temporality of the standard working 
week (“what did you do today, dear?”) and as leisure, a hobby (“what would I like for Christmas 
this year?”). A central figure is the “new cook,” the joke here being the easy slippage between 
the lack of employment rights among domestic workers and the extrajudicial torture and killings 
Peter has been carrying out. However, sympathy in this ironic scene is directed less toward the 
vague “some chap” that suffers castration, than at Peter himself, the “blushing bridegroom” 
turned “bloody-handed murderer” who fears he may no longer be capable of participating in the 
protocols of white bourgeois life. His weeping, and the shame it expresses, is only a response to 
the suffering of his victims in the most general sense. Their decapitation/castration is of 
secondary concern to the prospect of his own loss of assurance in his role as man of the house.
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 Significant portions of “Home” are taken up with exhaustive descriptions of hunting and 
the material culture of white settler life -- not agricultural labour, but rather the luxurious, booze-
soaked domestic and social life that labour made possible. Such passages read less like a gory 
tale of derring-do, and more like marketing copy for expensive real estate, as in the following 
description of the “new home” with which Jeff surprises Elisabeth on their return from 
honeymoon:
Sliding panels, stained gray-green, hid a bar, an icebox and a small  kitchenette pantry at 
the far end. At the other end, vast french doors let in the sunlight and opened onto a cool 
green terrace which was rimmed with herbaceous borders and shaded by a towering 
cedar. The short end of the L consisted of two one-storied bedrooms divided by an 
immense bathroom containing tub and shower. The first room held only a tremendous 
double bed and a chest of drawers flanked by leather chairs. The other room, green 
paneled on three sides and white-stoned on one, owned a small fireplace pierced halfway 
up the wall, a single bed, a big chintzed easy chair, a blond-wood vanity table with triple 
mirrors, bookshelves, and a yellow Indian chenille carpet. Jeff had stretched a 
magnificent leopard skin along the wall over the fireplace, its mounted head held in a 
bracket [...] The big living room contained an old but newly varnished and tuned grand 
piano, once the delight of Jeff’s mother [...] One whole wall was bookshelves [...] There 
was a huge writing desk in one corner and several deep leather easy chairs scattered 
around. Jeff’s gun cabinet, as always parenthesized by elephant tusks, stood next the bar, 
and the oiled guns gleamed through the glass front. (Ruark, 135)
Here, the furnishing of the settler colonial home provides a material index of white male 
accomplishment, the construction of a luxurious domestic space ordered around the display of 
phallic symbols of masculine power. The sentimental heirloom of the renovated piano, combined 
with the “tremendous double bed” and Elisabeth’s immediately falling pregnant renders the 
home and the property within it meaningful inasmuch as it constitutes the space for white settler 
reproduction. “And why else, my good brood mare,” Jeff asks her, insisting that they name their 
firstborn Geoffrey, “do you think I built this new wing? I’d planned on filling up the other one 
with kids” (Ruark, 137). Part of the pleasure of this reproduction (and its description) is the 
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exactness with which each generation replicates the preceding one: Jeff begetting Geoffrey, the 
emphasis on Elisabeth’s resemblance to her mother, the piano evidencing the perpetuation of 
inherited modes of aspiration, pleasure and desire, as well as inherited wealth.
In “Book Two: The Young Warriors,” the narrative follows Peter’s adventures as a young 
“white hunter,” taking wealthy European and American tourists (principally Tom and Nancy 
Deane, a wealthy Manhattan couple) “on safari” around“Hollywood Africa” (Ruark, 162) 
interspersed with his periods of “wenching and heavy drinking” in Nairobi (Ruark, 159). Peter’s 
childhood sweetheart, Holly, returns from England and they get engaged, his desire for her an 
unambiguous metaphor for his his desire for Kenya: “God, I love this country [...] I love you in 
the same way I love the country” (Ruark, 357).  The reader is frequently interpellated as a tourist, 
as Peter offers lengthy disquisitions on Kenyan social and political life, both urban and rural, the 
unquestioned authority on all things Kenyan by contrast with the complete ignorance of his 
clients. The African quarter of Nairobi is described through a comprehensive assortment of racist 
cliches:
The car approached the native bazaars, and Nancy Deane got her first look at Africa, 
heard her first African sounds, smelled her first African smells. She seemed stunned. The 
smell was enough to stun a stranger [...] As you come by in a car, as Peter and Holly and 
the Deanes slowly drove along to reach the town, you are conscious of one thing -- a 
singleness of black expression. There is no curiosity, no active anger, only a great 
sweeping animal dumb animosity, a massed swing of the heads, like cattle against an 
enemy, and a frozen stare [...] There is only the completely blank look, the look of 
nothing behind the eyes, no expression near the mouth, nothing. Nothing. The black man 
in Kenya crouches behind that blank staring wall, and no white man can penetrate that 
wall when the black man builds it. As your car passes in a puff of dust, the chatter 
resumes behind you and silence drops just ahead of you.
“You don’t mean to say people actually live in these shacks?”
“They jolly well do. About fifty thousand of them, I reckon. They’re happy 
enough. You’ll see after you’ve been out here a few days that these niggers are different 
to what your niggers are. Yours have been down out of the tree longer. These boys aren’t 
here very far away from the baboons.”
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Again, the word “nigger.” It touched a nerve. (Ruark, 184-186)
This is one of the more obvious moments in the novel at which Ruark counterposes a white 
liberal perspective with an explicitly white supremacist one, invariably doing so in order to 
commend the latter. The embarrassment felt by the Deanes is framed as a naive, effeminate 
response to an African “reality” about which the plain-speaking Peter has far greater knowledge 
and experience. The reader is hailed in the second person, as a double for Nancy Deane, the 
description of the reader’s touristic gaze running parallel with her “first look at Africa.” The 
“nerve” of liberal anxiety regarding Peter’s repulsive rhetoric can plausibly be read as belonging 
to Nancy or to the reader, as the narrator anticipating the novel’s effect on liberal readerly 
sensibilities. The repetitive insistence on projecting various kinds of “blankness” -- of stare, 
thought, expression -- is at odds with the sense of lively sociality conveyed by “the chatter,” of 
life going on despite the white colonial presence. Here the passage deploys the popular white 
settler trope of “an island of white in a sea of black,” terms used explicitly in 1938 by Godfrey 
Huggins, the Rhodesian prime minister (Kennedy 1987, 2). The narrator’s anxiety is highly 
gendered, centering on the frustration of the “white man’s” failure to “penetrate” internal black 
experience at will, the sense of black life beyond the full control/knowledge of white rule, 
inhospitable to the colonial gaze through the collective refusal to continue with ordinary life 
when subjected to that gaze.
 Mid-way through “The Young Warriors,” the narrative rejoins Kimani, in a Nairobi 
brothel. From there, he reflects on the course his life has taken since his attack on Jeff Newton 
and departure from home, leading up to his rise within the guerilla movement. The sections on 
“Mau Mau’s” early formation focus heavily on the invention of new oaths and rituals. Ruark is at  
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pains to integrate the white liberal explanation for “Mau Mau” as a cultural and social formation 
within the over-arching white-supremacist polemic.  Ruark’s epigraph, from which the novel’s 
title is drawn, is given as a “Basuto Proverb”: “If a man does away with his traditional way of 
living and throws away his good customs, he had better make certain that he has something of 
value to replace them.” Peter’s rambling political analyses reproduces this trope, interspersed 
with the vulgar racism associated with “conservative” white opinion. On the one hand, he insists 
“All I’m saying is that a Wog is a Wog, no matter what you do to him” (Ruark, 200), while on 
the very next page he says: “We destroy every bit of their old logical living because it conflicts 
with our law, and replace it with bleeding nothing” (Ruark, 201). The resolution to these 
apparently contradictory claims is provided by Tom Deane, a kind of proxy for the reader: “I 
gather that you think the problem out here is that you’ve tried to ‘civilize’ them, for want of a 
better term, too fast” (Ruark, 201). 
 The account of Kimani’s rise through the ranks, in “The Young Warriors,” includes a 
special focus on gender. Following his first raid, he obtains a gun. Whereas the guns belonging to 
white men are fetishized, Ruark ironizes the investment of masculinity in the weapon when it 
comes into Kimani’s possession: “The business of spears was for boys and old men. Now 
Kimani was a full man, for did he not own a gun?” (Ruark, 261) Kimani’s moral degeneracy is 
indexed initially less by his militancy against the colonial order than by misogynistic 
descriptions of African women and Kimani’s perfunctory sexual encounters, first with Kabui in 
the brothel, and then with his mentor Njogu’s daughter Mumbi (“You may bed with my daughter 
[...] a fine, comely girl. She will bring you food in the forest” (Ruark, 251). “There was no 
fighting over the women in the camps. They served as communal property [...] A woman was too 
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unimportant a thing to make trouble over. Any woman could accommodate a dozen men in a day 
without disturbing the bulk of her basic work, since women were made that way” (263). Ruark 
extends this figuring of “Mau Mau,” as a form of social organization instantiated by the 
abandonment of bourgeois sexual norms, through the account of Kimani’s time in a Tanganyikan 
prison. Sent there on a mission to radicalize his fellow inmates and induct them into the 
movement, his instructions are to have sex with his male inductees in the absence of the 
paraphernalia usually required for oathing rituals. Kimani protests: “This makes me forever 
outcaste from my people, my clan, the Kikuyu people.” The “well-traveled Kikuyu” (a caricature 
of Kenyatta as the dangerous anthropologist capable of re-making his own culture at will) tells 
him: “We are the Kikuyu people. We create our new nation outside the old structure [...] You will 
practice sodomy to bind your people” (Ruark, 292). This homophobic characterization of “Mau 
Mau” -- like the cursory inclusion of boilerplate Cold War Russian and Indian villains 
orchestrating the uprising (Ruark, 283) -- reads as a propagandistic attempt to overdetermine the 
movement, figuring it as an entity onto which any and all Anglo-American fears could be freely 
projected. However, the notion of “Mau Mau” as a response to colonialism’s distorting effects on 
African traditional culture, that is as a set of invented cultural practices, is consistent with the 
explanation given by Peter, which also features prominently in the novel’s paratexts (title, 
epigraph, Ruark’s introduction). 
Something of Value figures “Mau Mau,” just as Ng!g"’s John Thompson does, as a 
specific kind of crisis of African culture by sustaining a central structuring paradox. On the one 
hand, the crisis is best explained as a specifically modern problem -- the loss of the old ways, 
that a properly authoritarian white supremacist regime might have preserved. On the other, it is 
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an expression of “a hundred generations of darkness,” the savage lurking beneath the “veneer” of 
civilization adopted by African colonial subjects (Ruark, 408).50 This paradox, as it played out in 
colonial debates during the period, has been of central interest to historians. Kennedy sums up 
the conservative view of “Mau Mau” as rooted in “primitive aggression [...] the inherent 
bestiality of the African,” but contrasts this with “the settler brand of liberal paternalism” that put 
forward “ a socially nuanced explanation [...] the corrosive impact of unbridled 
Westernization” (Kennedy 1992, 251). Duffy describes the “unholy convergence” of a “civilizing 
mission” with counterinsurgency strategy (Duffy, 542). Far from being neatly resolved, Lonsdale 
contends that the colonial response to “Mau Mau” was defined by the combination of these 
contradictory analyses, until the massacre at Hola in 1959 turned into a major scandal when the 
eleven so-called “hardcore” detainees were seen to have been “beaten to death in the name of 
modernisation” (Lonsdale, 416). In Lonsdale’s view it was Hola that precipitated the belated 
resolution of the contradictory politics of counterinsurgency up to that point, that had articulated 
itself as both a project of liberal reform and a conservative race war. After Hola, the “remaking 
of civilization in Kenya [...] had to be a political creation, not a confessional crusade” (Lonsdale, 
417). “Britain could not continue to remake Kenya by force,” Lonsdale concludes, “when other 
European powers were abandoning attempts to remodel colonial rule for the moral high ground 
of informal empire” (Lonsdale, 416).
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50 In his comparative study of white settler discourse in early 20th Century Kenya and Rhodesia, Dane Kennedy 
identifies the word “veneer” as a key term, “incessantly used as a metaphor for the influence of European culture 
upon African peoples” (Kennedy 1987, 163).
 The attack on the Newton family (by which the “Mau Mau” event is inaugurated in the 
novel) is narrated most obviously as coitus interruptus.51 The phone rings by the bed on the 
second morning of Peter and Holly’s honeymoon, and Peter informs Holly in turn of the “dirty 
filthy rotten hell of a goddamned thing” that has taken place (Ruark, 368):
So this is the way it runs, Peter thought. One minute you are warm in a sweet-smelling 
bed with the most beautiful woman in the world who loves you and nothing to do but 
wake her up, kissing, and then do what you did and want to do as much as ever you can 
forever. All you have to think of is Holly’s arm and Holly’s mouth and then breakfast and 
some golf maybe or just loafing off for a spin to Isiolo to shoot some francolin or watch 
the elephants and then home to the fire and a drink and watching her change out of the 
day clothes and into the night clothes and then into the bar to say hello to all the people 
and then maybe a cinema or a dance and then back to bed. And do it again tomorrow and 
then Nairobi and then the plane to Rome and London and New York which I’ve never 
seen and Tom and Nancy and that “21” they always talk about and the Museum of 
Natural History I always wanted to see and a trip to Florida to see the other nice ones, the 
Devlins, and then home again and all your life to make around each other and now this. 
This. This goddamned hell-sent this [...] Damn Jeff for getting his head cut off on my 
honeymoon. I didn’t interfere with his. (Ruark, 368-9)
Here, Peter’s shock is written through the manic listing of lost objects of bourgeois desire, the 
primary denial of “Holly’s arm and Holly’s mouth” connected sequentially with the denial of the 
various pleasures of the white settler “life” to which he imagines himself entitled, and 
significantly (via the honeymoon itinerary) desire for hospitality and friendship in Europe and 
the United States. The joke -- “Damn Jeff for getting his head cut off” -- works by ironically 
attributing to Jeff an intentional flouting of a code of white male reciprocity, despite the event of 
the white father’s decapitation being an unambiguous figure for the crisis of such a white 
patriarchal order. The attack on the Newtons is then retold, from Kimani’s perspective. Kimani 
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51 The attack on the Newton family in the novel can be thought of as a sensationalized version of the raid on the 
Ruck family farm on 24 January 1953. This event (along with the Lari massacre) formed the central focus of British 
propaganda efforts, within Kenya and beyond. Klose describes “a protest march by an excited crowd culminating at 
the governor’s palace in Nairobi, where protestors demanded the extermination of the Kikuyu” (Klose, 73).
strikes Jeff down with a machete in mid-sentence: “Don’t be a goddamned foo--” (Ruark, 385). 
Also interrupted are Tom Deane’s duck hunt (Ruark, 401), his plans to purchase a nearby “ranch” 
for recreational purposes (Ruark, 396) and his extensive order of mounted trophies from the 
taxidermists in Nairobi after it too is attacked by “Mau Mau” (405). Not least among the horrors 
of the “Mau Mau” uprising as narrated in Something of Value is its extreme inconvenience for the 
American tourist through whom the reader is introduced to the pleasures of British Kenya. 
 The highly detailed description of the Newtons’ newlywed home earlier in the novel 
directly foreshadows the pornographic account of the same house following Kimani’s raid as 
Peter visits the scene. Ruark writes a fantasy of innocent white bodies mutilated beyond 
recognition as human forms: “There’s nothing left of either [the children] Harry or Caroline,” 
says the police officer. The narrator then describes Jeff’s corpse: “You could not really say what 
was there and what wasn’t there, any more than you could say what exact shape the meat that 
makes a hamburger patty was before it became a hamburger patty” (Ruark, 371). The brief 
description of the bodies gives way to a lengthy discourse on blood: “The blood-smell was 
overpowering, hot, steamy-thick, and sickly-sweet. It was the first time Peter had ever thought 
precisely about blood [...] But the Wogs loved it. They lived off it. They doted on it” (Ruark, 
372-373). In Something of Value, “Mau Mau” is the name for a form of violence that tears white 
bodies apart, and then ruins the ideal white home and the property it holds by distributing the 
“minced bodies” (Ruark, 375) across it:
The room was soaked in it, swimming in it. It came soggy into his shoe soles. His gaze 
swung first to the piano. There were bloody footprints stamped across the keys, as if 
someone had stood on it to reach something. A tangle of wires rose like brambles from 
the inside of the piano where someone had struck it several times with a panga. There 
were separate big pools of blood, sticky, coagulated, crusty now [...] The drapes were 
partially charred, and one set had been pulled down and was soggy on the floor [...] 
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Someone had raked the bar clean with a panga. The gun case was smashed and naked of 
its guns. The weathered green/gray walls of the room were decorated at intervals with 
bloody handprints [...] There was blood on the tile, and blood on the shelves, and blood 
on the lav [...] There was a steady high-airplane hum of the big, fat bluebottle flies. The 
floors and furniture were clustered with them, some too bloated to move. The grounded 
ones squashed underfoot with a juicy pop (Ruark, 374-375).
In this grotesque description, black violence is figured as the double violation of the white body 
and white property. The abundance of “bloody footprints,” “bloody handprints,” “bloody 
fingerprints” conveys the sense of violence carried out without concern for the law, for notions of 
innocence or guilt -- indeed a violence that eagerly announces the guilt of its perpetrator. The 
contrast with the tropes through which whiteness articulates the fiction of its own innocence, 
within its archive and beyond (blankness, absence, erasure, amnesia, obscurity, “islands of 
white,” John Thompson’s whitewashed walls and clean blotting paper in A Grain of Wheat), 
could not be more stark. Later, Ruark’s John Thompson explains his decision to choke a woman 
to death: “if we’d stuck a knife into her there would have been the usual muck, and somehow 
there’s always that one drop of blood you forget to hide” (Ruark, 442). The saccharine 
sentimentalization of the pristine house and its various furnishings earlier in the novel, especially 
the heirloom piano, frames the later description of the Newton home as the total destruction of 
the idealized space of white male accomplishment and reproduction. Figures for castration in this 
scene include the smashed gun case, “naked of its guns,” as well as the bottles of alcohol cut in 
half, the beheaded leopardskin and the “huge buffalo” whose nose had been cut off with “one 
stroke of a panga” (Ruark, 374-375). 
 Having expended yards of florid prose on descriptions of Peter’s virility – especially 
during “Book Two: The Young Warriors” which begins by rhapsodizing upon “the strong sloping 
shoulders of a boxer, running smoothly into a corded column of neck” and his “abnormally 
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sturdy, enormously thewed” legs – the greatest outrage committed by the “Mau Mau” turns out 
to be the impotence to which they reduce Peter through his traumatic experience of the forest 
war. A brief visit home to Holly offers the fleeting possibility of a resumption of their sex life:
She bent and kissed him gently on the throat. His eyes opened, and smiled, and he was 
back again. He turned, drawing her toward him, and kissed her. His hands moved over 
her, and then his eyes opened wide in panic, almost in horror. “No!” he said. “No! I 
can’t!” He hid his head in her shoulder, and once again his body shook with sobs. (Ruark, 
424)
The approximation of his panic with “horror” is significant here. Whereas Peter is largely able to 
sustain the deadening affect of the “stiff upper lip” while murdering and torturing in the forest, 
he is unable to control his emotions when, at home, he perceives, “eyes opened wide,” the truth 
of his impotence (the true atrocity as far as he is concerned). He duly reacts with horror 
(“almost”) and then for the first time in the novel, with shame, hiding his face. Their relationship 
had been constructed as a figure for heroic white colonial rule. “I love this country and I love 
you,” Peter tells Holly earlier in the novel (Ruark, 357). The experience of his “loss” of Holly 
through his impotence is thereby invested with broader political meaning, the failure of the 
colonial romance and its teleologies narrated at both the personal and political level. Peter’s 
failure to come of age in his proper masculine roles as son, husband, lover, protector and master 
is emphasized throughout the final section of the novel, as he fails to achieve his father’s 
approval: “Henry McKenzie stared at his son from time to time and shook his head and said 
nothing at all” (Ruark, 495-496).
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 Inasmuch as the novel ends with an ambiguous restoration of Peter to the kind of power 
and potency the reader has been encouraged to desire for him, the ending bears analysis as the 
only way in which Ruark figures the possibility of the salvaging of white patriarchal authority 
after “Mau Mau.” White power in the face of anticolonialism is staged as a singular atrocity with 
clear symbolism in terms of gender and sexuality. After a long search, Peter and his accomplice 
Lathela locate the cave in which Kimani and his family are living and make a dawn ambush. 
Peter wrestles with Kimani and throttles him to death, while Kimani’s wife Kabui is killed “with 
Lathela’s spear all the way through her” (Ruark, 556). Lathela then beheads Kimani at Peter’s 
request.  Finding “a little brown baby squirming in a packing box cradle,” Peter looks around the 
cave where the family has been living, Peter repeats, “So this is the home and that is the 
family” (Ruark, 557), emphasizing the ironic echo of the earlier descriptions of the Newton 
family before and after Kimani’s attack. But whereas the Newton children were reduced to 
“minced bodies [...] scraped up” (Ruark, 375) and their home drenched in blood and hacked at by 
pangas, Peter blows up Kimani’s home with explosives and “saves” Kimani’s (ungendered) baby  
after initially acceding to Lathela’s suggestion to “knock it on the head,” saying “Poor little 
bugger’s got no future” (Ruark, 557):
They walked all the day and finally came to the low slopes which prefaced, lime-green, 
the deep rich green of farming country [...] I suppose it’s actually my baby now, Peter 
thought. It’s about all I’ve got. I’ll take it home to Elisabeth and let her raise it up with 
young Wilbur. (Ruark, 560) 
Something of Value constructs the limits of its hero’s genocidal desire by ending with this event, 
Peter’s decision to save the child and use it (by its symbolic function as evidence of his 
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emasculation of the black father/freedom-fighter) towards the restoration of the white family.  
Both the baby and Kimani’s severed head are repeatedly referred to as Peter’s “burden” (Ruark, 
559-560), an obvious allusion to the “white man’s burden” of Kipling, here re-imagined as a 
double duty -- both to care for/civilize the “native” child and to destroy anticolonial iterations of 
gender and free black family life. Peter’s claim to ownership over the child marks his return to 
the now apparently secured “farming country,” rendered a fertile “home” once again through the 
penetration and death of the rebel black mother, the decapitation of the guerrilla black father and 
the absolute destruction of the insurgent black home. In Something of Value, we have a novel of 
the white settler imagination that narrates in frank terms a version (once a popular sensation, now 
utterly obscure) of the “reason,” and the underlying structures of desire, for the intensely 
sexualized forms of torture inflicted on suspected “Mau Mau.”
 Though she barely speaks in the novel, Elisabeth is an especially important character for 
the text’s staging of gender. The disfigurement inflicted on her by Kimani, her mutilated face and 
body, is repeatedly invoked in framing acts of torture and killing by the colonizers. “The slash on 
the head and face had left a broad red scar that disappeared in her hair and dragged down one eye 
at the outer corner, making one whole side of her face grotesque” (Ruark, 407). Shortly after Jeff 
and her children are killed, she discovers she is pregnant, and in the latter part of the novel her 
pregnancy forms the major sub-plot to the forest war. Elisabeth and her baby (Wilbur) are 
adopted as a cause celebre by Nairobi settlers, who set up a “maternity patrol” (Ruark, 509) in 
her hospital ward:
In a way, the great paternal pride of half of Kenya in the unborn baby of the dead Jeff 
Newton was easily understandable. This would be a sort of symbolic baby [...] Here’s this 
poor girl hacked to pieces, you see, with her husband in bits in the yard and the other kids 
clobbered and the house burned down, and she still hangs onto the baby. She’ll have it, 
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Mau Mau or no Mau Mau, emergency or no emergency, drought, rain, hell or high 
treason, and it’ll be a bloody good baby. It takes more than Mau Mau to lick this breed. 
Mau Mau or bloody Japs or Germans or the Russians tomorrow. As long as women like 
Elisabeth Newton will have babies like this one, everything’s going to be right. Well, 
cheer-ho. I must just whip off and check in for bedpan detail. (Ruark, 514)
Written in free indirect style as if from the perspective of one of the male settlers on “maternity 
patrol,” this passage makes explicit that this is a “symbolic baby,” invested with “great paternal 
pride” and evidencing the strength of “this [white Anglo] breed.” Elisabeth is celebrated as an 
archetype of the resilient white mother, through the voice of a generalized white male protector. 
In his comparative study of white settler culture in Kenya and Rhodesia, Dane Kennedy shows 
the central place of anxieties regarding white fertility at all levels of white settler society, with 
longstanding debates on such questions as whether or not reproductive capacity among whites 
was diminished by the strength of the tropical sun (Kennedy 1987, 109-127). Wilbur also 
functions as a kind of double for (and putative sibling to) Kimani’s baby. In describing “the 
intimacy of counter-insurgency,” White points out that a settler rumour existed regarding a 
British member of a pseudogang who adopted a baby orphaned in the forest war (White, 15) and 
that there was a great deal of public interest in orphaned Kikuyu children during this period as 
“Europeans sought to supplant Kikuyu parenting” (White, 18). Ruark’s text ends by offering a 
vindicatory settler fantasy through which the many crises of “Mau Mau” are resolved, on the one 
hand, by the African child taken into white care through the violent destruction of the African 
family and, on the other hand, the white baby who survives anticolonial violence as proof of 
white fertility and resilience. They serve as an ironic echo of Peter and Kimani’s childhood 
together, and as a perverse figure for Kenya’s racialized future under white rule, post-“Mau 
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Mau,” in which the new African subject is to be fashioned entirely according to the needs and 
norms of white settler life.
The reframing of the Land and Freedom struggle as a human rights atrocity, through 
historical and legal work, has publicly established (albeit in a limited way) the idea of British 
colonial guilt, where denialism had largely predominated. This achievement can be usefully 
supplemented by cultural work that seeks to foster a sense of implication and enduring 
responsibility among readers who are the beneficiaries of the social and political structures that 
produced colonial violence in both its extreme and more quotidian forms. In this chapter, I use 
the files of the belated Hanslope Park Disclosure to show that the archival purge of the early 
1960s was rationalized as a means of avoiding “embarrassment,” and accountability. With so 
much key historical evidence destroyed, I investigate the use of a different kind of record of 
colonialism, Something of Value, a text that functions as an archive not of colonial bureaucracy 
but of broader structures of feeling that speaks powerfully of a transnational white supremacist 
imaginary. By restoring this text (subject to the very historical amnesia put decisively in motion 
by colonial officials equipped with jerry-cans and boxes of matches), to public memory, I argue 
that readers can learn to think of the kinds of atrocities foregrounded by the legal case not as 
isolated outrages, but rather as expressions of an entire political order, rooted in intimate 
structures of desire, rigid white supremacist, heteropatriarchal visions of gender, sexuality, and 
family life.
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Chapter IV | “Intimate casualties”: Narrations of Kenya’s anticolonial struggle in three 
post-independence women’s texts
While I was in A levels, somebody gave me a copy of Decolonizing the Mind by Ng!g"  wa 
Thiong’o and fancied myself an intellectual. The book impressed me because it used words like 
decolonizing. A very satisfying word: like a squeegee on a dirty dorm floor, it promised to leave 
things squeaky clean. We are not messy people, it said, you can pull a completely unpolluted 
person out of the mush. I was terribly impressed. -- Binyavanga Wainaina
In May 2003, Kenya’s recently elected government invited the man they believed to be the great 
Land and Freedom Army general Stanley Mathenge to the celebrations marking 40 years of self-
rule. It was a moment of great hope that a new political order lay ahead. Daniel arap Moi’s 
debilitating presidency had ended after nearly a quarter of a century, and his nominated successor 
Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, had suffered a resounding defeat at the polls to Mwai 
Kibaki and his National Rainbow Coalition. Stanley Mathenge had last been seen in July 1955. 
By this time the forest war was virtually lost, and when Mathenge failed to convince Dedan 
Kimathi to enter negotiations with colonial forces it is thought Mathenge attempted to escape the 
Aberdare mountains by crossing into independent Ethiopia (Branch, 2011: 289). Thereafter, he 
disappeared. Almost half a century later, a Kenyan living in Ethiopia contacted a prominent 
journalist, Joseph Karimi, and from early 2002 reports circulated in Kenya that Mathenge had 
been found alive and well, farming near Addis Ababa and heading a large family. Among other 
visitors from across the border, Mathenge’s wife Miriam Muthoni reportedly confirmed the 
elderly gentleman was indeed her husband, the general. Arrangements were made for Mathenge 
to attend festivities marking the 40th anniversary of self-rule (Madaraka Day), and he was met 
by cheering crowds singing freedom songs at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, which had 
itself been constructed in terrible conditions by detainees at the Embakasi prison (dubbed 
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“Satan’s Paradise”) during the “Mau Mau” struggle (Branch, 2011: 290). The enduring colonial 
ban on the Land and Freedom Army would be formally lifted later the same year by Kibaki’s 
government, another chapter in the complex and contradictory relationship between the peasant 
guerrilla movement and Gikuyu elites. The first doubts appeared when it became apparent that 
the man being welcomed back as a hero of the liberation struggle spoke neither Gikuyu nor 
Swahili. Then, at a press conference at the Panafric Hotel, where many veterans of the struggle 
who had fought side by side with Mathenge had gathered, he took questions in Amharic. He 
explained that he had been born in Ethiopia near the Kenyan border, and was certainly not 
Stanley Mathenge (Branch, 2011: 290). Ato Lemma Ayanu -- for it was he -- was disinvited from 
the Madaraka Day celebrations and returned on a plane to Addis Ababa early the following day.
 If the Mathenge/Ayanu affair -- distressing and confusing as it was -- contained a broader 
insight, perhaps it was to show the difficulties inherent in any attempt to bring the history of the 
anticolonial struggle to bear on Kenya’s more recent political life, especially in terms of a golden 
age of radical aspirations to be revived and mobilized on the contemporary scene. “Mau Mau’s” 
meanings, so many years on, are far from simple. What seemed a promising opportunity to 
invoke the armed struggle straightforwardly as political theatre -- the hero’s return to help 
authorize a second phase of the nation’s independence, in which the aspirations of the liberation 
struggle towards freedom would finally be fulfilled --  turned out to be not just unviable but a 
travesty that instead exemplified intractable issues around the uprising as an object of 
knowledge, the marginalization of prominent Land and Freedom revolutionaries in Kenyan 
public life, and the ambiguous and deeply contested legacies it has left as both liberation struggle 
and civil war. Rather than affirming the celebration of Kenya’s independence, the history of the 
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war against colonialism retains the possibility of troubling the assumptions embedded in such 
nationalist rituals profoundly. I want to suggest, too, that there is an important distinction to be 
made between, on the one hand, how the uprising and counterinsurgency can be usefully 
discussed within debates about the end of the British Empire, and on the other, the meanings the 
event carries in Kenya itself. Whereas it is certainly generative for the event to be reframed such 
that Britain’s imperial crimes (and its efforts to whitewash these atrocities) are highlighted, the 
retelling of “Mau Mau” in terms of a human rights catastrophe -- most obviously as an 
exceptional sequence of atrocities with clearly identifiable victims and perpetrators -- this 
relatively simple moral history sits more awkwardly within Kenya itself.52
In this chapter, I read three women’s texts. Two are novels: Dust (2014) by Yvonne 
Adhiambo Owuor, and Coming to Birth (1986) by Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye. The third is a 
short film, His to Keep (2013), by Amirah Tajdin. Each of these texts figures the anticolonial war 
as part of longer narratives that delve into the conditions of life in post-independence Kenya, 
moving toward a contradictory present from which “Mau Mau” is remembered, frequently 
hazily, as a kind of beginning. This chapter investigates the different ways in which these texts 
narrate the bearing of the anticolonial war on Kenyan life in the postcolonial nation-state. Each 
stages distinct modes of dissatisfaction with the new dispensation. My reading of Ruark in the 
previous chapter found in Something of Value a vulgar novel that can be turned on its head, so 
that white supremacist propaganda now serves as an “archive of sensibility” to connect the 
atrocities against “Mau Mau” with the liberal bourgeois white culture of the period. In this sense, 
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52 See for example E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, “Matunda ya Uhuru, Fruits of Independence: Seven theses on 
nationalism in Kenya,” Ch. 2 in John Lonsdale and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo eds., Mau Mau and 
Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (2003); and Bethwell Ogot, “The Decisive Years, 1956–63,” in 
Bethwell Ogot and W.R. Ochieng eds., Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940–93, (1995).
the world of Ruark’s novel might be said to complement the version of the story of the 
counterinsurgency as told by Elkins in her revisionist study Imperial Reckoning, as well as in the 
legal suit against the UK government. The moral problem (colonial violence) is established with 
complete clarity, and those caught up in the crisis are identified in terms of either victims, 
perpetrators or collaborators. By contrast, what I find in the ambivalent texts of Owuor, Macgoye 
and Tajdin is a crisis figured in ambiguous, unsettled terms, as different versions of the lived 
aftermath of the struggle are narrated. 
Each of the three texts poses in a distinct way the question of the relation between the 
new nation and the struggle that helped to precipitate its establishment, by foregrounding the 
experience of women. The anticolonial war is narrated as an event that is in a vital sense not 
over, as its forms of damage and loss persist well beyond the historical period in terms of which 
it is usually circumscribed. In other words, the armed struggle against colonialism is constitutive 
of the post-independence presents the texts configure, and not a distant event carrying a settled 
array of meanings. I examine the ways in which each text thematizes the work of repair in 
relation to this long historical experience of trauma, loss and dispossession, and figures this work 
as a feminist practice. I begin with a reading of Macgoye’s novel, the story of Paulina’s coming-
of-age in the new nation. Although the text naturalizes the nation-state as a necessary form of 
political order for personal development and heteronormative reproductivity, the novel 
nevertheless narrates the experience of African working class women as the perspective through 
which the violence of the state against its citizens, its sustained failures to support the work of 
care for its citizens, can be marked most clearly. The anticolonial struggle figures (mainly via a 
fleeting masculine narrative perspective) as a crisis to be resolved by the colonial state. A reader 
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may also choose to see it figured as the first miscarriage suffered by the protagonist as a very 
young woman, although a reading of Paulina as a figure for the nation proves unviable. Macgoye 
narrates women’s work within the domestic sphere as an alternative, reparative practice, by 
contrast with the destructive public sphere, gendered male and thus inaccessible to Paulina. If 
Macgoye’s novel expresses a mode of feminist dissatisfaction with the new nation, Tajdin’s film 
stages the experience of feeling confined by old forms of radical aspiration attached to the new 
nation state, a social and political project that has proven wholly inadequate both as a vehicle for 
these aspirations, and as a mode of redress for the enduring harms of colonialism and colonial 
counterinsurgency. Owuor’s novel shares this dissatisfaction, and ends by narrating a destruction 
and an irreversible break with “Kenya,” figured as a political structure and mode of belonging 
inherited from the British, impossible to salvage or transform, a nation which perpetually 
reproduces inherited structures of violence and oppression.
 I preface my readings of the texts by Macgoye, Tajdin and Owuor by drawing out some 
useful critical threads from a densely suggestive 2013 essay by the feminist theorist Wambui 
Mwangi, “Silence is a Woman.” An inquiry into the status of women’s bodies in contemporary 
Kenyan politics and public space, the essay makes a number of claims and provocations that I 
think are generative when put in conversation with the works that form the focus of this chapter, 
two of which speak to essentially the same conjuncture as Mwangi addresses, the period since 
the contested election of 2007 and the ensuing indictments of senior politicians including 
President Uhuru Kenyatta by the International Criminal Court. Her essay analyzes the radical 
possibilities of feminist discourse in the contemporary Kenyan context, and offers a number of 
key terms to think with in posing questions that concern the specific ways in which the 
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subordination of women is reproduced, and the relations between class, gender and ethnicity in 
Kenya: 
The Kenyan post-colonial social contract is not a political agreement between allegedly 
neutral individual citizens but a patriarchal and ethnicist order based on the domination of 
all Kenyan women by all Kenyan men. The seemingly unsayable political problem in 
Kenya is the post-colonial dominance  of the patriarchal ethnic Gikuyu elites, whilst the 
ethnic virulence of Kenya’s patriarchal politics threatens our constitutional democratic 
opening. The bodies of women speaking from different horizons of political possibility 
create generative conditions of dissent and democratic renewal (Mwangi).
Women’s discourse, in Mwangi’s theorizing, can pose an especially profound challenge to a 
repressive national order structured in terms of stratification by gender, ethnicity and class. 
Affirming the tradition of feminist resistance among Gikuyu women, Mwangi theorizes feminist 
protest and critique as a principal means by which “partriarchal narratives” of ethno-nationalism 
come unpicked. In a brief image, she describes a scene from 2008 of the social campaigner 
Rachel Kungu, “protected only by her commitment to the work of social repair, [walking] up to 
the barricades of burning tires erected by angry, armed, and violent young men, to negotiate for 
peace” (Mwangi). “Repair” here is thought as feminist work -- work done by women both for, 
and in spite of, men. The practice confers a weak form of “protection” upon the woman doing the 
reparative work, a tenuous possibility that is nonetheless the best available recourse to counter 
ethno-patriarchal forms of violence. 
Mwangi offers a critique of the complex figure of Wanjiku, who has been invoked since 
the debate over constitutional reform under Moi in the 1990s to denote the “ordinary Kenyan 
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citizen [...] the common good,” a “Kenyan riff on ‘Lady Justice,’ ” and an “avatar of social 
justice,” and is frequently declared “dead” within political and social critique, by contrast with 
the normative “monumental forms of homage to powerful men” that in Mwangi’s terms 
constitute “public space” in Kenya. Wanjiku’s gender is more complex than may first appear, in 
Mwangi’s view, since lacking a body and having “only a name” that “places her in Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s Gikuyu community”: “Perhaps instead of personifying a national aspiration to social 
justice, Wanjiku served or was perceived as a disciplinary site for the domestication of gendered 
and ethnicized dissent” (Mwangi).
It is Mwangi’s specific critique of the gender politics of silence (from which the essay 
takes its title) that I wish to emphasize most of all, especially with an eye on Owuor’s 
thematization of silence in Dust. Framed by epigraphs taken from Audre Lorde on this theme -- 
“Your silence will not protect you” (from Lorde’s 1977 paper “The Transformation of Silence 
into Action”), and “So it is better to speak / remembering / we were never meant to 
survive” (from her poem “A Litany for Survival”) -- Mwangi’s essay turns on the insistence that 
women’s speech is uniquely radical and disordering within Kenyan social relations and the 
public sphere. This is why in place of Wanjiku (whose definitive social role is to be 
ventriloquized by others) she offers the constitutional lawyer Kethi Kilonzo, who became known 
in Kenya due to her appearances on television challenging the validity of the electoral process in 
the Supreme Court in 2013. In Mwangi’s view, such speech by women is especially disruptive to 
ethnic orders underpinned by patriarchal structures, because:
The usual gloss of ‘mutumia’ [a generic word for woman; Mwangi’s literal translation is 
“the silent one[...] the one who does not speak”] is that Gikuyu womanhood is a reserved 
dignity and composed serenity. This gloss is unsurprisingly the one enforced and 
circulated by patriarchal and misogynist cultural interpreters. The natural condition of a 
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woman is to dwell in silence, to persevere mutely, and to communicate speechlessly. 
Silence becomes a woman. Silence is what a woman, in be-coming a woman, becomes. 
Silence is becoming in a woman because silence is the be-coming of a woman. A woman 
is silent. The presence of a woman is the presence of silence. Silence is a woman 
(Mwangi). 
The most striking aspect of this passage is, clearly, the unusual personification of silence as a 
gendered subject, a woman. Within this ordering, speech is implicitly written as a masculine, or 
masculinizing, practice. What does it mean to think of silence, of withheld or suppressed speech, 
in terms of a woman, to gender that which goes unspoken as feminine? At what level -- the 
family, community, the nation, historical discourse -- might Mwangi’s provocation pertain? She 
earlier names “the post-colonial dominance of the patriarchal ethnic Gikuyu elites,” which she 
calls the “unsayable” problem at the heart of Kenyan political life, while women’s discourse can 
inscribe “different horizons of political possibility.” Mwangi’s thinking helps me to frame my 
reading of the three texts by Kenyan women in this chapter as works that hold, at minimum, the 
potential to carry radical political meaning, works whose very textuality presents a most 
profound problem to the normative political and social order as Mwangi describes it. 
I. “Making and mending”: Macgoye’s Coming to Birth and the new nation
Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye was a naturalized Kenyan writer, born in England in 1928, 
who moved to work as a bookseller in Nairobi with the Church Mission Society, joined a Luo 
family by marriage, and remained in Kenya (with the exception of four years spent among the 
radical intellectual circles of early 1970s Dar es Salaam) as a prominent part of the literary 
community until her death in 2015. Coming to Birth (1986), her second novel, narrates the last 
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years of colonial rule and the first fifteen years of independence, culminating just a few months 
shy of Jomo Kenyatta’s death in August, 1978. A number of salient historical milestones figure in 
the background of the protagonist Paulina’s experience: the “Emergency,” the advent of 
independence, the assassinations of major political figures on the Kenyan scene such as the 
socialist Pio Gama Pinto (1965), Tom Mboya (1969), Argwings Kodhek (1969) and J.M. Kariuki 
(1975), as well as the political imprisonment of Ng!g"  wa Thiong'o (1977) and the formidable 
woman parliamentarian Chelagat Mutai (1976). At the regional/continental level, the murder of 
FRELIMO leader Eduardo Mondlane  in 1969 also features. However, the novel’s focus is not on 
events at a national political level, but rather on Paulina’s ordinary life as a working class young 
woman from the provinces struggling to find her way in Nairobi, start a family, and negotiate 
romantic and professional relationships in a patriarchal society.  
The struggle against colonial rule is alluded to early in the novel: the curfew imposed on 
Gikuyu residents is mentioned (Paulina and Martin are Luo), and the modest house they live in is 
said to have been re-assigned to Martin following Operation Anvil, the 1954 military operation 
that removed an estimated 50,000 so-called suspected “Mau Mau” from Nairobi. The end of the 
anticolonial struggle is narrated fleetingly and naively: “there was no more talk of shooting and 
few people taken away” (Macgoye, 30). There is little detail, and rather than standing out as an 
exceptional historical event, it forms merely the first part of a continuous and ongoing 
experience of violence and political crisis. What little political context as there is in the novel 
regarding the anticolonial war is largely given in the very first paragraph:
Martin Were pushed a ten cent piece into the slot and marched on to the platform to meet 
his wife. He was twenty-three and the world was all before him. Five feet ten, a hundred 
and fifty pounds, educated, employed, married, wearing khaki long with a discreetly 
striped blue and white shirt and a plain blue tie, socks and lace-up shoes, he had already 
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become a person in the judgment of the community he belonged to. It was eight o’clock 
in the morning, one of those cool, bright Nairobi mornings with a strident blue and white 
sky like the best kind of airmail pad, promising heat later on, bougainvillea dry and 
overpowering with a familiar papery rustle, the station desperately important, 
loudspeaker announcements, tickets and passes, hustle and bustle, the life-line of the 
country as he had been taught at school, and a a hubbub of young soldiers coming and 
going in khaki, for this was 1956 and the Emergency an accepted fact. (Macgoye, 1)
The narrator privileges Martin’s perspective for just five further pages, and for the remainder of 
the novel we are with Paulina. The opening paragraph stages a sense of order that Paulina’s 
arrival will disrupt: Martin has already “become a person,” and his “blue and white shirt” are in 
harmony with Nairobi’s “blue and white sky.” The imagery of the bougainvillea’s “papery 
rustle,” the sky like an “airmail pad,” and the “tickets and passes,” suggests a tidy 
correspondence between the world as recorded on paper and lived experience within the urban 
environment of the colonial capital, as the lessons of his colonial education are confirmed before 
his very eyes as he walks through the “desperately important” railway station, the “life-line of 
the country.” The description of the Emergency as merely “an accepted fact” extends this just-so 
sense of the world, and the matching of his “khaki” with that worn by the “young soldiers” 
implies an affinity with the counter-insurgency campaign. The sense of harmony conveyed by 
the entire scene -- and the consciousness of the confident young man at ease in his society that it 
figures --  relies on the minimal description of the liberation struggle, given in the preferred 
colonial idiom. The claim that “the Emergency” was “an accepted fact” attempts to conceal any 
ideological position behind a fiction of objective truth; prior to Paulina’s arrival Martin’s 
relationship with the colonial state is unexamined. In the novel as a whole, the struggle against 
colonial rule in the 1950s is neither a moral cause nor even an event characterized by exceptional 
brutality, but rather the initiating moment in a longer narrative of a violent disfiguring of Kenyan 
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society, that finds expression through decontextualized images: “the dark terror of those 
moments, the betrayal by friends, the gradual chopping off of fingers” (Macgoye, 111).
Paulina comes to Nairobi in 1956, aged 16 and with minimal education, from a rural area 
of Western Kenya, to join her husband. Early in the novel she suffers the first of her 
miscarriages, gets lost in the city alone following her discharge from hospital, is accosted by the 
police, and locked up in a cell for the night. Eventually finding her way home, Martin physically 
assaults her. Gradually she makes friends out of neighbors, through whom she learns to navigate 
city life as a young woman and from whom she learns to crochet in order to sustain a small 
income. They continue to try for a baby, without success. “Emergency” restrictions begin to be 
lifted, elections are held, and Kenyatta released, as Paulina moves away from Martin to Kisumu 
in order to complete a “Homecraft” course: “She would have an income and then, surely, as a 
grown-up person, she should have a child” (Macgoye, 46). This time apart grows into a more 
prolonged estrangement as both Martin and Paulina begin relationships with other people. Ahead 
of the Independence celebrations in December 1963, Paulina frets over “how to teach [a group of 
visiting women] the National Anthem, since their Swahili was so bad, and about the new 
flag” (Macgoye, 52). The next year, Paulina and Martin are reunited, but once again he is 
physically abusive. Estranged once more, Paulina falls pregnant by her lover Simon and gives 
birth to a healthy son, Okeyo. Her initial contentment -- “There was nothing she 
lacked” (Macgoye, 70) -- gives way as her sense of restiveness returns: “She loved him and kept 
close to him but he did not fill her life [...] she wondered if there was any end to this way of 
life” (Macgoye, 71). 
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The central event of the novel comes when police accompanying Kenyatta to the opening 
of a new hospital in Kisumu open fire on the crowd gathered in welcome along the roadside. 
Little Okeyo is shot dead: 
As they helped her into the house she glimpsed her own face in the mirror, staring now 
with grief but basically as smooth and unlined as Okeyo’s own, and wondering how 
much more one has to take, how many more years, how many desertions and deaths, 
before it could show and command respect. And as she fingered Okeyo’s face and 
clutched at his body, she saw that this too was calm and unused. The puckered skin of 
healed cuts, the bulge of a remembered burn, were not in him. Except for the little wound 
he was perfect, and that one would never go through the straining together of a healed 
wound. He would go to the earth, like herself, unperpetuated and unfulfilled. (Macgoye, 
84)
Macgoye’s style in the novel is generally plain and uncomplicated, but here she uses language in 
a number of complex and distinctive ways: describing Okeyo’s face as “unused,” the alternation 
between Okeyo as subject (“his,” “him”) and object (“this too”), and the use of Paulina’s dead 
child’s face and the wound upon it as figures for Paulina’s own experience. The passage 
expresses a sense of great anguish, but also a measure of relief that her son has been spared 
having to “go through the straining together of a healed wound.” Yet Macgoye ties mother and 
child together -- “He would go to the earth, like herself, unperpetuated and unfulfilled” -- even as 
the difference between her experience of life as a succession of “desertions and deaths” is 
marked against the ordeal of healing that Okeyo will never have to endure. This connection 
works through the descrption of the visual resemblance between Paulina’s grief-stricken face and 
Okeyo’s in death: both are “smooth and unlined.” The celebration of the state’s capacity to care 
for its citizens (the new hospital) gives way to a massacre of its most vulnerable citizens. 
Through the central tragic event of the novel, then, Macgoye figures the ordinary lives of 
working class Kenyan women in terms of the death of an innocent infant boy, calling upon the 
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kinds of tropes that support outrage for the innocent victim in such egregious acts of state 
violence and reframing Paulina’s quotidian experience within that moral economy.53
The structures of oppression encountered by Paulina alter only slightly over the course of 
the novel, and any apparent amelioration is concomitant with her personal flourishing , as she 
learns new competencies, builds social and economic relationships and gains self-knowledge, 
developments the reader is invited to think of in terms of her formation as a citizen of the new 
state.  She moves back to Nairobi and works as the housekeeper -- “general factotum” (Macgoye, 
110) -- for a liberal, affluent family, the Okelos, both of whom are involved in national politics, 
and during this period Paulina votes in national elections for the first time. Gradually she is 
reunited with Martin, her assured and outgoing approach to daily life contrasted with his 
increasingly withdrawn and sullen manner. Whereas the first part of the novel describes Paulina 
lost in the streets of Nairobi, unable to find her way home, she later confidently navigates 
prominent public institutions such as the bank and the theatre. Her photograph appears in the 
national press, held up as an exemplary figure of public-spiritedness, after she stops a fight 
among a group of street children and takes them to a snack bar for a meal. A journalist requests 
an interview, which she declines, saying she will agree only “When I have done something.” 
“She wondered what in her life she had ever expected to do. But it bore thinking 
about” (Macgoye, 142). The novel ends with Paulina, pregnant by Martin once again at 38, 
answering the questionnaire held by a nurse at the hospital about her “four or five” previous 
pregnancies and the death of Okeyo: “ ‘I am sorry,’ the woman whispered. ‘I know. I was a 
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53 Macgoye makes a related move in her description of the Entebbe hostage crisis of 1976: “Compared 
with the humdrum of every day, where most people who got killed died arbitrarily and passed into 
obscurity, here was romance and gallant sacrifice” (Macgoye, 114).
schoolgirl and we had to stand by the road’ [...] ‘Any [current] discomfort?’ ‘Nothing special. 
But a very great hope’ ” (Macgoye, 150).
A central question for any critical response to the novel concerns the symbolic connection 
between Paulina’s experience, especially her pregnancies, and the broader historical context dealt 
with by the text. The parallel between her miscarriages and the various crises of anticolonial and 
early post-independence politics that constitute the background to her young life is impossible to 
miss. My own view is that the effect of this parallel is rather to draw attention to the unsuitability 
of personifying the new nation as an aspirant young mother (as in Gikonyo’s vision of Mumbi at 
the end of A Grain of Wheat, which I read in Chapter 2) since the text repeatedly marks the ways 
in which Paulina is marginalized and excluded from a state that repeatedly fails in its 
responsibilities towards her and inflicts grievous harms upon her. Figuring the newly 
independent nation as a child or pregnancy is a familiar move in postcolonial fiction, with 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981) offering perhaps the best known example. J. Roger Kurtz 
has argued that as a woman’s text, childbirth in the novel should be thought of in metonymic, 
rather than metaphorical, relation to the nation (Kurtz, 169). This is a helpful perspective, I think, 
because it directs the reader to reflect on the ways in which the early formation of the 
postcolonial nation-state, thematized in the novel, is irreducibly gendered; the new nation both 
structures Paulina’s experience and is defined by it in Coming to Birth.
One critical reading of the novel that I find especially suggestive is that given by Joseph 
Slaughter. Slaughter reads Coming to Birth in making his argument that the Bildungsroman has 
been “part of the freight of globalization as the West has prosecuted it through colonialism, (neo)
imperialisms, international humanitarianism, and multinational consumer capitalism,” and “one 
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of the primary carriers of human rights culture” (Slaughter, 123). The novel’s “rather strict” 
adherence to the conventions of the genre results, for Slaughter, in a text that is entirely invested 
in the post-colonial nation-state as the necessary venue for the formation of the modern subject:
Although the novel acknowledges some of the obstacles to postcolonial state formation, it 
nonetheless accepts the nation-state and the state/citizen bind as inevitable and natural 
forms of the human personality’s self-expression -- as the ultimate horizon of individual 
and collective emancipation. Macgoye’s novel presents an optimistic vision of the 
commensurability of the personal and the political, narrating the progressive absorption 
of the postcolonial citizen by the once-colonial subject through the harmonization of 
individual desire and institutional state design [...] Macgoye’s novel accepts Westphalian 
modernity’s institutions as immutable and inevitable [...] Paulina’s life story thus 
becomes temporally synchronous and spatially contiguous with that of modern Kenya 
itself. (Slaughter, 126-128)
Crucial to this effect is the recurrent blurring of the line between personal experience and 
national historical events. Following Kariuki’s death, the narrator reflects that, “J.M.’s death had 
crystallised a feeling of belonging” (110). Then, when Chelagat Mutai is detained, the distinction 
between the individual and the state is ironized: “ ‘We must do something” Paulina howled at 
Martin. [He responds:] ‘Don’t shout at me. I’m not the High Court of Appeal’ ” (111).
For Slaughter, the text’s “acceptance” of the political formations he associates with the 
Bildungsroman as a genre is manifest in the staging of time and space in the novel. “Nairobi’s 
urban geography,” he writes, “becomes Paulina’s personal biography” (Slaughter, 129). He 
points out the prominent role played by newspapers and the radio in the narrative, with Paulina’s 
emergence as a responsible and active citizen signalled by her appearance in the newspaper as a 
maternal proxy for the dispossessed children she encounters fighting on the street. “If the novel 
and newspaper facilitated the individual’s imagination of belonging to a national community,” 
writes Slaughter, “they did so partly by synchronizing their readers in what Walter Benjamin 
called “homogeneous, empty time” -- the time of the modern nation state” (Slaughter, 130). The 
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novel stages time in a markedly steady, linear way, without flashback, while space is only really 
figured as an index of Paulina’s emergence as a competent citizen, gradually more and more able 
to travel and to navigate public space, where earlier in the novel she struggles to navigate even 
the small domestic space she lives in (Martin locks her inside the house at one point). The text, 
argues Slaughter, “performs the genre’s historical incorporative work of nationalizing the 
marginal subject to such effect that Paulina comes to regard the capital city and the national 
public sphere as the natural chronotopia of her own biography of citizen-
subjectivation” (Slaughter, 130). It is no surprise, by the terms of this reading, that the anti-
colonial uprising and counter-insurgency of the 1950s can figure only marginally within the text, 
since the guerrilla army and its supporters sought to dismantle the colonial project named 
“Kenya,” while the brutal colonial response to the uprising undermined in a significant way the 
liberal pretensions of many modern state institutions. The “Emergency” nevertheless forms the 
first part of an extended period of traumatic history, coincident with (one might argue figured by) 
a young and naive Paulina suffering a miscarriage and then becoming hopelessly lost in the 
modern capital.
 While I broadly concur with Slaughter’s critique of Coming to Birth, I would emphasize 
the ways in which the novel nonetheless stages gender as the central problem for postcolonial 
Kenya, and articulates, through Paulina’s tragic sensibility, a longing for a form of citizenship 
relieved of that burden. Close to the end of the novel, as Paulina tends to the Okelo household, 
the gendered division of labour is offered as a moral distinction that might also be mapped onto 
the ways in which the novel shows post-independence Kenyan society being simultaneously 
ruptured and nurtured:
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Nobody ate lunch except the children, and Paulina spent the rest of the day crocheting in 
the garden. She liked doing things with her hands and enjoyed seeing good work done by 
others. Perhaps women’s work was like that - the word for creation was the same one you 
used practically for knitting or pottery. Men’s work was so often destructive -- clearing 
spaces, breaking things down to pulp, making decisions -- and how often did the 
decisions amount to anything tangible? Words in the air, pious intentions, rules about 
what not to do. She was glad that a lot of her work lay in making and mending things. 
(Macgoye, 129)
Here, repair is thematized as the flip-side of what men do under patriarchy. Gender oppression 
necessitates the feminist work of “making and mending.” One might argue that the novel 
naturalizes the kinds of essentialisms found in this passage, and designates the domestic as 
feminine and the state irreducibly masculine. Nevertheless, as Paulina wonders “how much more 
one has to take, how many more years” (Macgoye, 84), the novel surely stages in some fashion 
the desire for a different social and political order. Slaughter is right to point out that in 
Macgoye’s text, “the virtuous female citizen is rewarded with motherhood” (Slaughter, 129); 
however it is a reward that Paulina is at best ambivalent towards even as she continues to pursue 
it. The novel, like Paulina, expresses a profound weariness at the sustained violence and 
oppression that shapes life in the new Kenya, even as it ultimately remains attached to the 
independent nation-state in which its characters are determined to flourish as citizens.
II. Tajdin’s His to Keep and the pain of redress
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His to Keep (2013) is a short film, 15 minutes in length, directed by Amirah Tajdin.  I 
include a reading of this work in this chapter because it stages in a singular way a sense of being 
trapped by old modes of aspiration attached to the liberation struggle in Kenya, which feel 
incongruous when attached to the independent nation so many decades hence. The film tells the 
story of a single afternoon in which a Land and Freedom Army veteran learns the news that the 
case of Mutua and Others vs. FCO will be heard at the High Court in London. In the front room 
of a small house, an elderly gentleman sits alone. On the wall opposite his armchair, above a 
stack of books, a bottle of liquor, a china tea set and a vase of red roses, hangs a framed black 
and white photograph of six young men with guns, perhaps in a forest. The paintwork on the 
wall is pale green and peeling. A radio report announces that the High Court in London has 
rejected the UK government’s argument that liability for abuses committed by colonial 
authorities in the 1950s should pass to the successor Kenyan government, and that there is indeed 
a case to answer. His telephone rings, and a woman’s voice says “I always knew this day would 
come. Finally we can…” He interrupts: “I lived to see it, but I’m crying tears of pain, not joy. It 
was never meant to be like this. Njeri, it was…” “I know,” she interjects. “Don’t hurt yourself 
with words. I’ll come round later.” He hangs up, settles back in his chair and gazes for a moment 
at the photograph on the wall. A shot outside the house, a leafy green hillside. Inside, we then see 
an unframed photograph of Martin Luther King Jr. delivering a speech, tacked to the wall 
beneath a red plastic clock stopped at 4 o’clock. He lights the stub of a roll-up cigarette, his 
hands shaking. Stubbing it out, we hear the opening bars of Robert Johnson’s “Drunken Hearted 
Man,” as he pulls himself to his feet with a cane and walks slowly into the bedroom, where a 
guerrilla uniform hangs on a nail by the open closet. I’m a drunken hearted man / my life seem so 
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misery / I’m the drunken hearted man / my life seem so misery / And if I could change my way of 
livin’ / it would mean so much to me. Another shot of a framed photograph, this time an infant in 
black and white. Shirtless and stout, he shaves with great care, shaping a goatee. We glimpse a 
young woman’s photograph, also black and white and gold-framed, on a doily by his bedside. 
The many gaps in the dialogue are filled with silences, but also with Robert Johnson’s voice, the 
sounds of cicadas, and of nearby cows. He pulls on the uniform, putting on a navy blue beret and 
buttoning up the heavy looking grey overcoat with its gold-trimmed epaulettes, then sits on the 
bed, clutching his cane with an unsteady hand. 
A cut takes us into his memory, a hazy shot that becomes clearer, his younger self in that 
same grey coat sheltering in a gloomy house. A young woman enters. “Thank you, Njeri,” he 
says. “You guys are okay in the forest?” she asks him. “They say the homeguards are raping the 
women.” “Fucking assholes,” he shouts. “This is why we’re out there. This is why… And my 
wife?” “It’s just me here,” she says, they stare at each other helplessly, and we return to the 
present. He kisses his fingers and gently lays them across the woman’s face in the photograph. 
“Drunken Hearted Man” swells back up, and the camera lingers on the photograph as he walks 
slowly from the room. Retrieving a small brown paper package, from a poorly-lit corner, he goes 
out into his garden, sits down on the grass, opens the package and unfolds the Kenyan flag 
inside. He approaches what we now see is a flagpole in the corner of the garden. A red Land 
Rover approaches up a dirt track. It is late in the afternoon. An elderly woman in a white 
headscarf and knitted sweater gets out of the Land Rover and walks towards him. The driver, a 
younger man, waits at the wheel. She calls his name, “Wamiti!” He responds, “Njeri, hello,” 
without turning from the flagpole as he fiddles with the rope. Both stand with their backs to the 
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camera. “She was also my sister,” she tells him. “I lost her too. She blamed me for supporting 
you and your comrades. I had no one. You had your brothers in the forest. Who was I with? I was 
alone. You’re not the only one who lost loved ones.” He turns to face her. “The night she left she 
told me she’d always love you, but couldn’t risk having her son, your son, growing up afraid for 
his life every day amidst all that violence and pain.” “We all make mistakes,” he responds. “I 
know that now. I’ve known for a while. In my youth I thought fighting for my country would 
bring me freedom, all it brought me was a life sentence of loneliness.” By this time the driver has 
joined Njeri, and stands by her, listening. “Everybody turned against me. My wife. I lied to 
myself. I wasn’t a hero. I am a nobody now. I don’t even know my son, nor my grandchildren.” 
The younger man walks forward, kneels, takes his hand. “Even sons make mistakes,” he tells 
him, “Am here now.” He removes his white flat cap. “Tomorrow’s story hasn’t been told.” 
Wamiti places his hand on his son’s head: “Son. Stand up.” He turns back to the flagpole and 
hoists the flag as Njeri and his son watch in silence. “For my wife,” he says, “the only hero I lost 
in the struggle.” He salutes briefly, removes his beret and stares up at the flag. His son looks on 
behind, as Robert Johnson starts up once again: I’m a drunken hearted man / my life seem so 
misery / I’m the drunken hearted man / my life seem so misery / And if I could change my way of 
livin’ / it would mean so much to me. 
 His to Keep is a film defined by the paradoxes it presents to its viewer. The inaugural 
event, the news of the arrival of a long-awaited measure of justice and recognition for the victims 
of colonial crimes (or at least the possibility of this), is met not with gladness (“joy”), nor even 
relief, but with sorrow and “pain.” The comfort Njeri eventually offers Wamiti takes the form of 
her admonishing him for exceptionalizing his personal suffering, despite the relative security 
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afforded him as a man, and reuniting him with his son. While the film certainly centres the male 
veteran and his experiences -- devoting the bulk of its 15 minutes span to Wamiti, inhabiting his 
memories, and depicting the small details of his intimate home life -- it also foregrounds those 
whose absence from his life is most keenly felt, by lingering on the old photographs of his 
former comrades, and (especially) his estranged wife and child. Tajdin’s narrative is structured 
around Wamiti, then, but in a manner that stages the lone male veteran not as a figure of power 
and authority, but rather an isolated figure trapped by loss, pain, vulnerability, and defined by his 
failure to come to terms with these experiences. 
The blues refrain Tajdin intersperses throughout the film, of which we hear only the 
opening verse, expresses both despondency and a profound longing for a transformation in the 
conditions of everyday life. The singer’s senses are dulled -- “drunken hearted” -- and the claim 
he makes about his suffering is curiously indefinite: “seems so misery” (my emphasis) rather 
than “is so misery.” However, the succeeding claim is unambiguous: “if I could change my way 
of livin’ / it would mean so much to me.” This vacillation between certainty and lingering 
ambiguity is matched by the slippage between the speaker’s identification of himself as first “a 
drunken hearted man” and then “the drunken hearted man,” both a singular and generic figure. 
The film invites the viewer to puzzle out the relation between the refrain and Wamiti. It is never 
quite clear where the music is coming from -- the radio, perhaps, or the inside of Wamiti’s head, 
or somewhere else entirely. In the remainder of the song, the speaker laments having left his 
mother’s home, the death of his father, and his weakness for “no-good women” to which he 
attributes his personal ruin; however in the film only the first verse is played, repeatedly. It 
serves then, to thematize a sense of sorrow, helplessness, and the longing for a profoundly 
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different mode of life, as well as the blurring of the lines between personal and collective 
experience.
 The most complex and suggestive moment in His to Keep comes at the very end, when 
Wamiti articulates his grief at the loss of his wife by repurposing the paraphernalia of 
nationalism and the liberation struggle. He hoists the Kenyan flag in his garden and salutes it, 
clad in his carefully preserved Land and Freedom Army uniform. He names this as an act of 
tribute to a wife, who left him in order to protect their son and opposed his joining the struggle. 
Wamiti reimagines their estrangement in terms of martyrdom, and his wife as “the only hero I 
lost in the struggle.” Just prior, Wamiti laments what he now regards as the naivety of his 
younger self, in fighting for a freedom which never arrived but brought only “a life sentence of 
loneliness.” Despite these regrets and his profound disillusionment, he can dispense with neither 
his uniform nor the national flag that figures this elusive freedom. The film stages Wamiti’s 
inability to find fresh terms through which to reflect upon, and mourn, the prolonged experience 
of suffering and loss, except those provided by the institutions of the anticolonial struggle on the 
one hand and Kenyan nationalism on the other, even as he dwells upon -- perhaps even embodies 
-- their disappointments. In making a nationalist tribute to his estranged wife, he only underlines 
the ways in which the terms of family and nation are at odds. His wife’s conscious decision to 
value their son’s wellbeing over the aspirations of the liberation struggle, and to act accordingly, 
make the saluting of the flag a singularly incongruous form of tribute. The return of his son, far 
more than the news from the High Court in London, has offered some sense of comfort, as he 
tells Wamiti, “tomorrow’s story hasn’t been told.” Yet the moment of legal redress, of colonial 
power held belatedly accountable, is figured in His to Keep as a moment when the inadequacy of 
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the Kenyan national project, in relation to the personal anguish and loss suffered in fighting 
against colonial rule, is felt most keenly, a disjuncture rendered still more tragic by the continued 
attachment of the freedom fighter to aspirations he no longer believes in.
III. Re-imagining freedom for Kenya: Owuor’s Dust
In 2015 I was fortunate to interview Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor about her first novel, Dust (2014). 
Towards the end of our conversation, she explained to me that what hopes she sustains for her 
country’s future take the form of imagining not freedom for “Kenya” per se, but for “lots of little 
Kenyas” (Ross, 2015). The desire she expressed was for different Kenyas to thrive, diminutive 
and proliferating, new formations uncoupled from the unitary state and the grand national project 
of “pulling together” that has responded so poorly to problems of social difference.54 The phrase 
has stayed with me through subsequent re-readings and reflections upon Dust. Like Coming to 
Birth and His to Keep, Owuor’s novel prominently thematizes constructions of the nation. 
Coming to Birth, a text that moves between Nairobi and Kisumu, broadly accepts the nation state 
as the framework for personal flourishing, while His to Keep stages the inadequacy of Kenya, in 
its post-independence articulation, in meeting the aspirations of those who fought for freedom. 
Owuor’s novel distinguishes itself in a number of ways. Dust narrates the nation from its 
territorial periphery, the Northern Frontier District, as well as Nairobi, with a plot structured 
around an unsolved missing person case that confounds state police officials and disorders their 
lives over decades. It includes a sympathetic portrayal of a home-guard turned caring father, a 
digger of mass graves who is later the victim of torture (Nyipir).  If Owuor’s text offers the most 
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54 One might think of Owuor’s phrase in relation to long-standing public debates in Kenya concerning 
“majimboism,” the term commonly used to denote the devolution of political power to regional authorities. 
She did not cite majimbo in our conversation.
searching critique of the Kenyan national project, and marks it as part of the inheritance (or 
perhaps “legacy”) of colonialism with which she ultimately refuses to come to terms, it does so 
by staging temporality in a fashion that renders any linear account unviable. In this way, the 
novel stages an important insight within recent Black feminist thought. Scholars such as 
Christina Sharpe (2016) have insisted on attending to the ways in which structures of oppression 
and catastrophic events continue to constitute contemporary Black experience, and refuted the 
kind of rigid historical periodization that draws clear distinctions between past and present. In 
developing her concept of “the orthography of the wake,” Sharpe cites Toni Morrison’s Beloved 
(1987): “everything is now. It is all now” (Morrison, 198, cited in Sharpe, 41).55 In a similar way, 
the past goes on in the present configured by Owuor’s fiction.
 The 1950s constitute an originary moment for Dust -- this is as far back as the narrative 
stretches -- but the novel begins during the political crisis that followed the disputed presidential 
election at the end of December 2007, that has come to be acronymized as “P.E.V.” (post-election 
violence). Like Coming to Birth and His to Keep, Dust recounts major historical events and 
political phenomena in the context of a sustained focus on the experience of a family: the 
anticolonial struggle and counterinsurgency campaign, the Shifta War of the 1960s, the long 
succession of political assassinations (especially that of Tom Mboya, a key figure in Kenya’s 
trade union movement, the formation of the Kenya African National Union and senior 
government minister after independence), and the slide towards ever more brutal, negligent and 
authoritarian government, deep corruption within the state, and political violence exacerbated by 
ethnicized politics, large numbers of internally displaced people and land hunger. All these 
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55 For a critique of ‘melancholy historicism’ see Stephen Best, “On Failing to Make the Past Present,” 
Modern Language Quarterly (2012) Vol. 73, No. 3, 453-474.
themes are woven together as a continuous and ongoing catastrophe, as they shape the lives of 
the inhabitants of the family home, Wuoth Ogik. An important difference is that whereas Coming 
to Birth is organized as a strictly chronological narrative, Dust works episodically, moving back 
and forth fluidly between the configured “present” and moments from preceding decades. This 
much more complex staging of time enables the text’s more radical response to the problem of 
the nation.
The novel begins on the day of the presidential and parliamentary election. Odidi 
Oganda, a young structural engineer, is pursued and shot dead on a Nairobi street, following a 
dispute over a stolen car. A senior police officer, Petrus Keah, holds him as he dies and thinks of 
Odidi’s father. His sister, Ajany (a sculptor), returns from Brazil and recovers his body from the 
morgue: “she shifts her body to stare at a beige coffin, habitat of the new and unquiet dead on a 
day when distorted election results will set a bucolic country afire” (Owuor, 18). Together with 
their father, Nyipir, they fly Odidi back to Wuoth Ogik, the family home in the Northern Frontier 
District, where Akai, mother of Odidi and Ajany, awaits them: 
The past’s beckon is persistent. From the air, Nyipir peers down at an expanding abyss. 
His country, his home, is ripping itself apart. Stillborn ballot revolution. These 2007 
elections were supposed to be simple, the next small jump into a light-filled Kenyan 
future. Everything had instead disintegrated into a single, unending howl by the nation’s 
unrequited dead. This country, this haunted ideal, all its poor, broken promises. Nyipir 
watches, armpits damp. A view of ground-lit smoke. Dry lips. His people had never set 
their nation on fire before. (Owuor, 24)
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The figure of “the past’s beckon” chimes with Ajany’s earlier reflection on the “two sides of the 
world” --  Before-now” and “But now” (Owuor, 21) -- and the two successive sections of the 
third chapter that begin: “Today is the day after last night” and “Today, the day after last 
night” (Owuor 42-43). This marking of time, repeatedly specifying the present’s connectedness 
to both the immediate past and to the longue durée, is a recurrent feature of the novel, especially 
in the early part, and is an aspect of the way the national political crisis is narrated in terms of a 
family bereavement -- “the new and unquiet dead” -- and the connection is insisted upon 
between the present crisis and the longer history of “his country, his home.” 
By contrast, Owuor’s narration of futurity is structured by the choric question, scattered 
innumerably throughout the novel, and frequently italicized: “What endures?” The plenitude of 
different answers that ensue demonstrates the impossibility of responding in terms of any single 
category of object or experience, as in this sequence early in the text: “A disappearing mother, 
heaving silences, and the desire to vomit out anguish” (Owuor, 47), “A father sighing Aiee! 
Talkative shadows, crumbling walls, scent of dung and dream, reflections of long-ago clattering 
of polished Ajua stones falling into a brown wooden board of fourteen holes; the lives of cows, 
sheep, goats and camels, three mangy beige-and-black descendants of a fierce mongrel herding 
dog with a touch of hyena. What endures? Elastic time [...] What endures? Surprise. It is also a 
question mark” (Owuor, 47-49). In Owuor’s terms time imagined as a rigid object may exist but 
does not last, does not endure -- unlike that form of time which expands, contracts, snaps back 
upon itself, holds things in place, shapes itself according to whatever it surrounds. Near the end 
of the novel, once again, “What endures? Silence [...] What endures? Starting again” (Owuor, 
361-362). Through the repeated posing, and grappling with, this question of “what endures,” 
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Owuor’s text thematizes its orientation toward the future, even as a great deal of the novel works 
by staging the continuation of the past in the present.
 Ajany mourns her brother at the family home, Wuoth Ogik, with her mother and 
father. There are glimpses of the past -- her memory of Nyipir teaching her how to fire a gun as a 
child (Owuor, 59), a black and white photograph on the mantelpiece of “a man on horseback 
carrying a crooked Kenyan flag -- her father, Nyipir Oganda” (Owuor, 50) -- but the histories of 
the house and its inhabitants unfurl slowly through the text and in the early pages a great deal 
goes unexplained. The physical details of Wuoth Ogik are described in depth: “coral tints that 
darkened as the light’s mood shifted. Colored tiles, mostly brown. Walls of termite-mound soil, 
wood mixed and crushed coral” (Owuor, 72). However, there are few indications of why the 
house was built and by whom, how such a grand house, with its large library, came to be at such 
a remote place. 
A middle-aged white man, Isaiah Bolton, arrives at the house exhausted, requesting to 
speak with Odidi. Following the death of his elderly mother, Selene, Isaiah is searching for his 
father, Hugh Bolton, whose signature he soon discovers on the papers and books in the library. 
Hugh and Selene, we learn, came to Kenya in 1950. His attempts to become a vintner are 
thwarted by flooding, and when the “new favourite dinner topic: Mau Mau” emerges, Hugh 
enlists with the colonial security forces. The colonial perspective on the 1950s struggle is 
narrated in the first part of the novel from Selene’s perspective, desperately lonely and homesick, 
having suffered a miscarriage: “I want… to belong to something real, like truth. Erase unspoken 
things, like Hola -- a work camp where an unnamed man goes berserk and pounds eleven 
inmates into pulp. Men are redeployed, Hugh one of those. Why? Silence” (Owuor, 103). As so 
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often the case in fiction in which this crisis figures, major events are recounted secondhand, at a 
distance, with little detail. As in A Grain of Wheat (1967), the Hola massacre is an important 
historical marker in narrating the counterinsurgency. Like Ng!g"’s Thompson, Hugh is 
implicated in the massacre at Hola, and this history is juxtaposed with descriptions of his office 
filled with papers. He is another dedicated reader who bears responsibility for the atrocity 
through which the counterinsurgency came to be defined, and which arguably precipitated its 
conclusion. Selene, however, is no colonial zealot and is deeply ambivalent about the conflict. 
When the police station in Naivasha is raided, she reflects: “Good [...] About time. Hit the 
installations. Make it a real insurrection so I can go home” (Owuor, 102). 
Nyipir’s memories from the period -- “Memories are ghosts,” we read repeatedly 
(Owuor, 123, 125) -- are juxtaposed with those of Selene. An attempt to go to Burma to join his 
father and brother fighting there is thwarted, and he moves from one gruesome job to the next, 
beginning as a digger of secret mass graves, then a homeguard, and after independence he helps 
put down secessionist forces in the Shifta War (for which he receives a formal “Head of State 
Commendation,”) before joining the police unit tasked with preventing livestock rustling 
(Owuor, 124). Like Ng!g" ’s Karanja, Nyipir is loyal to colonial power; however his character is 
more nuanced -- both the tender father he became and the hapless young butcher he once was -- 
as opposed to Karanja, who is never shown as anything other than craven and self-serving. The 
young Nyipir’s “vulturing” work -- making “bodies disappear for the Crown, and anyone else 
who paid for it” -- renders him an ambivalent figure, at once an essential witness to atrocities, a 
victim of circumstance and colonial coercion, and a busy functionary within the colonial 
apparatus: 
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He did not yet understand the state of the nation, or that interrogation units were 
generating far too many bodies for one man to bury alone under the blanket of night. 
Bodies in gunia leaked liquids into the ground, over his hands, the stench of invisible 
human beings, smashed up and nameless, lowered into grounds that he then leveled 
(Owuor, 167).
The language and images of Nyipir’s trauma supplant any conscious political meaning to his 
actions. He is ordered around by a colonial officer, “a fierce son of a struggling empire,” who has 
him retrieve corpses from a hut after it proves impossible to torch it: “So this was war? Nyipir 
had pressed his face into the soil and screamed until he blacked out” (Owuor, 169-170). Later in 
the novel, when he recounts to Galgalu his experiences working for Hugh as a homeguard, 
Nyipir says simply: “We hunted men [...] This kind of thing does not end right”:
Silence. Yet in Nyipir’s mind, turbulence. Scarred memories of a patriot with a wire 
around his scrotum that would be pulled at another man’s whim, for the sake of the 
nation. Rotting in state dungeons. Losing faith, in God, in men, in country. (Owuor, 271)
Is Nyipir remembering his experience as a torturer or as a victim of torture? The ambiguity here 
sustains both possibilities. “Nation,” “state” and “country” can apply equally well to either the 
colony or independent Kenya. “No,” he reflects, extending his earlier thought that the 
counterinsurgency could not “end right,” “he had never imagined intimate casualties, had never 
thought his only son would die before him in these nameless wars” (Owuor, 271). The historical 
and political differences that conventionally distinguish between different mid-20th century 
conflicts in Kenya are elided in the work of Nyipir’s memory; he calls these “nameless” as a way  
of thinking of them in a generic way as wars “for the sake of the nation.”
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 The assassination of Tom Mboya is narrated as the definitive event in Nyipir’s life and 
specifically in his relation to the national project. The crisis that ensued is described 
unambiguously as a continuation of the violence of the 1950s:
Nyipir had lost his Kenya on July 5, 1969, in Nairobi, when Tom Mboya was 
assassinated. The murder was the culmination of fears, swirling rumors, the meaning of 
clandestine oaths that made the rest of the country enemy territory to be owned. It was 
the purpose of the silences that had started before [...]
Tom. Mboya. 
His heart had slowed down, and he collapsed with his disintegrating national 
dreams.
Then.
It is a lie, Nobody would kill Tom. Nobody would dare kill Tom, because it means 
they would be willing to kill Kenya [...]
This death created a fissure in the nation, as if it had split apart its own soul. The funeral 
cortege was more than two kilometers long. A wailing nation lined up on three hundred 
kilometers of road to touch the passing hearse. In the silence of everything else, in the 
farce of a trial, a man named Njenga, who had fired the gun, cried, Why pick on me? Why 
don’t you ask the big man? Before he could suggest much more, Njenga was hanged.
After Mboya, everything that could die in Kenya did, even schoolchildren 
standing in front of a hospital that the Leader of the Nation had come to open. A central 
province was emptied of people who were renamed cockroaches and “beasts from the 
west.” But nobody would acknowledge the exiles or citizens who did not make it out of 
the province before they were destroyed. Oaths of profound silences -- secret shots in a 
slithering civil war.
 Days later cholera danced violently across the landscape, dragging souls from 
that earth, pressing dessicated bodies deep under the earth. 
No words.
Under the trance of fear, a nation hid from the world. Inside its doors ten thousand 
able-bodied citizens died in secret. Some were buried in prison sites, and others’ bones 
were dissolved in acid. 
Nyipir knew.
He saw.
He did not speak.
He hoped it would end soon.
Just like the others who had also seen, he told no one. 
A hundred, and then a hundred more, herded into holding houses. 
Picked up -- taken from homes, offloaded from saloon cars, hustled from offices, 
stopped  on their way to somewhere else -- prosecuted, and judged at night. Guilty, they 
were loaded onto the backs of lorries. And afterward, lime sprinkled corpses were heaped 
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in large holes dug into the grounds of appropriated farms. Washed in acid, covered with 
soil that became even more crimson, upon which new forests were planted.
After Mboya, Kenya’s official languages: English, Kiswahili, and Silence. There 
is also memory. (Owuor, 271-273).
Here, Owuor’s fictionalizing of history is especially rich in the kinds of detail one might expect 
to find in historical scholarship: dates, locations, a paradigmatic historical event, the specific 
language used by Njenga. However, as a work of fiction the text is able to make particularly 
complex figurative claims, such as the inclusion of “Silence” as a national language after Mboya, 
probably the line in the novel that has been quoted by critics more than any other in its short life 
so far. This represents the culmination of the thematization of silence in this passage: “the 
silences, that had started before,” “the silences of everything else,” Njenga’s hanging which 
silences him, the “oaths of profound silence” (the best known oath among the Land and Freedom 
Army and the British pseudogangs was “if I speak, may this oath kill me,”) and Nyipir’s failure 
to testify to what he had seen: “He saw. / He did not speak.”
What does it mean to think of silence as an “official language” of the Kenyan state, in the 
wake of Mboya’s murder ? A language in which one might be educated, a language with cultural 
and institutional standing, through which the citizens of Kenya are supposed to express 
themselves to one another. Like Mwangi’s essay Owuor’s novel arrives at “silence” as its key 
theme for describing structural oppression in Kenya. If Mwangi theorizes the problem of gender 
in Kenya as its designation of the role of women as a form of “silence,” Owuor’s text repeatedly 
marks the production of silence, especially by the state, as fundamental to the perpetuation of 
what was once colonial violence against its citizens. Mwangi’s essay, “Silence is a Woman,” 
helps me to ask whether Owuor’s thematization of silence -- a structural effect of power on the 
social and political landscape, with an ambiguous relation to memory -- functions at some level 
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as a means of figuring the problem of gender in the novel. Women in Dust are not state actors. 
All the colonists, politicians, homeguards, police officers and bureaucrats are men, and it is they 
that do the work of the state, frequently figured in terms of massacres and atrocities, just as it is 
they that like Nyipir fail to speak of what they have seen. Ajany leaves Kenya as soon as she can, 
and only returns out of a sibling’s obligation following her brother’s murder. For most of the 
novel, Akai wanders in the wilderness of Kenya’s northern borderlands, her location uncertain. 
Owuor’s own text performs the work of memory, a woman’s literary discourse that counters the 
“silences” it describes. The violence said to be produced by “silence” in Dust is enmeshed with 
the patriarchal order that not only survived but gave form to the end of colonial rule in Kenya. 
Repair, if it were thinkable in Dust, would need to be a feminist project.
Like time, the novel stages place heterogeneously. Owuor introduces a small community 
of characters peopling the Northern Frontier District of the novel, among them a racist, 
anglophile Indian shopkeeper, and “the Trader,” a mystical, polyglot figure who travels around 
by camel selling assorted items, listening to the BBC World Service on his shortwave radio, 
bringing news and gossip, and selling items such as “a Chinese-made Uzi and a five-stringed 
Spanish guitar” (Owuor, 83).The Trader has four passports and has access to state ministries 
where he is somehow able to dispose of files at will. If the novel’s staging of place can be 
thought of in terms of a project of narrating “Kenya” from its geographical periphery -- the 
Northern Frontier District that remains the area of the country in which Kenyan sovereignty has 
been most in question -- it is especially through the Trader that Owuor constructs the N.F.D. as a 
place populated by people of many overlapping, heterogeneous and uncertain origins, in which 
the concept of a nation comprised of discrete ancestral “homelands” makes no sense: “He 
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suspects his father might be the old Kenyan Punjabi trader who once lived in Ethiopia, or the 
embittered illegitimate son of a murderous and psychotic Greek trader. He knows about one of 
his great-great-grandfathers on his mother’s side, a failed Arab slaver whose human cargo had 
died of dehydration in Bagamoyo, and who, to escape creditors, had fled northward until he 
collapsed and was saved by a widow whom he maried” (Owuor, 82). 
Through encounters with the Trader, pieces of Nyipir’s past are gradually revealed. 
Discussing Kofi Annan’s visit to the country, “to save Kenya,” the Trader describes a family 
burned alive in a barricaded house while neighbours looked on:
  Red glow of desert light.
 Silence made of revulsion.
 Nyipir sits very still.
 He has seen this before.
 Touched it.
 Hidden it.
His mind tumbles back to a different time, when brother, son, mother, father 
sealed family members in rooms and huts and set these alight in honor of covenants of 
terror that guaranteed silence: If I speak, may the oath kill me. Much later, the horror was 
painted over and replaced with myths of triumph, repeated, repeated again, then adorned 
in all seasons of retelling. Nyipir waited for the inheritors of these silences to call out the 
names of their undead dead. Not a word. Now, fifty years later, the murdered were 
shrieking from earth tombs of enforced, timeless stillness, wailing for their forgotten, 
chopped-up lives. They seemed to accuse every citizen inheritors of their hemorrhaging. 
Nyipir shivers, chilled. He looks over his shoulder [...] A hum in his ears, Nyipir mutters 
a confession: “Long ago, I carried Kenya’s flag. It was not so heavy then” (Owuor, 
83-84).
Both the scene of the post-election violence of the present and that of the colonial war in Kenya 
in the 1950s are given here in abstract and ambiguous terms. Who is attacking who? Who 
perpetrates “the horror” in each instance, and to what end? The italicized oath is strongly 
associated with the Land and Freedom Army, which used such oaths as an organizing technique. 
In place of political and historical context, Owuor sustains the connection between the two crises 
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by emphasizing the experiences of suffering, death and fear; it is the detachment from specific 
political explanations, and a generic quality to the violence, that rationalizes the “tumbling back” 
of Nyipir’s mind. All this hinges on the workings of Nyipir’s sensory memory -- “seen,” 
touched” -- which establish the resemblance between the different moments, times “woven from 
sorrow alone” (Owuor, 155). 
The question of Kenyan citizenship is figured directly in relation to these “forgotten, 
chopped-up lives.” To be a citizen, in Owuor’s novel, is to be a “citizen inheritor” of a broadly 
conceived patrimony of ongoing political violence. Later, the veteran senior policeman Petrus is 
described trying to escape “the re-emergence of violent memories, of doubt, of the accumulated 
voices of a thousand bleating citizen-victims” (Owuor, 183). But later in the novel we read the 
joke he tells about himself in explaining his role as state torturer in the late 1960s: “I mentor 
delinquent citizens” (Owuor, 300). “So this was nationhood?” thinks Nyipir, under Petrus’ 
torture, on the very next page (Owuor, 301). Kenya’s ongoing formation as a political 
community is figured in the text in terms of a shared experience of, and complicity in, a form of 
political violence that has a strikingly generic aspect to it. This is one significant way in which 
Owuor’s text reorders and reimagines conventional narratives of modern Kenyan history, moving 
towards a conception of a single continuous and ongoing crisis -- “our slithering civil war” -- 
rather than discrete events with highly specific causes and moral economies.
 Sick of mourning Odidi at Wuoth Ogik, Ajany returns to Nairobi: “Now she tries to 
gather her scattered selves by putting together pieces of Odidi” (Owuor, 197). Her “search” for 
the brother whose body she has just flown home exemplifies the structuring paradox of 
reparative work: the one who repairs does so in (and because of) full knowledge that the task is 
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impossible. Hers is a “perpetual remarking of default” (Sanders, 119-120). She goes to see his 
former tutor in the Department of Civil Engineering and Material Sciences, University of 
Nairobi, announcing, “I’m… uh… looking for Odidi” (Owuor, 142). He reminisces fondly over 
his time mentoring a favourite student, laments political corruption -- “we’re spawning tawdry 
thieves, hitmen, and gigolos who love nothing!’ (Owuor 145) -- and hands Ajany the business 
card for the Tich Lich engineering firm he understands Odidi to be working for. Visiting the 
company’s offices, she learns the salient details of Odidi’s young career: 
A time in the life of Kenya when the long and short rains failed. El Niño. Odidi had 
chased after a contract for the nation’s dams. He had lobbied, argued, and dazzled [...] A 
week later, Odidi, as chief engineer, received top-secret instructions to silt the dams. 
Contract to “service the turbines” -- in other words, render them incapable of delivering 
power to the public [...] A few days later, the managing director was on national 
television, showing journalists how low the levels of water in the dam had fallen. In 
sorrowful tones he announced an imminent power-shortage emergency and the 
enforcement of a power-rationing plan. As if by coincidence, obsolete diesel generators 
from Europe and Asia happened to be aboard cargo ships on their way to Kenya. They 
would take care of the shortfall in power at 3,000 percent above the usual cost. A 
company to administer the supply of power from these generators had already been 
registered. Tich Lich had been contracted to install and service the equipment (Owuor, 
160-161).
The broader resonance of a project of “delivering power to the public” being scuppered by 
private elite interests scarcely requires elucidating as an exemplary neo-colonial event. Odidi 
alone objects, addressing a letter to the government minister headed “Acts of Treason Against the 
People and Nation of Kenya,” then writing to the newspapers, but all such efforts are 
stonewalled: “Some NGOs he visited made the right sympathetic noise but emphasized to him 
that AIDS, women, malaria, girl children and boreholes were priorities” (Owuor, 163). His 
mortgage is recalled and he is evicted from his house, can find no lawyer willing to represent 
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him against the state, and is harassed by the police for “loitering.” His car is stolen, and he is 
murdered by police in attempting to retrieve it. 
Odidi’s refusal to participate in state corruption sees him immediately ejected from the 
propertied elite he had briefly begun to join, the only constituency represented and protected by 
the state. His insistence on responsible citizenship places him instead among the urban 
unemployed against whom the state directs its violence in the form of policing. Near the end of 
the novel, Ajany tells her father “that the stupid state did not have the capacity to grasp Odidi’s 
vision and had destroyed him” (Owuor, 287). In Macgoye’s Coming to Birth, Paulina’s personal 
struggles correspond with political crises at the national level, but ultimately her development as 
a citizen-subject is not at odds with a state that basically seeks to act rationally in accordance 
with its modernizing presumptions, recognizes her citizenship, affords her political participation, 
provides a measure of care and support so long as she is able to make herself legible by correctly 
filing paperwork. Odidi, a central figure in Dust, is in a quite different position: his commitment 
to citizenship not only exceeds but runs counter to the character of the Kenyan state, which 
Owuor figures unambiguously as the primary obstacle between the people of Kenya and 
“power.” Likewise, the state bureaucracy in Dust is no rational, progressive system; it structures 
citizens’ time merely to impose interminable delays upon them, as when the cop Ali Dida Hada 
submits his application for a transfer back to Nairobi: “His supervisor nodded, scribbled notes 
and sent his application into a large room stacked with other dusty, pending-for-action 
documents” (Owuor, 234).
 The remainder of the novel narrates the past and present entanglements of Ajany’s family 
with Isaiah’s. As Ajany searches for her dead brother, Isaiah comes to Nairobi in search of his 
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father. Both cases turn on the two senior policemen, Petrus and Ali Dida Hada. Petrus is a 
veteran enforcer and torturer, serving successive Kenyan governments. Part of his staying power, 
we learn, can be put down to a form of ethnic ambiguity afforded him by his having become 
fully circumscribed under the sign of colonial military power: “His name, Keah, derived from the 
acronym for the King’s African Rifles -- KAR -- blurred access to the place of origin. Petrus was 
hard to place. There were Keahs of every Kenyan ethnicity. Petrus had been born in Nairobi. In 
the blood-hunt season of 1969, “Tribe Unknown” was a lucky thing to be” (Owuor, 310). Able to 
himself elude any fixed point within the politics of ethnicity, Petrus’ role as an enforcer of state 
violence is unaffected by the end of colonial rule. His friend, Ali Dida Hada, was assigned the 
missing persons case of Hugh Bolton, a mystery he never solved but which came to consume his 
life as he became infatuated with Akai Lokorijom, mother of Ajany and Odidi. 
Ajany and Isaiah begin a relationship. Isaiah eventually learns that Hugh is not in fact his 
father. This undoes any suspicion that the narrative will be resolved or authorized by the problem 
of the absent figure of the white father. Hugh attempted to attack Akai over the loss of their two 
young children, and was shot dead by Nyipir. Akai and Nyipir then buried him in a cave, and in 
order to stave off curiosity they “plant new myths about Wuoth Ogik [...] It was an aborted 
mission base. The disappointed priest had gone back to Europe [...] In Kenya’s pre- and early 
post-independence days, anything was believable. And a story repeated often enough become 
fact” (Owuor, 351). Towards the end of the novel, Akai returns to Wuoth Ogik once again. 
Owuor’s distinctive style, which breaks frequently into sequences of short lines, is most elliptical 
in writing Akai, whose presence distorts any linearity or settled temporality within Owuor’s 




Ajany watches her mother’s silhouette merge with the vast darkness in a slow-
flow dance. On a distant hill, a pinprick of firelight. It wavers. She watches until time -- 
or something like time -- becomes seeing. After that, there is more waiting” (355).
The relation between time, space and experience is always in question in Dust. Here, the 
description of the figure of the mother within the landscape, the landscape’s absorption of the 
mother, prompts the narration of time in terms of sight, and the marking of a doubt about the 
form of temporality being described -- “something like time.” What might be some of the 
broader implications to be drawn from the novel’s staging of time and space as so uneven and 
contingent? How might a reader think about these configurations in relation to Slaughter’s 
critique of Coming to Birth as a text whose spatial and temporal imagination corresponds too 
closely with that of “the modern nation state?”
The novel’s ending must be central to any consideration of this question of the text’s 
staging of space and time in relation to the nation. The novel ends with the family leaving Wuoth 
Ogik, and burning it to the ground. As “home,” Wuoth Ogik occupies a great deal of space in the 
novel, accreting layers of meaning such that by the time it is set ablaze it has been vividly 
overdetermined. Early in the novel, Ajany identifies “Wuoth Ogik’s enchantment with silence” 
as the reason her brother “fled” from the place, the home serving to obscure the family history 
they longed to understand. “Secrets” and “silence” are woven into the structure itself. Its primary 
figurative meaning is as the dwelling whose order, and the objects it holds, is metonymic at the 
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level of the family for the inheritance of the colonial state apparatus -- what colonial bureaucrats 
thought of in terms of a “legacy”:
There were houses like this everywhere. Homes taken from colonial-era owners. After the 
new owners moved in, old, misunderstood household goods -- books, artwork, and 
cutlery -- were left untouched to gather dust or quietly decompose with everything else. 
Nobody asked why or how” (Owuor, 215). 
As the richly exoticized site of learning, seduction, rest, child-rearing, privilege, both during 
colonial rule and since, Wuoth Ogik can be read as a figure for many of the different forms of 
desire animating colonial life. Central to this is the library from which Ajany and Odidi derive a 
colonial education as the grounds for fashioning themselves as good citizens for the independent 
Kenya: 
Memories of long, flickering shadows pouring out of nooks, seduced by naked firelights. 
A rough shelf laden with the weight of Someone Else’s Baudelaire, George Sand, Charles 
Dickens, the Brontës, Carle Vernet, Flaubert, encyclopedia, and books on engineering, 
empire, and agriculture. Books on flowers, trees, birds, animals, and hunting. Jack 
London’s Call of the Wild. One black-leather covered Holy Bible. Ajany can select a 
book and name it by smell alone. 
Musty-earthy: The Flowers of Kenya.
Fingers run across book spines.
Tactile familiarity. (Owuor, 53)
Much later, Akai explains her desire for Hugh to Ajany: “But he read me things from his books. 
He showed me how to feel his music. Eyes shut, memory resurrects strains of what she cannot 
name as Chopin’s Nocturne in E minor. She sways with the sounds of that past. This is what I 
wanted” (Owuor, 344). The novel thus describes Wuoth Ogik both in terms of (on the one hand) 
stasis, decay, a rigid adherence to an old order that inhibits the formation of new ways of living, 
of inhabiting the space, while on the other hand it is eroticized as an object of great nostalgia, the 
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intimate home that also contains (or once contained) all the promise of colonial education and 
“high” European culture, the knowledge and pleasure found in the library’s varied canon. Odidi 
mails Hugh Bolton’s copy of the Engineer’s Field Guide to Isaiah, and Hugh’s name written on 
the inside page inspires Isaiah to seek the “father” he never knew. This volume, freighted with 
white paternal authority, is also the inspiration for Isaiah’s studies and career as an engineer, his 
(it turns out impossible) aspiration of “delivering power to the public” (Owuor, 160).
 Excavating the meaning of the name, Juliane Okot Bitek writes: “Wuoth Ogik, the central 
home in Dust signifies the end of the journey, home, where wuoth gik, where all the walking and 
running and struggle to be, stops [...] How long Wuoth Ogik can remain the home depends on a 
number of things, much of which is dictated by how history plays out on a familial level as well 
as the national level” (Okot Bitek). Wuoth she translates as “to wander.” Hugh had built the 
house and requested a name for it -- “Something civilized” -- to which Nyipir, exhausted from 
years of travel suggests Wuoth Ogik, translates it for Hugh as “The journey ends” (Owuor, 316). 
Both translations are helpful, Nyipir’s with its emphasis on a singular journey ending, and Okot 
Bitek’s broader sense of “all the walking and running and struggle to be.” The home is a place of 
rest, of achievement, but that sense of relief carries with it the idea of stasis, of being fixed in 
place. During a fight with Ajany, Isaiah taunts her sarcastically: “The house. Keeping it up is not 
really your family’s forte [...] Will you build apartments there? Lay foundations for another 
African slum?” (Owuor, 230).
Ultimately, the family resolves to leave Wuoth Ogik, and not merely leave it, but set it 
ablaze: “Ajany and Isaiah are the last to leave Wuoth Ogik. They leave so the fire burning down 
the house can finish its work. The house glows. Resin-infused flames. Everything -- wood, 
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books, art, chairs, memories -- turns to ash” (Owuor, 363). David Scott has described a key trope 
in figuring the post-colonial nation-state as “a redemptive home [that constitutes] an integral 
aspect of a world-historical answer to the moral-political question about the harms of 
colonialism” (Scott 2014, 806). I read the ending of Dust as an attempt to imagine forms of 
political and social life unencumbered by the principle of the unitary Kenyan nation-state as 
home, as the necessary and central structure in articulating a future beyond coloniality. It needs 
to be left, burned down, walked away from, precisely because it has failed to provide a 
satisfactory form of redress for colonial harms. Even as the novel repeatedly marks the crucial 
role of memory in mitigating the harms of “silence,” the imaginative shift Owuor’s fiction makes 
is a movement from an ending -- the death of Odidi and the mourning that follows -- towards a 
beginning, the characters unmoored from the structures which keep them constantly at odds with 
the past. The novel works by staging the desire to set memory to work against the kinds of 
silences about the past that reproduce earlier state violence in the present, while at the same time 
taking seriously the longing for a radical break with the past. A conversation at the end of the 




Sounds right.” (Owuor, 357)56
 Destroying the old colonial structure, they are fixed in place neither by past terrors nor past 
hopes, but able to wander and struggle once again, and to make new forms of home. If 
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56 It is ambiguous which of these words are spoken by Ajany and which by Isaiah.
Macgoye’s Coming to Birth staged the new nation’s crises by narrating the ways in which it fails 
a young woman whose imagination is more or less circumscribed by the national project, and 
Tajdin’s His to Keep figures the inadequacy of Kenyan nationalism and old forms of anticolonial 
militancy in addressing the suffering and loss of those who fought for freedom in the present, 
Owuor’s novel leaves its reader with a narrative in which the new nation state itself is found to 
be bound up with coloniality, fated to reproduce rather than redress the violence of colonialism, 
ultimately hopeless and beyond repair in its current form. 
The novel ends ambivalently, by juxtaposing a song about leaving one’s beloved with 
images of organic and reproductive renewal. It offers two contradictory kinds of resolution, 
rebirth and estrangement of a lover from their beloved: “Within sight of what had been Wuoth 
Ogik, a spread-out acacia sprouts green life [...] The bluster of air currents flanking the country 
disturbs the quiet care of a graying midwife crouched in front of a long-limbed, panting woman 
who has just given birth to twins, who emerged with little arms entwined around each 
other” (Owuor, 365). From a tape played in a “squalid downtown bar” in Nairobi, Fadhili 
William -- a well known musician who began his career in the mid-1950s -- “croons”: “Hakuna 
mwingine zaidi yako, ni wewe, ni wewe wa maisha, moyo wangu na mapenzi yangu 
nimekuwachia...” (There’s no-one besides you, it’s you, you’re my life, my heart and my love, 
I’ve let you go…”)57
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57 I am indebted to Aditi Surie von Czechowski for this translation.
Conclusion
The complex tableau of scenes, sounds and movement with which Owuor ends Dust includes the 
figure of the newborn “twins, who emerged with little arms entwined around each 
other” (Owuor, 365). These twins can of course be read in connection with Akai’s twins (whose 
death is related earlier in the novel,) and with Ajany and Odidi, whose ordeals form the centre of 
the story. What might life hold for these newborns? Would they too find their lives blighted by 
the new nation’s inability to do other than repeat structures of violence inherited from the 
colonial state? What meaning, if any, could the seemingly momentous destruction of Wuoth Ogik 
hold for these nameless infants, linked to Ajany’s burned-out home only by the “bluster of air 
currents flanking the country.” The strikingly generic aspect of this figure ironizes Dust as a 
national allegory, posing the question of whether the departure from Wuoth Ogik really carries 
broader significance, or whether the fate of the family whose lives and historical entanglements 
feels so consequential throughout the novel is, in fact, an isolated experience whose connection 
with the rest of the society is tenuous at best. A novel that records a great deal of violence, 
trauma and loss, ends with this (for now) tranquil figure of new life, sibling love, fresh 
possibilities.
 The recurring figure of the newborn child offers one way of moving across many of the 
different texts that I’ve read in this dissertation. My project has a distinctly exploratory form, an 
open inquiry as to the kinds of critical insights concerning concepts of “Mau Mau” and repair 
can be yielded from reading different fictions. I began with two primary arguments. Firstly, I 
argued that reparations claims require narrative in order to take form and gain purchase in the 
present with regards some past harm in need of redress. Secondly, I wanted to insist on thinking 
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reparations within a “politics of freedom” (Brown) rather than an accommodationist mode of 
response that reduces collective experiences of injury to individual torts and offers a fiction of 
closure in regards harms that will nonetheless endure. One aspect of my readings that I had not 
anticipated in the early phase of organising my research was the central place of gender in 
attempting to read assorted fictions of “Mau Mau” with a focus on the theme of repair. In each 
text I studied, my examination of the ways in which the texts figured harm and notions of redress 
invariably became caught up with the question of gender, and moreover with a thematic 
concerning the politics of reproduction in relation to coloniality. 
 On the basis of the readings contained in this dissertation, I would venture that reparation 
is best thought of as a feminist practice, for it is in this sense that the problem of finding ways of 
responding to past harms takes on its fullest and most radical possibilities. It is from a feminist 
perspective that intimate as well as spectacular forms of injury, the irreparable character of such 
harms, and the structural dimension to the reproduction and perpetuation of injustice comes into 
view most clearly. Much more remains to be investigated in terms of the reproductive and gender 
politics of notions of repair. This “Conclusion” offers a small beginning to such an inquiry as 
much as an ending to the dissertation. What does it mean to think of repair as a feminist practice? 
And why do figures that seem to express diverse questions about a politics of reproduction in the 
aftermath of social catastrophe continually surface as concluding motifs in fictions that narrate 
forms of irreparable harm? Finally, to return to a question I have tried to sustain throughout the 
project, and which certainly drives the first two chapters in particular: how can literary texts 
supplement our understanding of reparations claims made in the legal context through witness 
testimony, and how might they do this, specifically, in terms of how they stage gender?
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 Macgoye’s novel stages the new nation through a narrative centred on Paulina’s efforts to 
have children. Read allegorically, the nation coming into view is evaluated according to its 
capacity to sustain Paulina’s pregnancies and support care for her and her children. Whatever 
hope for reconstruction or renewal can be found at the end of A Grain of Wheat resides in 
Gikonyo’s resolution to “carve a woman big -- big with child” (Grain, 280). As in Owuor’s text, 
the optimistic potential of the image sits rather awkwardly at the tail-end of a narrative that 
records the tragic repetition of patterns of injury and loss across multiple generations. This child, 
narrated as a figment of Gikonyo’s hospital bed imagination, can be read as an alternative to the 
recurring imagery of wounds and woundedness, in terms of how the novel figures futurity for 
those on the Thabai ridge. Whereas the wound specifies primarily an individual experience of 
violation and trauma, the figure of the newborn more readily denotes an orientation toward the 
future that is irreducibly collective, social. The prospect of Gikonyo and Mumbi having a child 
together -- as well as Gikonyo’s belated acknowledgment of Mumbi’s child by Karanja -- 
constitutes the limit of the text’s narration of the “Mau Mau” crisis as generative. As in Dust, the 
hopeful promise of this successor generation is a highly precarious one, yet it nonetheless opens 
up a dimension of the novel’s ending that is not fully circumscribed by the tragic. Just as the 
passage of injuries, obligations and responsibilities passes across “intergenerational 
communities” (Thompson, xviii) -- posing a key problem for thinking repair in many contexts -- 
so too the births in these novels announce the appearance of such an intergenerational 
community, and with it the possibility of a level of recuperation, recovery, improvement. The 
survival and reproduction of the very community colonial power sought to torture and 
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exterminate might be considered a thwarting of colonialism’s totalizing violence. Despite 
everything “Mau Mau” life, and the possibility of freedom and/or further harm, goes on. 
 We can recall here that Ruark’s fantasy of white power in Something of Value plays out 
through the destruction of the free Black family home, the castration of the Black father, the 
penetration of the Black mother, and (most crucially) the transposition of the orphan “Mau Mau” 
infant into the white family, itself back under construction having been fragmented by “Mau 
Mau.” As Ruark narrates it, white power (colonialism) ultimately desires the unmaking of all 
forms of Black sociality, especially the family, and to pursue the civilizing mission on the 
grounds of that unmaking. Ruark’s novel, with its warped fictionalization of “the Emergency,” 
ends through the redress of losses suffered by white masculinity (Peter), in the form of the most 
literal kind of revenge -- Kimani’s head taken for Jeff’s. Repair from the white supremacist 
perspective, for the injuries (mainly imagined) of “Mau Mau,” takes the form of obliterating the 
Black family and the possibility of Black reproduction.
 How then, to think about Mutua and Others vs F.C.O., and the specific injuries at the 
centre of the case that made the demand for compensation in the most compelling way? It was 
not just extreme brutality and cruelty that was at issue. For this, the testimony and the physical 
presence of the many others like Wambugu who had suffered the routine beatings and 
exploitation within “the pipeline” might have sufficed. Rather, the claimants presented a set of 
injuries that record and exemplify the way in which colonial violence was directed against their 
reproductive capacity -- not only against them as “Mau Mau” persons but also against their place 
in a family lineage, a primary mode of orienting oneself towards futurity. “After I was castrated 
[...] I felt completely destroyed and without hope,” Nzili’s statement reads. “I could not see what 
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the future held for me, I was useless and felt genuinely that it was better for me to die” (Nzili, 7). 
“I was fighting for my land and for the future of the children and my family,” states Mutua. “The 
people who I was fighting against knew that I was fighting for this and they killed that future for 
me” (Mutua, 17). The testimony that elicited the UK’s minimal acknowledgment and 
compensation, then, had to describe not only harms inflicted on individuals, but also in a very 
specific way against the children they could never have. Both Nzili and Mutua explicitly mourn 
these unborn children. Part of the work of the legal case is to create a very public space for these 
acts of mourning. Mutua: “My children could have been doctors or lawyers but I have been 
denied the opportunity of seeing them grow up to be these things” (Mutua, 17). Nzili: “I would 
never be able to marry and have children, which is a man’s pride” (Nzili, 7). Just as one limit on 
the prospects of repair in the legal setting was the requirement that the claimants be presented as 
not, strictly speaking, “Mau Mau” proper, so too it is troubling (though perfectly understandable 
from the lawyer’s perspective) that the case had to construct the would-be subjects of 
compensation through figures we might recognize from Ruark’s twisted tableau of colonial 
victory, “Mau Mau” defeat -- the raped Black woman, the castrated Black man. 
 Literary narratives offer us other models for thinking about the politics of reproduction in 
relation to the question of repair -- and especially so in relation to “Mau Mau,” the term that sits 
somewhere between English and Gikuyu, whose function is to describe a resistance to colonial 
power the terms of which can never be fully defined and which opens, still, onto the future. What 
redress Wamiti finds in Tajdin’s film His to Keep not only takes the form of the radio bulletin 
about events at the High Court in London, but is folded into his long-awaited reunion with his 
son, who he had lost in infancy along with his wife, due to the danger his commitment to the 
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Land and Freedom Army placed them in. The more meaningful form of repair in the film is taken 
by the words of Wamiti’s adult son, who asks Wamiti to re-orient himself away from the past and 
towards the future: “Am here now. Tomorrow’s story hasn’t been told.” Like Owuor’s lovers 
trying out names for the break with the past they would like to envision for themselves (amnesia, 
exorcism, atonement), Wamiti’s son, and the other children who populate the endings of these 
fictions, insist on care in the present and future as the best available response to the irreparable 
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